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Abstract  
This research develops a Bayesian Abduction Model for Sensemaking Support (BAMSS) for 
information fusion in sensemaking tasks. Two methods are investigated. The first is the classical 
Bayesian information fusion with belief updating (using Bayesian clustering algorithm) and 
abductive inference. The second method uses a Genetic Algorithm (BAMSS-GA) to search for 
the k-best most probable explanation (MPE) in the network. Using various data from recent Iraq 
and Afghanistan conflicts, experimental simulations were conducted to compare the methods 
using posterior probability values which can be used to give insightful information for 
prospective sensemaking. The inference results demonstrate the utility of BAMSS as a 
computational model for sensemaking.  The major results obtained are: (1) The inference results 
from BAMSS-GA gave average posterior probabilities that were 103 better than those produced 
by BAMSS; (2) BAMSS-GA gave more consistent posterior probabilities as measured by 
variances; and (3) BAMSS was able to give an MPE while BAMSS-GA was able to identify the 
optimal values for kMPEs. In the experiments, out of 20 MPEs generated by BAMSS, BAMSS-
GA was able to identify 7 plausible network solutions resulting in less amount of information 
needed for sensemaking and reducing the inference search space by 7/20 (35%). The results 
reveal that GA can be used successfully in Bayesian information fusion as a search technique to 
identify those significant posterior probabilities useful for sensemaking. BAMSS-GA was also 
more robust in overcoming the problem of bounded search that is a constraint to Bayesian 
clustering and inference state space in BAMSS. 
2 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background   
In the last decade, asymmetric warfare has evolved into complex multifaceted conflicts in 
all the major trouble spots around the world. The conflicts have involved conventional armies of 
nation states against a proliferation of non-state actors that carry out sustained insurgencies 
against the superior armed forces. The end states of these insurgencies, the motivations, and 
tactics vary from one insurgency to another, introducing a level of complexity into the 
battlespace that requires military strategists to adopt new ways of thinking to cope with the 
complexities. Often, these insurgencies are nested in complex conflicts involving third and fourth 
forces (Metz, 2003) the insurgents themselves, and the regime.  
Consider the most recent military conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The adversary 
environment is known to be complex, “wicked” and completely asymmetric - the adversaries are 
barely known, and their tactics keep changing against the coalition forces. The conventional 
forces have superior weaponry, resources and manpower enabling their domination in ground 
and air maneuvers, while the adversaries have the advantage of superior terrain knowledge, no 
time constraints, and support from the local population making them dominant in guerilla 
maneuvers. The deliberate Military Decision Making Processes (MDMP) with all their linearity 
assumptions collapse immediately when they come in contact with asymmetric information 
environments. Generating courses of action must be progressive and opportunistic - the usual 
analytical models of judgment and choice that fit force-on-force tactics must be recalibrated to 
fight unknown enemies.  
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Traditionally, this kind of problem has been addressed using Boyd’s (1987) Observe, 
Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) model which cognitively aligns the battle staff’s intuitive 
estimates through a linear space of “Observing” the data, “Orienting,”  “Deciding,” and 
“Acting.”  Usually mentioned anecdotally is the sensemaking aspect of the Orient stage in the 
OODA (Breton & Rousseau, 2005). It is believed here that by improving the sensemaking aspect 
of the OODA with analytical models, the commander’s decision making could be improved 
(Munya, Trevino, & Ntuen, 2005).  
A commander must draw inferences from uncertain data, identify appropriate sequences 
of objectives and optimally assign resources to ensure their attainment (Thoms, 2003). In recent 
decades, information has been obtained by employing sensors, data fusion and communication 
systems that support inferential reduction of uncertainty in battlespaces. In the context of 
asymmetric warfare, the ability of the commander to swiftly decide to counter the enemy’s 
insurgent behavior puts more mental load on the staff and the commander owing to the quantity 
of information to be processed. Making sense of dynamic, multivariate information to establish a 
reasonable, justifiable belief about the adversary’s intent has become a hard, cognitive, analytical 
problem (Ntuen, 2009). 
As noted by Van Creveld (1985), there are four contextual processing regimes which 
influence the commander’s decisions - the organizational, operational, informational and 
inferential components. Organizationally, the commander must deal with the stratified 
hierarchical nature of the military structure at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. 
Operationally, he must have a complete understanding of the entire theater of war and the spectra 
of mapping one’s forces to counter the enemy’s plans. From an information perspective, the 
commander must align the battle staff to develop the best Courses of Action (COA) estimates 
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using the varied information available. Additionally, in making decisions, the commander must 
be able to deal with the current situations in the field and make probabilistic inferences about the 
future of the battlefield and the adversaries (Thoms, 2003). 
Given the four macro-regimes of the command space, the ability of the battle staff to 
develop a reasonable, but plausible rough estimate of the battle COA depends in part on their 
sensemaking ability under the flux of battlespace information from the many information 
generating mechanisms including humans and technology. The commander’s battle staffs, 
though aided by technology, still rely on their intuition to understand the evolving situation. This 
sensemaking process begins when both the commander and the staff assess the  battle situation 
by extrapolating their apriori knowledge onto the existing information space to understand the 
ground realities.   
1.2 Sensemaking 
Much of the epistemological discussions of sensemaking especially the adoption of the 
sensemaking construct and its impact on research paradigms, theory, and methodology, has 
occurred in the social and management circles (Weick, 1995) which have yielded most of the 
definitions of sensemaking. Weick defines sensemaking as a process involving identity, 
retrospect, enactment, social contact, ongoing events, cues and plausibility (1995).  Huber (1991) 
introduces the concept of “active agents” capable of constructing sensible and sensable events.  
From information fusion discipline, sensemaking involves putting stimuli into some kind 
of framework (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988).When people put stimuli into frameworks, this 
enables them to “comprehend, understand, explain, attribute, extrapolate and predict.” 
Sensemaking is also viewed as a thinking process that uses retrospective accounts to explain 
surprises (Louis, 1980).Thomas, Clark and Gioa describe sensemaking as the “reciprocal 
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interaction of information seeking, meaning ascription and action” (1993, p.240). Sackman 
(1991) talks about sensemaking mechanisms that organizational members use to attribute 
meaning to events, mechanisms that include the standards and rules for perceiving, interpreting, 
believing and acting that are typically used in a given cultural setting (p.33). Feldman and March 
(1988) define sensemaking as an interpretive process that is necessary for “organizational 
members to understand and to  share understandings about such features of the organization as 
what it is about, what it does well and poorly, what the problems it faces are and how it should 
resolve them.”  Ring and Rands (1989) define sensemaking as a “process in which individuals 
develop cognitive maps of their environments” (p.342). In military circles, sensemaking is 
defined as a multidimensional process of developing an operational understanding and awareness 
within a complex and evolving task domain (Leedom, 2004). 
These definitions point to sensemaking as a concept, a process or even a structural 
framework. Conceptually, sensemaking is presented in terms of principles and theories (Ntuen, 
2006). By general definition, a principle refers to an assumption, a basic truth, or law that must 
hold for an entity to be accepted as such in the field of research. As a process, sensemaking is 
defined in terms of situated (contextual) actions, informational or symbolic level of processing, 
and cognitive information processing that is mainly tacit knowledge explication. As a structural 
framework, sensemaking can be viewed as an ontological link of information from individuals or 
organizations for the purpose of discovering intrinsic values for decision making.  
Ntuen, Park, and Kim (2013) note that information is the heart of the sensemaking 
process. In cases where the required information may be completely missing, the sensemaking 
process starts with making guesses using retrospective knowledge. The information may be 
incomplete, in which case the sense-maker becomes an intuitive statistician, mentally estimating 
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and connecting dots. Finally, information may be overwhelmingly too much. For example, in 
military command and control centers, there is a multitude of sensor devices generating 
information in real-time.  
Relevant to knowledge management, Ntuen, Park, and Kim (2013) further observed three 
major characteristics of sensemaking: 
(a). Sensemaking is an aspect of information foraging: Pirolli and Card (1999) define the 
Information Foraging Theory as an approach to understanding how strategies and technologies 
for information seeking, gathering, and consumption are adapted to the flux of information in the 
environment. The theory assumes that people, when possible, will modify their strategies or the 
structure of the environment to maximize absorption of valuable information. Pirolli and Card 
(2005) note that foraging tasks consist of information gathering, representation of the 
information in a schema that aids analyses, the development of insight through the manipulation 
of this representation, and the creation of some knowledge product or direct action based on the 
insight. 
(b). Sensemaking is an information fusion tool: Sensemaking is viewed as a thinking 
process that uses retrospective accounts to explain surprises (Louis, 1980, p.241), and uses new 
information to update prospective states of a situation. Previously, Munya and Ntuen (2007) 
have used this axiom to develop an Information Fusion Model using Bayesian Information 
Updating.  
(c ). Sensemaking supports situation understanding: The overarching goal of 
sensemaking as noted by Starbuck and Miliken (1988) is information interpretation through the 
process whereby stimuli is placed into some kind of framework as a consequence of which, the 
situation is understood. Comprehending the situation supports better judgments, decisions and 
7 
 
 
actions. Klein (2006) describes sensemaking as the set of processes involved in trying to improve 
an individual’s understanding of a situation, often in response to surprise. Malhotra (2001) notes 
that by understanding a situation, we can conceptually link available information and the 
expected result or the anticipation of task outcomes. It helps us understand the gap between 
performance expectations based on information in context (Malhotra, 2001; pp. 120).  
1.3 Challenges in Fusing Information from Asymmetric Battlespace to Support 
Sensemaking 
In the asymmetric battlespace environments, the deliberate MDMP with all their linearity 
assumptions are generally deemed inadequate. COA generated must be progressive and 
opportunistic rather than contextual and analytical. While contextual and analytical models of 
judgment and choice fit force-on-force tactics, they are much less adaptable to asymmetric 
battlespaces. Sensemaking for asymmetric battlespace information management has been 
advocated by Bodnar (2005); Leedom (2004, 2005); Leedom and Eggleston (2005); Ntuen 
(2006, 2008); Klein (2006), and Good et al., (2004). Even among these researchers’, there is a 
consensus that sensemaking is anecdotal and prescriptive because it is governed by expert 
judgment and experience.  
There are also many problems and gaps in the literature with respect to developing 
analytical models to capture sensemaking. These gaps are enumerated and described below: 
(a). Asymmetric information is generally characterized with equivocation, different types of 
uncertainties, ambiguities and surprises, emerging and evolving information, and complexities, 
among others.   
(b). There is a problem of scale related to information complexity in military command and 
control (C2) organizations. For example, there are challenges in applying closed-form 
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mathematical models such as Bayesian Models to a battlespace system even at the brigade and 
lower levels mostly due to the information-handling costs. 
(c). Most analytical models lack the robustness to deal with sensemaking problems arising from 
non-crisp information.  
(d) Lack of cognitive architectures that support the ability to fuse core knowledge and use such 
knowledge in performing meta-reasoning with the available information in novel situations. Core 
knowledge, serves as apriori information to a decision maker and is a key sensemaking input. 
Given the above challenges, some critical issues giving impetus to this research can be 
identified for the analytical modeling of the sensemaking process as: 
 Development of a framework that can computationally represent sensemaking with 
all its tacit dimensions of knowledge as a model of human cognition. 
  A reasoning construct supported by Bayes Theorem that can support the 
sensemaking process. Bayesian Networks are propositional in nature and have 
inherent limitations in their expressive powers.  
 Development of an architecture that can sufficiently combine and represent the 
expressive nature of Bayesian Networks with the ability to handle multiple types of 
uncertain information while increasing information entropy. 
1.4 Research Goals and Objectives  
This research aims to develop a Bayesian Abduction Model for Sensemaking Support 
(BAMSS). The application domain is for the analysis of military Courses of Action. The research 
objectives are broadly defined as: 
1. To develop a sensemaking analytical model to support military commanders in 
integrating information from various sources in asymmetric battlespace. The modeling 
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process is centered on using a Bayesian Network to represent causal relationships among 
the decision variables and perform abduction reasoning to get the most explainable 
causes.  
2. To validate a prototype BAMSS using case situations from asymmetric warfare. 
3. To improve and optimize the BAMSS output by using a genetic algorithm to seed the 
relevant Bayesian data.  
1.5 Intellectual and Broader Impact Contribution 
The research demonstrates the development of a sensemaking analytical model using a 
Bayesian Network. Bayesian Networks are used as knowledge representation and analysis tools. 
A Bayesian Network was chosen because of its robustness to make abduction inference - typical 
of sensemaking in that it looks for the most probable cause-effect relations within the 
information. It is believed that Bayesian algorithms will enable real-time information fusion, thus 
easing the process of sensemaking, especially, testing multiple competing hypotheses from a 
domain-specific large database.  We also demonstrate that the model is robust and scalable and 
can be applied to many different situations that require information fusion. 
 
1.6 Chapter Summary and Thesis Overview 
Chapter 1 introduces the research topic, the problem statement, the research goals and 
objectives, the challenges encountered in the research and the general contribution to the 
scientific body of knowledge. Chapter 2 discusses the contextual framework of sensemaking 
analytics. Chapter 3 presents the Bayesian formalism as a mathematical model for knowledge 
representation in a sensemaking context. A discussion of abductive inference for BAMSS is also 
presented.  Chapter 4 presents the BAMSS information and functional architecture, the 
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computational platform requirements (software and hardware), sample computational algorithms, 
and sample case vignettes. Chapter 5 extends the discussion of the BAMSS model by 
incorporating a Genetic Algorithm to improve and optimize the output. Chapter 6 presents the 
research summary, observations, conclusions, and recommendations for further research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Sensemaking Analytics 
2.1 Contextual Framing 
Analytical models of sensemaking focus mainly on the micro cognitive aspects of 
sensemaking at the individual level. The underlying theme is to isolate and represent aspects of 
cognition that humans rely on to understand events in uncertain environments. The dominant 
rubric in the development of these models has been to fashion them like linear decision support 
systems whose output is almost always linear. Such systems take the black box approach to the 
problem of sensemaking assuming that any number of inputs to the system can be processed by 
some algorithm to produce the right output. This works well if we are to assume a deterministic 
situation. The reality is that sensemaking is used for situations that are dynamic and complex 
with nonlinear behaviors.  
Models for sensemaking analytics should consider uncertainty, contradiction, ambiguity, 
time-based behaviors, and indeterminacy which extend beyond the deterministic models. 
Anecdotally, the Think Loop Model (Bodnar, 2005) exemplifies these sensemaking 
characteristics by breaking down the analytical process into a nested series of “think loops” 
which indicate how analysts combine “bottom-up” data with “top-down” data to derive useful 
information. Leedom and Eggleston (2005) described a working simulation model of human 
sensemaking and decision-making within a future joint or coalition military Command, Control, 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C2ISR) system. Their sensemaking framework  
uniquely integrated two areas of modeling; i) explicit representation of the knowledge 
framework (abstraction hierarchy) required for decomposing command intent into actionable 
knowledge within each of the Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information and 
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Infrastructure (PMESII) dimensions of the battlespace and ii) explicit representation of the staff 
work flow and patterns of collaboration within the various centers, working groups, cells, and 
teams that build this knowledge framework.  
Other analytic models of sensemaking examine the cognitive and external resource cost 
of sensemaking (e.g. by Russell, Stefik, Pirolli, & Card, 1993), the effects of tools on the 
behavior of people doing rapid large-volume data assessment (Russell, Slaney, Qu, & Houston, 
2005), rapid understanding of large document collection (Russell &Slaney, 2004) and visual 
sensemaking (Chi & Card, 1999; Card, 2004; Russell, 2003). The next section examines 
different approaches to qualitative models of sensemaking. 
2.2 Qualitative Models of Sensemaking 
Several qualitative models have been proposed for sensemaking analyses. However, a 
unifying paradigm for sensemaking is currently lacking.  Additionally, there is no general 
consensus as to how the sensemaking process might be operationally defined, analytically 
modeled, empirically tested, and critically assessed in terms of key constructs and variables, 
process interactions and obstacles, performance dimensions and metrics, and objective criteria 
for assessing the adequacy or sufficiency of outcome (Leedom, 2004).These models have been 
tailored to suit different domains ranging from Mission Command situations to business 
decision- making . 
The OODA model was developed by Boyd and is commonly applied to military 
command and control decision-making situations. In the OODA model, the Orient phase 
attempts to capture the cognitive processes involved in sensemaking. A modified version of the 
model, the Cognitive-OODA (Breton & Rousseau, 2005), was developed in response to the 
military adoption of the Effects Based Operations (EBO) which emphasizes analytical rather 
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than conventional tactics. Endsley’s Model of Situation Awareness (1995) closely mirrors the 
sensemaking process mostly at the level II Situation Awareness (SA). At level II SA, 
sensemaking represents the comprehension of information (transformation of information to 
knowledge).  
Wiig (2002) describes sensemaking as a continuous integration of evolving situation- 
handling activities that are based on cognitive constructs. The model assumes that an individual’s 
sensemaking process is based on four types of mental models: the Situation Recognition Model, 
the Decision-Making and Problem Solving Model, the Execution Method Model and the 
Governance Approach Models. In Shattuck and Millers’ Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition 
(2004), sensemaking is viewed as a sequence of situated acts. Situated action models emphasize 
the emergent, contingent nature of human activity, and the way it grows directly out of the 
particularities of a given situation. A central tenet of the situated action approach is that the 
structuring of activity is not something that precedes it but only grows directly from the 
immediacy of the situation (Lave &Wenger, 1991).  
Klein’s (2004) Data/Frame Analytical Model focuses on the micro-cognitive aspects of 
individual sensemaking. Framing indicates how we structure problems into a particular set of 
beliefs and perspectives that constrain data collection and analysis. The Plan as You Execute 
(PAYE) model (Ntuen, 2006), was developed as a hybrid model incorporating a variety of the 
cognitive models discussed above. The model architecture is dependent on schema-based 
knowledge representation about the world, a question answering (Q-A) sensemaking query 
system, reflexive and reflective cognition models and the dynamic cognitive scripts or meta-
cognition knowledge elements.  
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The non-linearity and complexity of the asymmetric battlespace has been analyzed using 
Complex Adaptive Systems Theory. Kilcullen (2004) defines the asymmetric battlespace as an 
open and complex adaptive system characterized by the non-linear interaction of its subordinate 
elements. Comprised of many dynamically interacting subcomponents, complex adaptive 
systems exhibit coherent behavior despite their highly dispersed and decentralized control 
structure (Kilcullen, 2004).  
The complexity of asymmetric warfare has also been researched by a number of 
researchers (Ryan, 2008; Bar-Yam, 2004; Kilcullen, 2004). Ryan uses the Law of Multiscale 
Variety (Bar-Yam, 2004) to discuss two complex systems ideas (multiscale variety and 
adaptation) that underpin our understanding of asymmetric warfare. For a system with N parts 
that must be coordinated to respond to the external contexts, the scale of the response is given by 
the number of parts that participate in the coordinated response. Second, we assume that under 
(complete) coordination, the variety of the coordinated parts equals the variety of a single part. 
The induced sensemaking process is interpreted to operate on the same axiom of Law of 
Multiscale Variety—where information is subject to serious uncertainties and equally N-order 
entropy.  The generalized Law of Multiscale Variety states that at every scale, the variety 
necessary to meet the tasks, at that scale, must be larger for the system than the task 
requirements. 
The Cynefin Model (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003) emphasizes the effect of problem type and 
environment on the sensemaking and decision-making capabilities. The novelty of this model 
lies in its approach to problem-solving in a realm that encompasses all problematic situations. 
Combining Ryan’s concept of multiscale variety and adaptation with this model of sensemaking, 
we argue that the context of MDMP in asymmetric battlespace spans both the knowable space 
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and the complex space. In the knowable space, also called complicated order or Realm of 
Scientific Inquiry, cause and effect relationships are generally understood, but for any specific 
decision it is imperative to gather and analyze further data to predict the consequences of a COA 
without any uncertainty. Snowden characterizes decision making in this space as {SENSE, 
ANALYZE and RESPOND}. Decision analysis and support require accurate fitting and use of 
models to forecast the consequences of actions with appropriate levels of uncertainty (French, 
2013) 
 
Figure 1. Cynefin Model. Adapted from Kurtz and Snowden, 2003. 
In the complex space, also called the complex unorder or the Realm of Social Systems, 
decision-making situations involve many interacting causes and effects. Knowledge in this space 
is at best qualitative: there are too many potential interactions to disentangle particular causes 
and effects. There are no precise quantitative models to predict system behaviors as seen in 
known and knowable spaces. Decision-making is more focused on exploring judgment and issues 
and on developing broad strategies that are sufficiently flexible to accommodate evolving 
situations. Snowden suggests that in these circumstances, decision making is more of the form 
{PROBE, SENSE and RESPOND} (French, 2013). Analysis begins with informal qualitative 
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models. If quantitative models are used, then they are simple, perhaps linear multi-attribute value 
models (Belton & Stewart, 2002). 
Bodnar (2005) developed a Think Loop Model (TLM) for sensemaking analysis that 
breaks the analytical process down into a nested series of “think loops” which indicate how 
analysts combine “bottom-up” data-driven steps with “top-down” hypotheses-driven steps to be 
able to forage through new data, and then synthesize that data into evidence-based schemas and 
theories. The TLM process considers many back loops within a sensemaking component cycle 
by using one set of activities that cycle around finding information and another that cycle around 
making sense of the information, with multiple interactions between them. Additionally, the 
upward processes fall into a single overall scheme for data-driven analysis while the downward 
arrows fall into a single overall scheme for hypotheses-driven analysis. 
Russell, et al., (1993) developed the Sensemaking Thinking Loop (STL) as a continuous 
evolving state of reasoning about a problem context. The STL has three main processes, namely, 
search for representation, instantiating representation, and shifting representation, respectively. 
Searching for representations is designed to capture salient features of the data in a way that 
supports the use of the instantiated representation.  Instantiating a representation identifies 
information of interest and encodes it in a representation that emerges from the generation loop. 
The instantiated schemas called encodons are created in the data coverage loop. Shift 
representation is designed to cope with contextual information changes and entails forcing a 
change in the representation via a bottom-up or data-driven process. 
 A diversity of efforts exists within the sensemaking community of practice. Therefore, 
Buckingham-Shum and Selvin (1999) note that, “there are not only gaps in the languages, frames 
of reference, and belief systems that people in the different communities of practice have, but 
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also gaps between their respective sensemaking efforts - their concepts in the representational 
situation. In many cases, different communities have mutually unintelligible sensemaking 
efforts, leading to mutually unintelligible representational effort.”  
2.3 Sensemaking Analytics Tools 
The major difference between a Sensemaking Support System (S3) and a Decision 
Support System (DSS) is that S3 supports sensemaking activities, while DSS supports decision 
making activities. DSS has matured in its constructs and theories, and is usually designed to help 
an agent choose from the multiple options. S3s are relatively nascent and universally lack 
acceptable theoretical frameworks and constructs. An S3 will usually target problems in 
information foraging, diagnosis, information fusion, and help the sense-maker understand the 
specific problem situation.  
The S3 is a product developed by Ntuen, Park, and Kim (2013) as a tool for information 
fusion during sensemaking within a military domain. S3 provides the backbone for developing a 
collaborative decision support system since it is designed for multiple users engaged in 
collaborative sensemaking. The tasks are defined at different strata of operational doctrines. The 
user can use maps, whiteboards, annotations, and graphics to illustrate facts or clarify arguments. 
The display model is implemented using the stages of the cognitive abstraction hierarchy which 
maps the requirements of sensemaking stages (Figure 2). S3 enables the users to develop and 
frame the hypotheses, analyze the hypotheses in the experimental domain, and provide cases for 
simulation experiments. The visualization and sensemaking support module in S3 provides a 
user interface and visualization support. 
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Figure 2. Visual analytics screen capture in S3  
Good and his colleagues from PARC AI group (2004) developed the ACH0 as an 
experimental program intended to aid intelligence analysis in sensemaking. ACH0 is a table-
oriented workspace for performing the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH). By 
accommodating multiple explicit hypotheses and systematic consideration of available evidence, 
the ACH method counteracts confirmation bias and other causes of inaccuracies. ACH0 provides 
two simple algorithms for scoring evidence: an Inconsistency Counting Algorithm and a 
Normalized Algorithm. Both of these are intended only as rough guides for scoring hypotheses. 
The algorithms operate on the same data, but make different trade-offs.  
Figure 3, a screen shot of ACH0, illustrates its table format. The hypotheses under 
consideration in the example are the columns labeled H1, H2, and H3. Six items of evidence are 
present in the example in the rows labeled E1 through E6. In the ACH Method, each piece of 
evidence is assumed to be independent and the hypotheses are exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive. In Figure 3 an entry of “I” signals that this evidence is inconsistent with the 
corresponding hypothesis, and entry of “II” signals that it is very inconsistent with the evidence. 
The “C” and “CC” entries indicate two levels of consistency. Similarly, ACH0 provides three 
levels of weight assigned to evidence. Roughly, this weight is a stand-in for a richer 
representation of the evidence quality. 
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Figure 3. ACH0 interface table (Good et al., 2004) 
More recently, Lebiere et al., (2013) presented a computational cognitive model, 
developed in the ACT-R architecture of several core information-foraging and hypotheses-
updating processes involved in a complex sensemaking task. In the context of an intelligence 
task analysis, the authors view sensemaking as the act of finding and interpreting relevant facts 
amongst the sea of incoming reports, images, and intelligence. They describe the computational 
module as an “explicit, unified, mechanistic and theoretical framework for cognitive biases that 
provides a computational understanding of the conditions under which such biases occur.”  
Using the Cognitive Architecture Model they provide a functional bridge from the 
qualitative theories of sensemaking to detailed neural models of brain functions. Testing the 
model entailed performance of experimental tasks using a task modeling approach for different 
sets of scenarios and human participants. The quantitative prediction of a number of cognitive 
biases by the model was then recorded and analyzed on a trial-to-trial basis. The model correctly 
predicted the presence and degree of four biases: confirmation, anchoring and adjustment, 
representativeness, and probability matching. 
20 
 
 
While there is a growing interest in sensemaking analytics, it is important to discuss the 
histories behind them. Among the first sensemaking support tools developed is the gIBIS 
(Conklin & Begeman, 1988). The gIBIS describes an application-specific hypertext system 
designed to capture early design deliberations. It implements a specific method, called Issue 
Based Information Systems (IBIS), which has been developed for use on large, complex design 
problems. An improvement on gIBIS is Compendium (Shum & Selvin, 1999), a software tool 
providing a flexible visual interface for managing the connections between information and 
ideas.   
The Sensemaking Support Environment by Eggleston, Bearavolu, and Mostashfi (2005) 
is a tool developed to augment an intelligence analyst’s cognitive capabilities. Similarly Sticha, 
Buede, and Rees (2005) have developed APOLLO, a software application that enables the 
analyst to reason through a prediction of a subject’s decision making, to identify assumptions 
and determinant variables, and to quantify each variable’s relative contribution to the prediction, 
by producing a graphical representation of the analysis with explicit levels of uncertainty. 
CoSen (Furnas, Qu, &Sharma 2003) provides an integrated workspace for information 
gathering and sensemaking. It examines sensemaking activities across different levels of social 
aggregation and focuses on technological support of representations for sensemaking to improve 
knowledge enhancement in the context of information sourced from the web. A user with a 
sensemaking task searches the information on the web and organizes it into a hierarchical tree 
structure.   
DECIDE (Cluxton & Eick, 2005) is an analytical engine for hypothesizing and 
visualizing structured arguments. The tool enables analysts to construct arguments, associate 
evidence with conjectures, sub-hypotheses, and hypotheses, set evidence credibility and 
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relevance, and score the arguments. WORKING BY WIRE (Gundry & Metes, 1996) is a 
software program that equips distributed team members to “work together apart”. Going beyond 
the usual level of tool skills, WORKING BY WIRE addresses the behaviors, methods, 
approaches and protocols required to support distributed team work. A similar approach to 
sensemaking is seen in Livenet (Rura-Polley, Hawryszkiewycz, & Baker, 2000). DISCOVER 
(Milligan & Ahmed, 2005) and Battlesense (Klein, Long, Hutton, & Shafer 2004) have been 
developed specifically to support sensemaking in the battlefield environment.  
COLAB (Morrison & Cohen, 2005) is a laboratory for studying tools that facilitate 
collaboration and sensemaking among groups of human analysts as they interpret unfolding 
situations based on accruing intelligence data. The laboratory has three components. The Hats 
Simulator provides a challenging problem domain involving thousands to millions of agents 
engaged in individual and collective behaviors, a small portion of which are terrorists. The 
second component, the AIID Bayesian Blackboard, is an instrumented working environment 
within which, analysts collaborate to interpret the problem domain. The third component is a 
web-based user interface that integrates the Trellis hypothesis authoring and management tool 
with a query language to allow human analysts to interact with AIID and each other. 
Collaboration Envelope (Nosek, 2005) follows a similar approach. In particular Collaboration 
Envelope develops architectures that support individual and group sensemaking. 
SSIGS (Qu, 2003) is a sensemaking-supporting information gathering system whose 
workspace offers features that not only facilitate information search but also, a representation 
search and representation shift that are crucial for sensemaking tasks. ClaimSpotter (Sereno, 
Shum, & Motta, 2004) is a text-driven interface that facilitates the creation of argument maps 
expressing, for instance, the position of multiple annotators over a particular problem. Such 
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concept maps could be used to represent the perspective taken on a domain, according to the 
different annotators (and potentially authors) of the documents being connected. A critical look 
at the tools developed points to the gradual shift from decision support tools to sensemaking 
support tools. The latter focuses on augmenting the cognitive capability of the sensemaker during 
the whole process of sensemaking. 
2.4 Chapter Summary 
Chapter two reviews both, the qualitative and the analytical models of sensemaking. 
From qualitative analyses, most researchers focus on cognition where the primary sensemaking 
task is to construct a meaningful mental representation of the problem space. Schema-driven 
representation, mental models, and other cognitive constructs dominate the process models of 
sensemaking that are discussed. These models give an understanding of the meta-cognitive and 
cognitive acts that inform the sensemaking process and how they may be applied to understand 
and overcome the cognitive limitations of the human mind. The limitations of this approach lie 
primarily in the lack of a unifying paradigm of sensemaking. An additional challenge exists in 
the way this information may be used to develop a unifying framework or standardized guidance 
for the development of better sensemaking support systems. 
  Research on sensemaking analytics is presented as a tool to support the sensemaking 
process. In this approach, sensemaking models are defined as computational cognitive models 
whose primary task is to enable processing of information to achieve an understanding of the 
problem space and facilitate effective analysis process. Most of the models discussed have been 
developed for the fields of intelligence analysis, information foraging and knowledge 
management. The tools developed indicate a gradual shift from decision support tools to 
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sensemaking support tools which focus on augmenting the cognitive capability of the 
sensemaker during the whole process of sensemaking. 
This research uses the tool-based approach to model the sensemaking process for two 
reasons: First, the advances in Computational Intelligence have led to the development of 
powerful and efficient algorithms and methods that can be used to computationally simulate 
some processes in sensemaking. For example, it is possible to represent sensemaking models in 
software and cognitive architectures. The algorithms also enable better user interaction with the 
models, thus simplifying the process of task performance and analysis in scenarios where 
sensemaking is required. Second, through the use of computational techniques such as Bayesian 
Networks and Abductive Inference, both the qualitative and quantitative approaches can be 
combined to provide a better representation of the sensemaking process. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Bayesian Models for Sensemaking 
3.1 Bayes Theory and Abductive Inference 
Any situation in which we have to make decisions often  necessitates hypothesizing from 
a sample space H, given some observed data D. Bayes Theorem provides a way of calculating  
the probability of a hypothesis based on its prior probability, the probabilities of observing 
various data given the hypothesis and the observed data itself. To define Bayes Theorem 
precisely, we first need to define the notations used. Let P(h) denote the initial probability that 
hypothesis h holds, before we incorporate any new data. P(h) is the prior probability of h and 
may reflect any background knowledge we have about the chance that h is a correct hypothesis. 
If no such prior knowledge exists, let P(D) denote the probability that  evidence data D  will be 
observed. P(D) represents the probability of evidence  D given  no knowledge about which 
hypothesis holds. Let P(D|h) denote the probability of observing data D given a situation where 
hypothesis h holds. We are interested in the probability P(h|D) that h holds given the observed 
data D. P(h|D) is called the posterior probability  of h because  it reflects our confidence that h  
holds after we have seen  some evidence D.  
Bayes Theorem provides a way to calculate the posterior probability  P(h|D), from prior 
probability  P(h),together with P(D) and P(D|h). This is mathematically stated as, 
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In this formalism, propositions are given numerical parameters signifying the degree of belief 
accorded to them under some body of knowledge, and the parameters are combined and 
manipulated according to the rules of the Probability Theory. For example, if h  stands for the 
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statement “ An attack on the subway is imminent ”, then P(h|w) stands for an individuals’ 
subjective belief in h given a body of knowledge w, which might include that in the individuals  
assumptions about security in the city, specific threats were made by terror groups along with an 
assessment of the threat level. 
 In defining belief expressions, it is common to denote P(h) or P(h), leaving out the 
constant w. This abbreviation is justified when w remains constant, since the main purpose of the 
quantifier P is to summarize w without explicating it. In situations where background 
information undergoes changes, there is a need to specifically identify the assumptions that 
account for our beliefs and articulate explicitly w or some of its elements. In Bayesian 
Formalism, belief measures obey the three basic axioms of Probability Theory: 
 0 P (A)  1 
 P(Certain proposition) = 1 
 P(A or B) = P(A) +P(B) if A and B are mutually exclusive. 
The third axiom states that the belief assigned to any set of events is the sum of the beliefs 
assigned to its nonintersecting components.  
The basic expressions in the Bayesian formalism are statements about conditional 
probabilities, for example,  P (A|B) - which specify the belief in A under the assumption that B is 
known with absolute certainty. A and B are independent if P(A|B) =P(A). If P(A|B,C) =P(A|C) 
then A and B are conditionally independent given C. Bayesian philosophers see the conditional 
relationship as more compatible with the organization of human knowledge. In this view, B 
serves as a pointer to a context of the frame of knowledge, and A|B stands for an event A in the 
context specified by B. Thus factual knowledge invariably is encoded in conditional probability 
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statements, while belief in joint events, if it is ever needed is computed from those statements via 
the product rule: 
        P(A,B)=P(A|B)P(B)                (2)                                                                       
The probability of any event A can be computed by conditioning it on any set of 
exhaustive and mutually exclusive events Bi, i=1,2…,n: 
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                 (3) 
This decomposition provides the basis for hypothetical or assumption-based reasoning in the 
Bayesian Formalism. It states that the belief in any event A is a weighted sum over the beliefs in 
all the distinct ways that A might be realized.  
3.2 Related Sample Applications of Bayesian Networks in the Military Domains 
Dynamic Bayesian Networks (Pearl, 1988; Pfeffer, 2000) have been used for military 
plan recognition. The translation of context independent (sensor) data to context dependent data 
(information) with respect to knowledge incompleteness has been successfully implemented with 
context-based navigation of troops (Su, Bai, Du, & Feng, 2011).  The task of tactical engagement 
of entity agents is described by means of a Behavior Definition Frame and task allocation entails 
using a Task Allocation Processing Bayesian Network Module (Li et al., 2010)  
Johansson and Falkman (2008) have used Bayesian Networks (BNs) and a ground target 
simulator to predict enemy intent for battle command. Expert elicitation was used to identify 
general parameters to predict the enemy’s tactical intention in different ground combat scenarios. 
Such parameters include enemy intention, distance between the enemy and different targets, 
enemy type and target type, direction, targets protection value, and attraction. 
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Suzic (2003) used dynamic belief networks as a method for representing knowledge 
about the enemy and performing inference based on sensor data. In this case, the BN was used to 
solve a dynamic, stochastic policy recognition problem with the task characterized a s “an on-
line multi-agent stochastic policy recognition.” It aimed at detecting the policies an agent or a 
group of agents would execute by observing their actions and using apriori knowledge about 
them in a noisy environment. Inferencing was undertaken to derive belief measures for the 
enemy plans.  
The BN is presented as a hierarchical model of a hostile tank company consisting of three 
tank platoons with each platoon containing three tanks as shown in Figure 4. For each level there 
is a certain set of policies invoked by the higher level. The simplest policies, their atoms, consist 
only of a set of actions. 
 
Figure 4. A BN representing the policy hierarchy model of a hostile company (Suzic, 2003), 
redrawn. 
In this instance, the policy for each agent (hostile unit) is represented as a BN node with the 
simplest policy being on the tank (group) level, k=0. The variable π0,i  represents Tank i’s policy 
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variable  with various  discrete states  that define directional movement (π0,i,), policy of the tank 
platoon;  (π 1,i)  and policy of the tank company (π 2,i). The network is then used to predict 
opponents behaviors based on observations, knowledge about the opponents’ doctrines and 
terrain data. 
Das (1999) describes the use of BNs to represent and update uncertainties encountered in 
the process of situation assessment using scenarios in naval anti-surface warfare. A set of 
hypotheses that adequately represent possible enemy intentions is generated with clarifying states 
- Passive, Defensive, Offensive and Not Modelled. Enemy intention directly influences enemy 
activity which may be Logistics, Reconnaissance of a restricted zone, Mounting naval attack, 
Enemy vessel type, Position of the enemy unit, Mobility of the enemy unit or Communication 
activities of the enemy unit. 
 Figure 5 shows the BN developed for situation assessment in a naval anti-surface 
warfare. Evidence to the network is supplied through the sensor and reconnaissance nodes. The 
network uses the evidence to update the probability distribution over the states of the position 
node. The parameters: vessel type, position and mobility are also detected through sensors and 
reconnaissance.  
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Figure 5. A BN for situational assessment in naval-anti-surface warfare (Das, 1999). 
Santos (2003) used BNs to develop an adversary model that could capture goals, 
intentions, biases, beliefs and perceptions based on a dynamic cognitive architecture that evolved 
over time. The basic adversary intent architecture comprised three core components: Goals/Foci, 
Rationale and Action. The Goal component was a probabilistically prioritized short- and long-
term goal list representing adversary intents, objectives or foci. The Rationale component was a 
probabilistic network representing what influences the adversary’s beliefs, about himself, the 
Blue Forces, their goals, and certain high level actions associated with these goals. The Actions 
component was a probabilistic network, representing the detailed relationships between 
adversary goals and the actions they were likely to perform to realize them. 
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Bayesian Networks were developed for the Rationale and Action networks. Each random 
variable in the network was classified into one of four classes: axioms, beliefs, goals and actions. 
Adversary axioms represented the underlying beliefs of the adversary about himself and served 
as inputs or explanations to the other random variables. Adversary beliefs represented the 
adversary’s beliefs regarding the Blue Forces. Adversary goals represented the goals or desired 
end-states of the adversary.  Adversary actions represented the actions of the adversary that 
could typically be observed by friendly forces.  
A computational framework for adversarial modeling and inferencing of adversary intent 
was developed as part of the Air Force Research Laboratory’s Intelligence Preparation of the 
Battlespace (Bell, Santos, & Brown, 2002). Bayesian Networks and Bayesian Knowledge Bases 
were implemented in an adversary Intent Inferencing Module for COA prediction, explanation 
and inference of adversary intent. Simulation and proof-of-concept used scenarios from the battle 
of al Khafji - during the Operation Desert Storm. This simulation included a stream of direct 
enemy observables as they unfolded in the battlefield. The initial intent of the adversary (not to 
attack across the Saudi border into al Khafji) was known apriori. As the situation unfolded in the 
simulation, the adversary model evolved the underlying intent dynamically based on the 
observables and predicted enemy actions in accordance with the actions taken during the battle. 
With this simulation, the authors were able to demonstrate the viability of probabilistic network 
modeling approach to capturing such scenarios. 
Falzon and Priest (2004) used Bayesian Networks in the development of the Center of 
Gravity (COG) Network Effects Tool (COGNET). COGNET provides a modeling framework 
and a generic database to aid knowledge reuse and knowledge transfer.  The modeling 
framework is then used as a basis for the construction, population and analysis of Bayesian 
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Networks to support a rigorous and systematic approach to the COG analysis. The BN developed 
is a causal probabilistic network that represents the functional decomposition of the key concepts 
used by operational planners in COA development: end-state, center of gravity, critical 
vulnerabilities, decisive points and lines of operations.   
Evans et al., (2003) used Dynamic Bayesian Nets to represent  the causal relationship 
between lower-level friendly tasks and higher-level effects on adversary systems in order to 
guide plan generation and analyze the observed  impact of planned military actions during plan 
execution. Pate-Cornell (2002) used a BN in intelligence analysis within tactical situations by 
developing a probabilistic method of assessing the intent and location of terrorists, their weapons 
and other enablers, as input to “local risk” analyses, in support of risk management decisions in 
the context of an unfolding crisis. McLaughlin and Pate-Cornell (2005) used Bayesian 
techniques to analytically illustrate Iraq’s nuclear program intelligence. 
3.3 Abduction in Bayesian Belief Networks  
 3.3.1 Abduction as the Most Probable Explanation (MPE) of Events  
Gelsema (1995) notes that “a special class of problems in Bayesian belief networks is 
abductive reasoning, inference from effects to the best explanations of the effects.”  Similarly, 
Lacave and Diez (2002) note that explanations of evidence consist of determining which values 
of the unobserved variables justify the available evidence. This process is usually called 
abduction, and is based on the (usually implicit) assumption that there is a causal model. In this 
context, an explanation is a configuration of the unobserved variables, and the goal of the 
inference process is to obtain the Most Probable Explanation (MPE) or the k Most Probable 
Explanations (kMPEs). In general, the variables that take the value “present” or “positive” in the 
MPE are considered the causes that explain the evidence. This kind of explanation is basically to 
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offer a diagnosis for a set of observed anomalies. For instance, in medical expert systems, an 
explanation determines the disease or diseases that explain the evidence: symptoms, signs, test 
results, etc. 
Lacave and Diez (2002), consider an explanation w which is an assignment of values to 
all the variables in a certain subset W of the variables of the network. Since the values of 
observed variables are known with certainty, only unobserved variables are the object of scrutiny 
in abductive methods. Abduction intends to find the MPE with the configuration w with the 
maximum a-posteriori probability P (w| e), where e is the available evidence. When W includes 
all the unobserved variables, the process is known as total abduction; else, it is partial abduction. 
In general, given an observation o, a hypothesis h and the knowledge that h causes o, it is an 
abduction to hypothesize that h occurred. Abduction tries to synthesize a composite hypothesis 
explaining the entire observation from elementary hypotheses. 
Pierce (1877) first described abductive inference by providing two intuitive 
characterizations: given an observation d and the knowledge that h causes d, it is an abduction to 
hypothesize that h occurred; and given a proposition q and the knowledge that pq, it is an 
abduction to conclude p. In either case, abduction is uncertain because something else might be 
the actual cause of d, or because the reasoning pattern is the classical fallacy of “affirming the 
consequent” and therefore, formally invalid. Additional difficulties can exist because h might not 
always cause d, or because p might imply q only by default. Generally, we can say that h 
explains d and p explains q and we shall refer to h and p as hypotheses and d and q as data. 
Peirce (1877) further defines the process of inquiry or discovery as including three fundamental 
inference processes: 
1) Abduction generates hypotheses to explain new anomalous data. 
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2) Deduction performs the function of making a prediction as to what would occur if the 
hypotheses were to turn out to be the case. 
3) Induction finds the ratio of the frequency by which the necessary results of deduction do in 
fact occur. 
Abduction is then, a reasoning process that forms plausible explanations for abnormal 
observations. It is distinct from deduction and induction in that it is inherently uncertain since 
information or data supporting the abduction process is dynamic, leading to human construction 
of multiple and often competing hypotheses. It takes as input a set of data and yields as output a 
hypothesis that can best explain the input data. Consider the example from Bhatnagar and Kanal 
(1993); 
“The surprising fact C is observed. However, if A were true, C would be a matter of course. 
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. Here, C is an observed fact. The second sentence 
states the relationship, which is available from the domain knowledge, that the presence of A 
explains the presence of C. In the third statement, A is an abductively inferred hypothesis. The 
content of the inference is the premise "If A were true, C would be a matter of course” (pp.233) 
The existing models of abduction are purely from the logical approach (Konolige, 1992). 
In the context of logic-based abduction, Eiter and Gottlob (1995) note that the main decision 
problems are: 
(i) To determine whether an explanation for the given manifestations exists at all; 
(ii) To determine whether an individual hypothesis h Є H is relevant, that is, whether it is part of 
at least one acceptable explanation; and 
(iii) To determine whether an individual hypothesis is necessary, that is, whether it occurs in all 
acceptable explanations. 
34 
 
 
3.3.2 Abduction Reasoning from Bayesian Belief Networks 
The relationship between Bayesian reasoning and abduction is governed by the assertion 
that issues affecting reasoning for example semantics are abductive in nature. Our interest is in 
the probabilistic models of uncertainties that enable some explanation to occur in a sensemaking 
information network. A set of plausible explanations of a proposition characterizing the context 
of interest (Prakken, 2004) can be derived as follows: 
Let P(w) =  P(E)                                                                                          (4) 
Where E is an explanation of world w  
  Eh hPEP )()(  (Assuming independent events E)                                    (5) 
)(
)&(
)|(
EP
EwP
EwP                                                             (6) 
The numerator term P(w&E) explains the conjunction of w and E while the denominator explains 
E. P(w|E) may represent, say, a mass demonstration by Iraqi citizens because of a mosque being 
bombed by the coalition force. The abduction problem in sensemaking is: given P(E), explain E, 
then try to explain w from these explanations. The difference between deduction and abduction is 
illustrated in Figures 6 a and b below. Abduction has been the principal model-based technique 
for diagnostic problem solving using models of abnormal behavior in terms of cause-effect 
relationships (Peng & Reggia, 1990).   
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Figure 6. a) Deduction and b) Abduction (adopted from Josang, 2008). 
In abductive reasoning, diagnostic problem solving consists of establishing a diagnosis 
using cause-effect relationships with a set of observed findings (effects) as the starting point. 
This is illustrated by three instances below: 
1. Abduction inference makes “backward” inferences based on known causal relations, to 
explain or justify a conclusion. Here, the system reasons from effects to causes, instead of causes 
to effects. It is a reasoning process that is a reverse of deduction as shown in definition A1. 
A1.  Given: the truth of proposition Q 
Given:  P Q 
Infer:  P explains Q  
Note that in definition A1, P can be background knowledge (also a theory) that describes a 
problem domain; Q represents an observation (or a set of observations). We want a hypothesis H 
that assumes that P is an abductive explanation for Q. 
2. The main issue of abduction is to synthesize a composite hypothesis explaining the entire 
observation from elementary hypotheses. Abduction also supposes implicitly that a relationship 
is available between hypothesis and observations in the form of rule A2. 
P(x)
P(y|x) P(y|¬x)   
P(y)
P(x)
P(x|y) P(x|¬y)
P(y)
Parent=antecedent
Conditionals
Child=consequent
Parent=antecedent
Conditionals
Child=consequent
xˇ  
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A2.  Given: P Q 
Given : Observation  Q 
Explain hypothesis H  
Here, Q may be a fuzzy characterization of the situation. 
3. Abduction is a type of reasoning that derives a set of hypotheses (causes) which explain a 
given set of events (symptoms) using causal knowledge (relational maps) of the system 
functionality. This can be represented in rule A3.  
A3.  Given:  Observation, Q 
Given:  Hypothesis (H) of disorders  
Infer:   the knowledge of H causes or explains Q  
As shown in rules A1-A3 above, the main issue of abduction is to synthesize a composite 
hypothesis explaining the entire observation from elementary hypotheses. In the sensemaking 
process, we tend to seek explanations to unexpected situations. Broadly speaking, abduction 
aims at finding explanations for, or causes of, observed phenomena or facts; it is an inference to 
the best explanation, a pattern of reasoning that occurs in such diverse places as medical 
diagnosis, scientific theory formation, accident investigation, language understanding, and jury 
deliberation.  
Figure 7 (with only analysis of the left-hand side) illustrates a simple MPE. We define an 
end state of the network as a composite hypothesis H0 and to this we assign a prior probability. 
The prior probability can be assumed based on the level of past information possessed about a 
particular situation that is of interest. For example, H0 could be disrupting stability and support 
operations in an urban center. The estimated probability could be from the news media, 
intelligence briefings, or simply the commander’s estimate.  
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Figure 7. A Sample hierarchical network with different levels of evidence nodes for hierarchical 
Bayesian inference. 
We can write, P(Ho) =0.4. This means that we are only 40% confident of the plausibility 
of our chosen hypothesis. By the axioms of probability, the probability of an alternative 
hypothesis P(¬H0) representing any other end state is therefore, P(¬H0)= 0.6 and this need not 
be explicitly stated. Similarly we can assign apriori probabilities for the conditional probabilities 
of interest representing the probabilities of the children events Xi and Si given the parents, hi and  
Xi  respectively.  
Assume for illustration, the following database is available: 
P(h1|H0) = 0.9; P(h1|¬H0)= 0.8; P(x1|h1)= 0.7; P(x1|h2)= 0.4; P(S1|x1)= 0.5; P(S1|x2)=0.6 
Next, we compute the prior probabilities of all the instantiated variables as follows:  
P(h1)= P(h1|H0)P(H0) +P(h1|¬H0)P(¬H0)= (0.9)(0.4)+(0.8)(0.6)=0.84 ;P(h2)=0.16 
P(x1)= P(x1|h1)P(h1) + P(x1|h2)P(h2)=(0.7)(0.84)+(0.4)(0.16) =0.652 ;P(x2)=0.348 
P(S1)=P(S1|x1)P(x1) +P(S1|x2)P(x2)=(0.5)(0.652) +(0.6)(0.348) =0.5348 
 
H0
h1
h2
X1 X2
S1 S2
X3
S3
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Considering the network shown in Figure 7,  

rsS
rSSSSXPSP
,..
32111
1
),..,,|()(
                                                                    (7)                                        
Because of the independence of {S1, S2, S3...Sr}, we can write 

rSS
rr SPSPSPSPSSXPSP
..
321111
1
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                                                    (8) 
)()|().......()|()()|()()|()( 13312211111 rr SPSXPSPSXPSPSXPSPSXPSP       (9) 
Clearly, there is a complexity arising from the computation, even for a relatively simple 
network. When new evidence is introduced, the analyst is interested in determining the possible 
effects on his most probable hypothesis, H0. Suppose the new evidence points to a new target to 
be exploited by the insurgents, the new target may be a coalition Command and Control (C2) 
post in a previously secured part of the country. This would definitely require a level of 
sophistication, challenging the analyst’s previous hypothesis about the end state of the 
insurgency.  
Using Bayesian Abduction Inference, we can compute the state of the network with 
variable Xi instantiated as follows:  
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3.3.3 An Application to Sensemaking Analytics  
Case 1: Prospective (or Predictive) Sensemaking Analyses: 
Based on Pearl (1988) we define a model of recursive Bayesian learning with data updates as 
follows: Let H denote a hypothesis, dn = d1, d2,..dn denote a sequence of data observed in the 
past ,and d denote a new fact. A brute force way to calculate the belief in H,P(H|dn, d) would be 
to append the new  datum  d to the past data dn and perform a global computation of the impact 
on H of the entire data set dn+1={dn,d}. Under certain conditions, this computation can be 
significantly curtailed by incremental updating; once we have computed P(H|dn),we can discard 
the past data and compute the impact of the new datum by the formula 
)|(
),|(
)|(),|(
n
n
nn
ddP
HddP
dHPddHP 
                                   (11) 
Comparing equation (10) and (11), it is easy to see that the old belief P(H|dn) assumes the 
role of the prior probability in the computation of new impact; it completely summarizes the past 
experience and for updating need only be multiplied by the likelihood function P(d|dn, H),which 
measures the probability of the new datum d, given the hypothesis and past observations. 
The likelihood function is independent on the past data and involves only d and H. For 
example, the likelihood that a patient will develop a certain symptom, given that he definitely 
suffers from a disease H, is normally independent of what symptoms the patient had in the past. 
This conditional independence assumption allows us to write 𝑃(𝑑|𝑑𝑛 , 𝐻) = 𝑃(𝑑|𝐻) 
and 𝑃(𝑑|𝑑𝑛, ¬𝐻) = 𝑃(𝑑|¬𝐻). After dividing equation (11) by the complementary equation for 
H, we obtain: 
).|()|()|( 1 HdLdHOdHO nn                                       (12)                                                                         
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Equation (12) describes a simple recursive procedure for updating the posterior odds. Upon the 
arrival of each new datum d, we multiply the current posterior odds O (H|dn) by the likelihood 
ratio of d.  This is a prediction model which replicates the behavior of a prospective sensemaking 
on datum dn+1. 
Case 2: Retrospective Sensemaking Analysis:  
Let H represent a set of hypotheses, Hi each of which is equally likely. We can modify Pearl’s 
(1988) model to capture retrospective sensemaking as follows: Define an m x n matrix Mk, where 
m and n are the number of values that H and Dk might take, respectively; and the (i,j)-th entry of 
Mk stands for   𝑀𝑘𝑖𝑗 = 𝑃(𝑑𝑘𝑗|𝐻𝑖). Then, 



N
k
ikiNi HdPHPddHP
1
1 )]|()[(),...,|( 
                                  (13) 
Equation (13) can be rewritten as: 
).|()|()|( 1 niin dHLHdnOHdO                                               (14) 
3.4 Bayesian Belief Networks  
A sensemaking problem often requires an eliciting of beliefs from experts. These beliefs 
can be framed as a set of hypotheses. For example, assume there is a bomb attack on a football 
stadium in a major university campus. A group of intelligence analysts is asked to build a 
sensemaking process model of the bomb attack. Assume also that the analysts start by suggesting 
three likely suspicious entities for the bomb attack. Let this be H = {ℎ1, ℎ2, ℎ3}. The analysts 
will take on each assumption ℎ𝑖  and identify major issues, suspected causes, and the likely 
effects. For the present discussion, ignore the effect and concentrate on the issues (I) and causes 
(C). Figure 8 is used to illustrate the analyst’s belief tree about the problem with their associated 
belief values estimated to be a number between 0 and 1. 
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Figure 8. Belief tree representing a set of hypotheses about a bomb attack. 
In Figure 8, the nodes H, I, and C represent a single analyst assessment of the situation by 
speculating on a set of hypotheses (H), the issues related to each hypothesis (I), and the possible 
causations (C).If beliefs are converted to probability values in the belief network, then a 
probability space can be modeled as a Bayesian Belief Network of propositional variables 
(nodes) which may be connected by directed arcs, pairwise. For example, if an arc exists from 
node I1 to node C1, the probability of node C1 assuming a given state ci depends on the actual 
state of node I1 (I1 is a direct cause of C1). The absence of an arc between two nodes implies that 
there is no such direct dependence. If in a Bayesian Belief Network, for all states of the root 
nodes the prior probabilities are known, and in addition, for all non-root nodes the conditional 
probabilities given the parent states are known, the joint probability distribution is completely 
known. This is not the case with the belief network in which only event or causal nodes are 
estimated by experts.       
 
H: Bomb Attack
h1 h2 h3
I1 I2 I3 I
c c c c c
0.5 0.2 0.3
0.5 0.5 0.7 0.3
0.8 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.9
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As postulated by Pearl (1988) a belief network also referred to as Bayesian Belief 
network (BBN), probabilistic network, or causal network is a directed acyclic graph in which 
each node represents a random variable or uncertain quantity which can take two or more 
possible values. Arcs signify the existence of direct causal influences between the linked 
variables and the strengths of these influences are quantified by conditional probabilities. A BBN 
is an augmented directed acyclic graph, represented by a pair (V, E), where, V is a set of 
vertices; E is a set of directed edges joining the vertices; and no loops are allowed. Formally, the 
structure of the BN is a representation of the factorization of the joint probability distribution 
over all the states of the random variable (Heckerman, 1997).  
For a BN consisting of n variables   X1, X2,..Xn, the overall joint distribution over the 
variables is given by the product  



n
i
Xin i
xPXXXP
1
21 )|(),...,,(
                                (15) 
where ПXi represents parent variables of Xi. An advantage of network representation is that it 
allows people to express directly the fundamental qualitative relationship of direct dependency. 
The network then displays a consistent set of additional direct and indirect dependencies and 
preserves it as a stable part of the model, independent of the numerical estimates. The 
directionality of the arrows is essential for displaying non transitive dependencies. It is this 
computational role of identifying what information is relevant or not in any given situation that is 
attributed to the mental construct of causation (Zhaoyu &D’ambrosio, 1993).  
In general, a BN consists of the following (Russell &Norvig, 2003):  
a) A set of random variables (either discrete or continuous) that constitutes the nodes of the 
directed graph. 
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b) A set of directed edges (arrows) that connects pairs of nodes. If there is an edge from 
node Y to node X, Y is called the parent to X and X is referred to as the child to Y. 
For every node Xi, there is a conditional probability distribution that quantifies the effect that any 
parent nodes have on the node in question. The graph is not allowed to have any directed cycles 
and from this, it follows that it is a directed acyclic graph.  
According to Onisko (2002), a BN consists of a qualitative part, encoding the existence 
of probabilistic influences among a domain’s variables in a directed graph, and a quantitative 
part, encoding the joint probability distribution over these variables. The quantification of a 
Bayesian Network consists of prior probability distributions over those variables that have no 
predecessors in the network and conditional probability distributions over those variables that 
have predecessors. These probabilities can easily incorporate available statistics and, where no 
data are available, expert judgment. 
The most important type of reasoning in Bayesian Networks is belief updating, which 
amounts to computing the probability distribution over variables of interest conditional on other 
observed variables. For example, in a battle command situation, the commander might receive 
intelligence reports about rioting by the population in a contested area. He would be fairly certain 
of it being a civil unrest and so refrain from sending in a suppressive force. If in the next instance 
however, a routine patrol in the area of unrest did come under sustained fire, then, the probability 
of civil unrest would be lowered and his belief would be updated. The hypothesis “insurgent 
attack” gets more support and the probability density function over the hypothesis space changes. 
In the network situation of Figure 8, drawing such a conclusion is referred to as evidence 
propagation. The essence of the Bayesian approach is therefore to provide a formalism 
explaining how a person’s existing beliefs can change  in the light of new evidence. Depending 
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on the complexity of the network, belief updating in Bayesian Networks is considered NP-hard 
(Heckerman, 1997), meaning its solution (if it exists) cannot be verified in the polynomial space.   
 Using the example in Figure 9, we can show some derivations and representations of 
conditional probabilities. Consider a simple case of the example network where the variables 
have only binary true or false states. For forward inference, consider that the variables S1 and S2 
are the variables of interest. 
 
Figure 9. Example BN of a battle command situation. 
S1 is High Level Attrition Attack such as a Suicide Bombing while S2 is a variable 
representing a Mob Protest. Variable X1 represents Sectarian Violence while X2 represents 
Threat Forces. The composite hypothesis H0 (Disrupting Stability and Support Operations) is 
informed by a set of hypotheses h1 (Resistance and Liberation) and h2 (Law and Order 
Breakdown).  
 
H0: Disrupting stability 
and support operations
h1:Resistance and 
liberation
h2: Law and order 
breakdown
X1: Sectarian 
violence
X2: Threat forcesS1: Suicide attack
S2: Mob protest
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By abductive inference: 
𝑃(𝑆1 , 𝑆2)
= ∑ ∑ ∑∑ ∑ 𝑃(𝐻0)𝑃(ℎ1|
𝑋2𝑋1ℎ2ℎ1𝐻0
𝐻0)𝑃(ℎ2|𝐻0)𝑃(𝑋1|ℎ1, ℎ2)𝑃(𝑋2|ℎ1 , ℎ2)𝑃(𝑆1|𝑋1, 𝑋2)𝑃(𝑆2|𝑋1, 𝑋2) 
It is not reasonable to estimate P(S1,S2|H0). That is, we cannot reasonably compute the 
probability of Suicide Bombing or Mob Protest even if we are certain both events are linked to an 
attempt to disrupt stability and support operations in the area of interest. In order to infer 
correctly and with a reasonable degree of confidence, we would like to assess more evidence 
such as whether the observed actions are a part of wider resistance and liberation movement or 
simply a result of a breakdown in law and order. If the evidence points to a wider resistance, 
then, we would be interested in knowing whether it is being perpetuated by sectarian militias or 
not. 
 If however, more evidence supports the hypothesis that it’s a law and order breakdown, 
then, we would like to know, with a degree of confidence, whether the breakdown is being 
caused by threat forces and criminal elements or by organized sectarian militias. To assess this, 
we first have to assume some probability distributions for all the parent nodes and the prior 
conditionals for all the variables. Consider the data below as an example: 
For node H0 
P( H0=T) P( H0=F) 
   0.4 0.6 
 
For nodes h1, h2                                                               
 
h1 H0=T H0=F 
 T 0.7 0.3 
F 0.2 0.8 
h2 H0=T H0=F 
T 0.5 0.5 
F 0.7 0.3 
46 
 
 
For nodes X1, X2  
h1 h2 P(X1=T|h1,h2) P(X1=F|h1,h2) 
T T 0.2 0.8 
T F 0.8 0.2 
F T 0.3 0.7 
F F 0.6 0.4 
 
For nodes S1, S2 
 
We can generalize the following  from the examples above: The child node X1  having 
states { xi,1, xi,2…xi,j} , j ≥ 1 is influenced by  n parent nodes  ,Y2…Yn (Das,2006). Any parent node 
Yi  has states {yi,1,y1,2…yi,k}, k≥ 2. The parent nodes represent n random variables Y1..Yn  while the 
child node represents a random variable X .The network will consist of k1 x….x kn  such parental 
configurations requiring a Conditional Probability Table (CPT) with as many probability 
distributions over the child node X. Such a parental configuration will have a distribution of the 
form 
{𝑃(𝑥𝑖,1|𝑦𝑖1, … . , 𝑦𝑖𝑘), 𝑃(𝑥𝑖,2|𝑦𝑖1, … . , 𝑦𝑖𝑘), …𝑃(𝑥𝑖,𝑗|𝑦𝑖1, … . , 𝑦𝑖𝑘)} 
Where 𝑃(𝑥𝑖,1|𝑦𝑖1, … . , 𝑦𝑖𝑘)  is the conditional probability 𝑃(𝑋1 = 𝑥𝑖,𝑗|𝑌1=𝑦𝑖1, … , 𝑌𝑛 = 𝑦𝑖𝑘). Let π 
denote the parental configuration, then, the conditional probability may be written as 𝑃(𝑥𝑖,𝑗|𝜋).  
 We extend the simple network of Figure 9 into a multi-variable multi-attribute 
hierarchical network of Figure 10. Representative of a real world situation, the network will have 
many levels to account for the different types of observable evidence in the problem space. Each 
h1 h2 P(X2=T|h1,h2) P(X2=F|h1,h2) 
T T 0.6 0.4 
T F 0.1 0.9 
F T 0.8 0.2 
F F 0.3 0.7 
X1 X2 P(S1=T|X1,X2) P(S1=F|X1,X2) 
T T 0.6 0.4 
T F 0.2 0.8 
F T 0.7 0.3 
F F 0.4 0.6 
X1 X2 P(S2=T|X1,X2) P(S2=F|X1,X2) 
T T 0.5 0.5 
T F 0.9 0.1 
F T 0.4 0.6 
F F 0.2 0.8 
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level in the hierarchy will have a large but finite number of variables, each of which may have 
more than one state.  
 
Figure 10. Hierarchical BN illustrating the research problem. 
The following definitions are provided for the variables in the network displayed in 
Figure 10: H0 is a composite hypothesis representing an analyst’s apriori belief about a situation 
before new evidence arrives. It is the end state for which the analyst would like to make an 
inference. To account for multiple types of uncertainty in the problem domain, H0 is an 
aggregation of sub-hypotheses h1, h2, h3...hn   each of which has a defined apriori belief. The 
variables X1, X2, X3…Xj define the first level of evidence variables. Variables S1, S2, S3…Sk 
represent the second level of evidence variables directly influenced by the level one variables.  
Depending on the complexity of the problem, the network could have more levels of 
evidence or informational variables, sometimes referred to as intermediate or step variables, to 
support the correct inference. Variables M1, M2, M3…Mr represent the target variables which are 
typically directly observable evidence variables or variables of some specific significance to the 
analyst. Causal representation and the assumption of conditional independence make the 
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computation of the conditional probabilities of the evidence variables relatively straightforward. 
Table 1 shows the conditional probability values for the network of Figure 10 where each 
random variable has several states as shown below. The variable h1 has states h11, h12…h1n. 
Table 1 
Conditional Probability Tables for the Network of Figure 10 
h1 h11 
h2 h21 h22 
h3 h31 h32 h33 h31 h32 h33 
hn hn1 hn2 hn3 hn1 hn2 hn3 hn1 hn2 hn3 hn1 hn2 hn3 hn1 hn2 hn3 hn1 hn2 hn3 
X1 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 a10 a11 a12 a13 a14 a15 a16 a17 a18 
X2 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 b9 b10 b11 b12 b13 b14 b15 b16 b17 b18 
X3 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 c15 c16 c17 c18 
Xj d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9 d10 d11 d12 d13 d14 d15 d16 d17 d18 
 
 Let the conditional probabilities of variable Xi for each state of hi be denoted by {ai.,bi,..di 
}.Then, we can write   
𝑎𝑖 =
𝑃(𝑋1|ℎ11 , ℎ21, ℎ31, ℎ𝑛1), 𝑃(𝑋1|ℎ11, ℎ21 , ℎ31,ℎ𝑛2), 𝑃(𝑋1|ℎ11, ℎ21 , ℎ31,ℎ𝑛3),
𝑃(𝑋1|ℎ11 , ℎ21, ℎ32, ℎ𝑛1), 𝑃(𝑋1|ℎ11, ℎ21 , ℎ32,ℎ𝑛2), 𝑃(𝑋1|ℎ11, ℎ21 , ℎ32,ℎ𝑛3),
𝑃(𝑋1|ℎ11 , ℎ21, ℎ33, ℎ𝑛1), 𝑃(𝑋1|ℎ11, ℎ21 , ℎ33,ℎ𝑛2), 𝑃(𝑋1|ℎ11, ℎ21 , ℎ33,ℎ𝑛3) 
𝑃(𝑋1|ℎ11 , ℎ22, ℎ31, ℎ𝑛1), 𝑃(𝑋1|ℎ11, ℎ22 , ℎ31,ℎ𝑛2), 𝑃(𝑋1|ℎ11, ℎ22 , ℎ31,ℎ𝑛3) 
𝑃(𝑋1|ℎ11 , ℎ22, ℎ32, ℎ𝑛1), 𝑃(𝑋1|ℎ11, ℎ22 , ℎ32,ℎ𝑛2), 𝑃(𝑋1|ℎ11, ℎ22 , ℎ32,ℎ𝑛3) 
𝑃(𝑋1|ℎ11 , ℎ22, ℎ33, ℎ𝑛1), 𝑃(𝑋1|ℎ11, ℎ22 , ℎ33,ℎ𝑛2), 𝑃(𝑋1|ℎ11, ℎ22 , ℎ33,ℎ𝑛3)  
Where 𝑃(𝑋1|ℎ11 , ℎ21, ℎ31, ℎ𝑛1) =   𝑃(ℎ11&ℎ21&ℎ31&ℎ𝑛1|𝑋1)𝑃(𝑋1)/𝑃(ℎ11&ℎ21&ℎ31&ℎ𝑛1) 
= 𝑃(ℎ11|𝑋1)𝑃(ℎ21|𝑋1)𝑃(ℎ31|𝑋1)𝑃(ℎ𝑛1|𝑋1)𝑃(𝑋1)/ 𝑃(ℎ11&ℎ21&ℎ31&ℎ𝑛1)  
Similarly, we compute conditional probabilities bi and ci. In general, for the jth state of the 
random variable X, the conditional probability di is given by  
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𝑑𝑖 =
 𝑃(𝑋𝑗|ℎ11, ℎ21, ℎ31, ℎ𝑛1), 𝑃(𝑋𝑗|ℎ11 , ℎ21, ℎ31,ℎ𝑛2), 𝑃(𝑋𝑗|ℎ11 , ℎ21, ℎ31,ℎ𝑛3),
𝑃(𝑋𝑗|ℎ11 , ℎ21, ℎ32, ℎ𝑛1), 𝑃(𝑋𝑗|ℎ11 , ℎ21, ℎ32,ℎ𝑛2), 𝑃(𝑋𝑗|ℎ11 , ℎ21, ℎ32,ℎ𝑛3),
𝑃(𝑋𝑗|ℎ11 , ℎ21, ℎ33, ℎ𝑛1), 𝑃(𝑋𝑗|ℎ11 , ℎ21, ℎ33,ℎ𝑛2), 𝑃(𝑋𝑗|ℎ11 , ℎ21, ℎ33,ℎ𝑛3) 
𝑃(𝑋𝑗|ℎ11 , ℎ22, ℎ31, ℎ𝑛1), 𝑃(𝑋𝑗|ℎ11 , ℎ22, ℎ31,ℎ𝑛2), 𝑃(𝑋𝑗|ℎ11 , ℎ22, ℎ31,ℎ𝑛3) 
𝑃(𝑋𝑗|ℎ11 , ℎ22, ℎ32, ℎ𝑛1), 𝑃(𝑋𝑗|ℎ11 , ℎ22, ℎ32,ℎ𝑛2), 𝑃(𝑋𝑗|ℎ11 , ℎ22, ℎ32,ℎ𝑛3) 
𝑃(𝑋𝑗|ℎ11 , ℎ22, ℎ33, ℎ𝑛1), 𝑃(𝑋𝑗|ℎ11 , ℎ22, ℎ33,ℎ𝑛2), 𝑃(𝑋𝑗|ℎ11 , ℎ22, ℎ33,ℎ𝑛3) 
Variables with no predecessors are marginally independent while variables that have one or more 
common parents but no arc connecting them are conditionally independent of each other, given 
their common parents. 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented a Bayesian Formalism for representing sensemaking information. 
The belief network reflects a person’s belief about the state of a variable in the real world 
through the use of joint probability distributions over the variables. Bayesian Networks are 
presented as normative cognitive models that support sensemaking under uncertainty. The 
networks are shown to support reasoning about evidence and actions not easily handled by other 
competing computational models. In Bayesian Belief Networks, the inference is done by 
abduction, meaning that we infer from effects to the best explanation of those effects. This 
reflects the behavior of a sensemaking problem. Forward (top-down) inference was shown to 
support information fusion in prospective sensemaking, while backward (bottom-up) inference 
implied support of information fusion in retrospective sensemaking. 
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CHAPTER 4 
The BAMSS Model 
4.1 BAMSS Description 
The Bayesian Abduction Model for Sensemaking Support (BAMSS) is developed as an 
analytical model to support sensemaking information fusion. The model is validated with 
military COA that involves understanding adversary intent. BAMSS can be considered a 
knowledge management tool since it allows one to capture and represent knowledge about a 
sensemaking context as well as provide analytics for information fusion in the same context. 
BAMSS is developed with the Bayesian Network (knowledge construction) while abduction 
reasoning is used for inference via a belief network of expert information. 
4.1.1. System Software Architecture Description 
Figure 11 shows the system software architecture and components of BAMSS. 
 
Figure 11. BAMSS software architecture and components. 
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The Structural Modeling, Inference and Learning Engine (SMILE) library of C++ classes 
provides the library of functions that are used to implement the Bayesian Network inference 
algorithm. SMILE is embedded in the BAMSS model through the use of an Application 
Programming Interface (API) that allows the C++ classes to be called within the model. The 
model creates a dynamically loadable library (.dll) file of the SMILE libraries called Jsmile.dll in 
the Java programming language. Jsmile.dll is configured to provide all the functionality 
necessary to implement the build and reasoning process of the Bayesian Network.    
Using the Jsmile.dll, an executable file (BAMSS.jar) that stores the computational logic 
of the Bayesian inference algorithm is created within the NetBeans Integrated Development 
Environment (IDE). The executable BAMSS.jar is called by the user through a simple graphical 
user interface (GUI) command line. The .dll file interacts with the executable file in a read/write 
mode as shown in Figure 11. The network module is created through the GeNIe graphical user 
interface. GeNIe is accessed through a web browser on the client side of a client-server model 
and contains all the functionality necessary to create a network with nodes and arrows 
representing variables and causal linkages respectively. The networks developed in GeNIe are 
loaded into the model by a simple command on the BAMSS GUI. 
BAMSS GUI facilitates user interaction with the main building blocks of the model in a 
read-only mode. The GUI is implemented in Java with the Java file ProbabilityUI.java and hosts 
command lines for all the model functionalities as well as the data input fields. The 
BayesianNetworkFitness.java is compiled to create the Java class that contains the subroutine for 
calculating the genetic algorithm fitness function. It interfaces with the SMILE library using the 
Java API for Genetic Algorithms (JAGA). JAGA API is an extensible API for implementing 
genetic algorithms in Java and contains a range of genetic algorithms, genotype representations 
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and genetic operators. UpdateBayesGA.java contains classes for the algorithmic implementation 
of the Bayesian Genetic Algorithm. GAResults.java is a Java bean class which contains the final 
results of the Fitness subroutine after evaluation. 
The sensemaking database can be regarded as a repository of conditional probability 
tables that represent the knowledge base for the sensemaker. Initially, the database is loaded with 
apriori beliefs about the hypothesis variables and apriori conditionals for all the other evidence 
variables. The results of the BAMSS.jar executable file run are the posterior probabilities of a 
network loaded in the model and represent the updated beliefs of the sensemaker. These results 
are added into the database using a GUI command line and form the apriori beliefs for the next 
round of computation in read/write format. The results are saved and made available to the user 
for analyses. 
Software development for the model was implemented in a dedicated Java IDE known as 
NetBeans. An IDE is a software application that provides a comprehensive build environment for 
software development. The NetBeans IDE consists of a source code editor, build automation 
tools and a code debugger. Currently, the network module is implemented and hosted in GeNIe; 
the graphical interface to SMILE. The web-based interface to the network module resides on the 
client-server model hosting the GeNIe software. The computational module and the GUI are 
standalone applications developed in the NetBeans IDE. Open Source code for the Bayesian 
Clustering Algorithm and the Genetic Algorithm was downloaded and configured in the IDE 
using a Java API. An API specifies how the software components should interact with each other 
to produce the desired functionality. The final result of the build process is an executable .jar file 
which contains the business logic of the computational module, a library of functionalities, the 
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GUI, and is operable on the Windows suite of Operating Systems (98/NT/2000/XP). BAMSS is 
supported by a suite of software and hardware systems as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Supporting Hardware and Software Suite for BAMSS 
Software Description As used in 
BAMSS 
Advantage Disadvantages Manufacturer 
Java  Java 
programming 
language 
Graphical user 
interface  and 
computational 
algorithm 
implementation 
Class based, object-
oriented and platform 
independent. Has few 
implementation 
dependencies, is 
dynamic and robust 
Longer execution 
times as it runs first 
on JVM (Java 
Virtual Machine). 
Also requires  
larger memory 
allocation than 
other languages 
Oracle 
Network 
Corporation 
JRE Java Runtime 
Environment 
Development of 
the Java 
applications 
Combines the Java 
virtual machine, 
platform core classes 
and supporting 
libraries 
 
  
JRE requires a 
substantial memory 
allocation. 
Oracle 
Corporation 
Java API Application 
Programming 
Interface 
Facilitates 
interaction with 
the SMILE C++ 
libraries 
Allows easy use of 
C++ libraries using 
inbuilt callable 
functions, portable 
and platform 
independent 
Slower and takes 
more memory 
space  
Oracle 
Corporation 
NetBeans 
IDE 
NetBeans 
Integrated 
Development 
Environment 
Development 
environment for 
BAMSS 
algorithm source 
codes 
Extensible and easy 
modular design .Also 
has a large library of 
most  commonly used 
APIs 
 Oracle 
Corporation 
Python 2.7 Interactive 
object-
oriented 
programming 
language 
Genetic algorithm 
implementation. 
 Platform 
independent, easy 
modular design, 
extensible in C++ 
and for applications 
that need API.  
Slower 
computation  time 
compared to C++ 
or Java, user has to 
maintain external  
library 
dependencies 
Python 
Software 
Foundation 
PySide 
1.2.2 
A Python 
Software for 
generating 
bindings to 
the  cross 
platform GUI 
toolkit QT4 
Implementing the 
graphical library 
of the genetic 
algorithm 
Platform independent 
and simple to use 
when creating menus 
Gets complicated 
to debug. Not too 
much 
documentation to 
support 
development 
Qt Project 
JAGA Java API for 
Genetic 
Algorithms 
Genetic algorithm 
implementation in 
Java 
Free and open source, 
contains an extensive 
library of  GAs, GA 
operators and  
genotype  
representations  
None University 
College 
London, 
available at  
www.jaga.org 
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Table 2 
Cont. 
GeNIe Graphical 
Network 
Interface 
Windows user 
interface to 
SMILE; network 
module 
development 
Open source 
software, intuitive 
and easy to learn and 
use 
Too much bugs; 
Exception  
handling is difficult 
 
Decision 
Systems 
Laboratory 
University of 
Pittsburg 
SMILE Structural 
Modeling, 
Inference, 
and Learning 
Engine 
C++ libraries of 
hierarchical 
Bayesian network 
inference 
algorithms 
Open source, 
platform independent 
and  can be 
implemented in Java 
and Python 
The software is 
provided as is, lack 
of development 
documentation. 
Decision 
Systems 
Laboratory, 
University of 
Pittsburg 
 
Hardware Laptop (PC)  
Bandwidth Operates on 2.4 GHz and 5.0 GHz radio 
frequencies (RF) bands 
 802.11g : < 54 Mbps 
 802.11n : < 150 Mbps 
 
Processor  Intel Core 2 Dual Core  (2.93 GHz)  
Operating 
System 
 Windows (98,NT,2000,XP) 
 Red Hat Linux 
 Mac OS X 
 
Scalability  Dual Band : < 64 (32 for the 2.4 GHz and 32 
for the 5.0 GHz) 
 
 
BAMSS is implemented using Open Source software freely available under the GNU 
General Public License, the most widely used free software license. It consists of three modules: 
A network module, a computational module and a GUI for user interface. The modular 
architecture and the Open Source implementation ensure that the model can be modified with 
additional modules or developed further to address new challenges.  
The BAMSS Network module uses the existing GeNIe library and allows the user to 
develop a Bayesian Network representation of the problem domain. This module is important 
because it allows users to define causal relations among the domain variables of interest. The 
user develops a Bayesian Network which qualitatively represents the problem domain to be 
modeled from these relations and by using directed acyclic graphs (DAG). Quantitatively, the 
user defines the network nodes and assigns prior probabilities which serve as inputs to the 
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computational module. Prior conditionals and marginal probability distributions are all input by 
the user based on his apriori knowledge of the problem domain. The user can develop several 
networks based on his/her core knowledge of the problem domain and store such networks in a 
repository on the client side of the network. 
The Computational module takes the input data from the Network and performs belief 
updating and abductive inference using two inference algorithms. The Clustering Algorithm 
(Lauritzhen & Spiegenhalter, 1988; Jensen et al, 1990) is implemented to perform Bayesian 
belief updating. The Clustering Algorithm is an exact algorithm that works by compiling the 
DAG into a junction tree and then, updating the probability there. The Genetic Algorithm (GA) 
introduced by Goldberg (1989) and Mengshoel (1999) is an evolutionary search and optimization 
algorithm for quick variable classification and identification of complete solution sets. In the 
Bayesian Network module, abductive inference using the GA is accomplished by computing the 
MPE or kMPE of events in the Bayesian Network. Both algorithms in the main user interface 
have been implemented in Java.  
 The GUI module enables user interaction with BAMSS. It integrates the network module 
and the computational module and allows the user to manipulate inputs (evidence) while 
observing the changes in the outputs. The textual and graphical output helps in the analysis of the 
effects of the new evidence on the hypotheses or target variables. The interface is the front-end 
to the computational module and enables easy and intuitive data input into it while the 
visualization of the output makes it easier to for the user to understand. It enables the user to 
directly input values for new evidence or load a network from file. The GUI for the 
computational module has been designed as a standalone application to be hosted on the client 
PC and runs on Windows or Linux Operating Systems. 
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An example code for BAMSS implementation in Java is shown in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12. Sample BAMSS implementation in Java. 
ntw.setBayesianAlgorithm(Network.BayesianAlgorithmType.Lauritzen);
                ntw.updateBeliefs();
                logger.info("Network initialisation completed.............");
            } catch (Error ex) {
                this.showMessage("SMILE", ex.getMessage());
                logger.debug(ex.getMessage(), ex);
            }
        }
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………….
       private void updateBeliefbayesActionPerformed(java.awt.event.ActionEvent evt) {//
GEN-FIRST:event_updateBeliefbayesActionPerformed
        if (fileChooserTextField.getText().equals("")) {
            this.showMessage("SMILE- XDSL file not found", "Please select Model file first");
            return;
        }
        double xd = 0, x12 = 0, x13 = 0, x21 = 0, x22 = 0, x23 = 0, x24 = 0, x31 = 0, x32 = 0, 
x33 = 0;
        double md = 0, m12 = 0, m13 = 0, m21 = 0, m22 = 0, m23 = 0, m24 = 0, m31 = 0, m32 = 
0, m33 = 0, m41 = 0, m42 = 0, m43 = 0, m44 = 0;
        double td = 0, t12 = 0, t13 = 0, t21 = 0, t22 = 0, t23 = 0, t31 = 0, t32
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………
 this.updateBayes(xd, x12, x13, x21, x22, x23, x24, x31, x32, x33, yd, y12, y13, y14, y21, 
y22, y31, y32, y33, y41, y42, y43, md, m12, m13, m21, m22, m23, m24, m31, m32, m33, 
m41, m42, m43, m44, td, t12, t13, t21, t22, t23, t31, t32);
        } catch (Exception ex) {
            this.showMessage("SMILE", ex.getMessage());
            logger.debug(ex.getMessage(), ex);
            ex.printStackTrace();
        }
    }//GEN-LAST:event_updateBeliefbayesActionPerformed
    private void x31InputActionPerformed(java.awt.event.ActionEvent evt) {//GEN-
FIRST:event_x31InputActionPerformed
        // TODO add your handling code here:
    }//GEN-LAST:event_x31InputActionPerformed
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………...
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4.1.2 Informational Flow Architecture in BAMSS     
A generic representation of the architecture and information flow in the BAMSS model is 
shown in Figure 12. Initially, a user defined domain specific BBN is created and loaded into the 
model from file or any other linked database.  
 
Figure 13. Information flow architecture in BAMSS. 
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Belief Network. This involves defining the domain state space, identifying all the critical causal 
variables and their relationships, and establishing discretization states for all the identified 
variables. The network topology is also defined at this stage. New evidence such as observed 
data from the field or user defined prior probabilities of the parent nodes and the prior 
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GUI. The prior probabilities are obtained from expert judgment based on the user’s tacit 
knowledge or historical records which document similar cases and their outcomes. In a 
collaborative work setting, the choice of priors may be a simple case of conjecture where several 
analysts brainstorm and agree on values that may be deemed representative of the domain-
specific problem. 
In the topology of the Network, the user defines the hypothesis variables, the evidence 
variables and the target variables of interest. A fully defined BBN with a defined topology and 
CPTs is then, loaded into the model through the GUI functionality. With the network loaded and 
initialized, evidence in the form of probabilities is input into the model through the GUI. The 
network module retrieves the input evidence from the user and initializes the appropriate BBN. 
The Belief Network with the initialized CPTs is then loaded into the computational module. The 
computational module is the inference engine of the model and undertakes updating of the 
Network Beliefs, Belief Revision, and Abductive Inference.  Two algorithms are defined for this 
module; a clustering algorithm which is the fastest exact algorithm for the hierarchical Bayesian 
Network inference and a GA which is an approximate fast search and optimization algorithm for 
performing the Abductive Inference.  
The GUI provides the option of selecting one or both of the algorithms and inputting 
parameters that are appropriate for each algorithm.  The results of the computation are received 
as output by the user through the GUI and comprise of textual output of the posterior 
probabilities of the variables in the Belief Network and a graphical display of the updated Belief 
Network. The updated Belief Network is also loaded and stored in the Network module and can 
be retrieved by the computational module for the next iteration of Belief updating. Updated 
Beliefs form the prior probabilities for the network when the new evidence arrives.  
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The user can draw inferences through the posterior probability output derived from the 
computational module, concerning the best (most probable hypothesis) variable by Abductive 
Inference and this is referred to as prospective sensemaking. In the domain of asymmetric 
warfare, the “probability of attack| evidence” requires the best COA selection P(h|e) from among 
all the hypotheses variables H in the updated Network. The user may also designate target nodes 
in the evidence variables and compute the probability P(e|h) in the case of retrospective 
sensemaking. In the problematic domain under study, the “probability of attack” is known or set 
to a certain value by the user and the change in the value of the target nodes “probability of 
evidence|attack” is observed. In this case, the analyst is interested in finding out the most 
probable causal variable(s) that could produce the selected hypothetical outcome.   
4.1.3 Inference Algorithm in BAMSS 
   To draw the Bayesian Network inference, the Bayesian Clustering Algorithm is used for 
data classification (Lauritzen & Spiegelhalter, 1988; Jensen et al., 1990). The algorithm works 
by first transforming the hierarchical Bayesian Network into a clique tree where each node in the 
tree corresponds to a subset of variables in the original graph. Message propagation is done over 
the clique tree. By transmitting information between the variables in the local clique rather than 
the full joint probability, one can realize and make tractable an efficient inference algorithm and 
inference in complex Bayesian Networks. The choice of the algorithm may be made based on the 
requirements for exact and efficient solution using BAMSS. These requirements, as first 
discussed by Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter (1988), for a hierarchical Bayesian network are 
described below: 
1) Initialization: Generating internal representations of beliefs from which the marginal 
distributions on individual nodes may be easily obtained. 
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2) Absorption of evidence: The effect of multiple pieces of evidence should be independent  
of the order of their arrival 
3) Global propagation: The algorithm should enable the propagation of the effects of the 
evidence received through the Network and enable for Belief revision in the nodes that 
are still not established. 
4) Hypothesizing and propagating single items of evidence:  The algorithm should allow for 
the ability to condition on a node taking on a particular value and observe its effect 
throughout the network. 
5) Planning: For nodes of particular interest, the algorithm should provide for the ability to 
efficiently assess the informational value in eliciting the response to nodes corresponding 
to potentially obtainable data. 
6) Influential findings: After the data are in, the algorithm should have an ability to retract 
their effect in order to identify the strong causal factors. 
    The clustering algorithm satisfies these requirements for BAMSS. The algorithm works 
hierarchically starting with the nodes at the top of the network and randomly (depending on the 
node distribution) selecting a state. This state will then be set and will influence the probabilities 
of all the nodes that have that node as a parent. The algorithm moves through all the nodes this 
way, randomly selecting states and setting them as evidence. The sampling is complete when a 
state is assigned to all the nodes and Belief updating is then performed.  
    According to the second requirement, BAMSS uses information from multiple sources of 
uncertainty as input. The evidence variables are informational variables since they reveal 
information about hypothesis variables. The process of computationally combining these 
informational variables to perform inferences on some target variable (usually a hypothesis 
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variable) is referred to as information fusion. The pseudo code for BAMSS inference algorithm 
is shown in Figure 14. 
 
 
Figure 14. Bayesian inference algorithm for BAMSS. 
4.1.4 BAMSS Working Memory 
Figure 15 shows a screen capture of the GUI for the BAMSS working memory. In the 
first operation, the domain specific BBN from a file residing on the client computer is loaded 
into the module. With the BBN loaded, the user can use the GUI to perform other required 
functions such as inputting new evidence, using commands for computing posterior probabilities, 
performing inference and so on. The interface can be divided into four quadrants. The first 
quadrant contains the input fields for all the random variables defined in the Network module. 
The Network residing on the client side database is loaded into the GUI using the “Select Model 
File” command line. Evidence in the form of numeric probabilities is then typed into the 
evidence input fields. The fields are grouped according to the defined network hierarchical levels 
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with the topmost level containing fields for hypothesis variables, followed by fields for Level 1 
evidence variables, Level 2 evidence variables, Level 3 evidence variables and Level 4 evidence 
variables. The evidence input fields are non-mandatory, that is, the user can input evidence for a 
single variable or can select multiple variables on different levels. 
 
Figure 15. Graphical user interface for the BAMSS model. 
To perform computational inference, the appropriate algorithm is selected from the 
command buttons at the bottom of the first quadrant. Selecting “Update Belief-Bayes” will 
enable the computation of the posterior beliefs of the Network variables given new evidence 
using the clustering algorithm. The algorithm gets the query and goes through the cyclic process 
of hierarchically sampling the nodes and assigning states until all the nodes in the network have 
an assigned state. Belief updating is then undertaken and the completed results are compiled and 
output by the appropriate function in the ProbabilityUI.java subroutine. Selection of the GA 
requires input of a fitness value and some optional GA parameters such as the probability of 
mutation. The results for both algorithms can be exported into a text file format using the 
appropriate “Export” command button.  
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The second and third quadrants show the results of the Belief updating process for the 
selected algorithm, both textually and graphically. The GA textual results fields display the 
gene/variable combination that constitutes a network solution for the input data. The last 
quadrant on the bottom right shows the graphical plots of the GA search process for all the 
network variables for the specified number of generations until the stop criterion is met. The 
“Clear Evidence” command button allows the user to clear the input and output fields of the GUI 
and input new evidence at any point of time.  
4.2 Sample Application: Sensemaking in Asymmetric Warfare Domain 
4.2.1 Identification of Domain Variables 
The US Army led invasion of Iraq − Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF, Iraq, 2003-2009) 
and Afghanistan, − Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF, Afghanistan, 2001-2014) and the Arab-
Israeli conflict − particularly the Israeli-Hezbollah War (Lebanon, 2006) were used as case 
studies for domain understanding, variable identification and extracting the BAMSS data set. 
The identified domain variables and their relationships were iteratively refined following 
interactions with the domain experts before the final set of variables and links was selected to 
create the Network structure. By expert consensus, four key effects that supported a 
commander’s asymmetric battlespace analysis were also identified. 
The first level variables identified were Strategic Effects. In the Network topology, these 
were defined as the level 1 hypotheses variables representing the end states, target states, or 
goals of the adversary that the Blue Force commander would have to correctly infer for 
successful counterinsurgency operations. These effects could be both short-term and long-term. 
These top level effects informed the commander of the adversary’s strategies and were key for 
effective COA planning.  Strategic effects were directly influenced by Political Operational 
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Effects which constituted level 2 evidence variables. Political Operational Effects were defined 
as informational variables that represented the Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information 
and Infrastructural (PMESII) variables of the battlespace. The operational environment would 
need to integrate the PMESII variables to fully define the battlespace. The PMESII variables 
were identified as causal mechanisms that could influence the Strategic Effects. 
Military Operational Effects were informational variables that the adversary could exploit 
to achieve the desired end state or target state. In the Network topology, these variables 
constituted level 3 evidence variables that commanders and their staffs would need to analyze to 
correctly infer the desired end state of the adversary. The adversary could aim at generating and 
exploiting fine scale complexity and seek to prevent the counterinsurgents from acting at the 
scale they were organized for: large scale but limited complexity environment (Ryan, 2008). 
These effects could be deemed dynamic variables that changed constantly depending on changes 
in both the internal and external factors of a group. These variables could also directly influence 
the Political Operational Effects. 
Tactical effects were identified as informational variables that represented the tactical 
effects of the battlespace and constituted level 4 evidence variables in the Network topology. 
These were sensor observable and represented actions taken by the insurgents to influence 
certain outcomes in the battlespace. Depending on the choice of targets, the range of Tactical 
Effects was considered to be very extensive and diverse. Most of these effects were kinetic and 
their strategic outcome was usually second order and not necessarily a direct outcome. 
Destruction of a key military installation for example, could have value not in the physical 
destruction of the target but in the psychological impact the COA would generate among the 
65 
 
 
population. Figure 16 shows an example network to represent the levels of information discussed 
in the preceding section.  
 
Figure 16. BN topology for adversary intent inference in asymmetric battlespace. 
4.2.2 Discretization of the Bayesian Network Variables 
The variables in the Network as shown in Figure 16 are discretized into nonnumeric sub 
factors so as to use the exact search algorithm implemented in BAMSS. The discretization is 
based on factors obtained from literature review as well as expert judgment. The states of each 
node in the Network are sub-factors, and they represent all the possible indicators each variable 
can take within the domain state space. With the Network topology defined and all the variables 
discretized, we can fully specify its parameters.  
Network parameterization is completed by learning the prior probabilities of all the nodes 
without parents and the conditional probabilities of all the nodes with parents, conditional on 
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these parents. A description of all the Network variables along with their discrete states or 
indicators is provided in Appendix A. With the discretization of the variables and the discrete 
states defined, the next step is to perform simulation with the model. 
4.3 Experimental Evaluation 
4.3.1 The Simulation Process 
A simulation experiment was used to validate BAMSS using historical data. Initial 
probabilities for the parent nodes were obtained from intensive research of databases and reports 
on insurgency and counterinsurgency operations in the Middle East. An example of a  database 
used is the RAND Database of Worldwide (RDWTI), available at 
http://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorism-incidents.html  (web accessed on 12/16/2013). The 
RDWTI is a compilation of data from 1968 through 2009 and is free and publicly accessible for 
research and analysis.  
Although the database deals primarily with terrorism incidents, these data were 
considered relevant because terrorism is always used as an operations tactic by insurgents. The 
attributes of terrorism considered relevant to this study are available in the RDWTI and include 
factors such as its use as a military tactic, psychological intentions to cause fear and alarm 
among the population, targeting of civilians and the military forces, group dynamics, and 
political motivation. More apriori data was obtained from the Global Terrorism Data base 
(GTD), an Open Source database hosted by the University of Maryland and the Brookings 
Institution (http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ web accessed on 12/16/2013). Other information from 
the databases was derived based their proportion (percentage) of occurrences. Where 
appropriately defined, these data provided initial prior probabilities.  Tables 3, 4, and 5 contain 
data obtained from these available databases. The data are summarized and reformatted to focus 
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only on the key variables in the problem domain. Table 3 gives the range of targeted actions used 
by insurgents in the region. In the asymmetric battlespace domain, we have focused on some of 
these targeted actions to inform our range of adversary Tactical Effects. Table 4 lists the 
weapons used to implement the targeted actions, an important part of the Tactical Effects 
modelling. 
Table 3 
The RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents, Middle East Region: Targeted Actions 
2003-2007 
Tactic Count Percentage 
Bombing 6261 52.23 % 
Armed Attack 4248 35.44 % 
Kidnapping 816 6.81 % 
Assassination 435 3.63 % 
Unknown 140 1.17 % 
Arson 42 0.35 % 
Other 21 0.18 % 
Unconventional Attack 9 0.08 % 
Barricade/Hostage 8 0.07 % 
Other 5 0.04 % 
Hijacking 2 0.02 % 
 
Table 4 
The RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents, Middle East Region: Weapons, 2003-
2007 
Weapon Count Percentage 
Explosives 6103 50.91 % 
Firearms 4850 40.46 % 
Unknown 455 3.8 % 
Remote-detonated explosive 349 2.91 % 
Fire or Firebomb 115 0.96 % 
Knives & sharp objects 67 0.56 % 
Other 40 0.33 % 
Chemical Agent 8 0.07 % 
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Table 5 
The RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents, Middle East Region: Targets, 2003-
2007 
Target Count Percentage 
Police 3827 31.93 % 
Private Citizens & Property 2589 21.6 % 
Government 1773 14.79 % 
Other 1123 9.37 % 
Religious Figures/Institutions 705 5.88 % 
Utilities 458 3.82 % 
Business 418 3.49 % 
Transportation 220 1.84 % 
Educational Institutions 216 1.8 % 
Journalists & Media 198 1.65 % 
Diplomatic 146 1.22 % 
Unknown 130 1.08 % 
Military 70 0.58 % 
NGO 47 0.39 % 
Telecommunication 29 0.24 % 
Airports & Airlines 16 0.13 % 
Terrorists/Former Terrorists 12 0.1 % 
Tourists 5 0.04 % 
Food or Water Supply 4 0.03 % 
 
The data were input into the BAMSS model and a simulation run was performed. CPTs 
for all nodes conditional on the predecessor nodes were also populated. For the CPT elicitation, a 
Noisy-Max canonical model function built in GeNIe was used to provide a logarithmic reduction 
in the complexity of parameter estimation in the BN (Pradhan et al., 1994; Onisko et al., 2000). 
In this canonical model, the presence of one causal factor in the parent node was sufficient to 
produce an impact in the child node. This canonical model was especially useful for the BAMSS 
network because the influence of each parent node on the child node needed to be considered 
independent of the other parents. Additionally, we did not need to specify all the causal factors 
necessary to produce an outcome in order to define the CPTs because this could be difficult for 
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the experts and computationally intractable to learn from datasets. Therefore, the Noisy-Max 
model was deemed best applicable to real life problems. The use of this canonical model for 
multi-valued variables has been advocated by Zagorecki and Druzdzel (2006) Zagorecki, 
Voortman and Druzdzel (2006), and Dietz (1993). Figure 17 shows a complete 14 node network 
developed for the simulation .As an example, Table 6 defines the nodes and the states for each 
level 2 (Political Operational Effects) variable node used in the CPT computation. 
 
Figure 17. BAMSS course of action analysis network. 
An example of the populated CPTs for the Political Operational Effects variables X1, X2 
and X3 conditional on the Strategic Effects nodes Y1,Y2, Y3 and Y4 is shown in Tables 6 - 9.  
 
 
Y2:Establish political 
Infrastructure
Y4: Promotion of 
fundamentalist  ideologyY1: Resistance and 
liberation from 
occupation
Y3: Control of 
political space
X2: Disruption of 
Stability and Support 
Operations
X1:Ethnic and 
sectarian  supremacy
X3:Exploiting the 
battlespace 
asymmetry
M1:Targeted 
assassinations and 
attacks on institutions M2:Sectarian and 
religious violence
M4:Projecting 
military 
capability
T1:High level 
attrition attacks
T2:Low level 
attrition attacks
M3:Undermining the 
legitimate government 
structures
T3: Attacks on Critical 
infrastructure 
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Table 6 
Complete CPT Elicited for Level 2 Nodes of the BAMSS COA Analysis Network 
Y1 y11= Resistance and liberation 
Y2 y21=Sectarian Governance Structures y22=Insurgent Ideology 
Y3 y31=Political 
opposition 
y32=Control of 
security Space 
y33=Disruption 
of civic 
processes 
y31=Political 
opposition 
y32=Control of 
security space 
y33=Disruption of 
civic processes 
Y4 y41 y42 y43 y41 y42 y43 y41 y42 y43 y41 y42 y43 y41 y42 y43 y41 y42 y43 
x11 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.41 0.41 0.44 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.41 
x12 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.33 
x13 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.25 
x21 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.14 0.19 0.19 0.15 0.19 0.19 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.10 
x22 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.49 0.46 0.46 0.49 0.46 0.46 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.52 
x23 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 
x24 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 
x31 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 
x32 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 
x33 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.21 
 
Table 7 
Complete CPT Elicited for Level 2 Nodes of the BAMSS COA Analysis Network 
Y1 y12=Law and order breakdown 
Y2 y21=Sectarian governance structures y22=Insurgent ideology 
Y3 y31=Political 
opposition 
y32=Control of 
security space 
y33=Disruption 
of civic 
processes 
y31=Political 
opposition 
y32=Control of 
security space 
y33=Disruption of 
civic processes 
Y4 y41 y42 y43 y41 y42 y43 y41 y42 y43 y41 y42 y43 y41 y42 y43 y41 y42 y43 
x11 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.38 
x12 0 20 0.20 0.20 019 0.19 0.19 019 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.21 0. 19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.19 
x13 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.40 0. 40 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.41 
x21 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.14 0.19 0.19 0.15 0.19 0.19 0.15 0.15 0.15 010 
x22 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.49 0.46 0.46 0.49 0.46 0.46 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.52 
x23 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 
x24 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 
x31 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 
x32 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 
x33 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 
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Table 8 
Complete CPT Elicited for Level 2 Nodes of the BAMSS COA Analysis Network 
Y1 y13=Population control 
Y2 y21=Sectarian governance structures y22=Insurgent ideology 
Y3 y31=Political 
opposition 
y32=Control of 
security space 
y33=Disruption 
of civic 
processes 
y31=Political 
opposition 
y32=Control of 
security space 
y33=Disruption of 
civic processes 
Y4 y41 y42 y43 y41 y42 y43 y41 y42 y43 y41 y42 y43 y41 y42 y43 y41 y42 y43 
x11 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.41 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.48 
x12 0 20 0.20 0.20 019 0.19 0.19 019 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.20 0. 19 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 
x13 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.30 0. 30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 
x21 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.14 0.19 0.19 0.15 0.19 0.19 0.15 0.15 0.15 010 
x22 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.49 0.46 0.46 0.49 0.46 0.46 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.52 
x23 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 
x24 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 
x31 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.28 
x32 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.47 
x33 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 
 
Table 9 
Complete CPT Elicited for Level 2 Nodes of the BAMSS COA Analysis Network 
Y1 y14=Excessive force 
Y2 y21=Sectarian governance structures y22=Insurgent ideology 
Y3 y31=Political 
opposition 
y32=Control of 
security space 
y33=Disruption 
of civic 
processes 
y31=Political 
opposition 
y32=Control of 
security space 
y33=Disruption 
of civic 
processes 
Y4 y41 y42 y43 y41 y42 y43 y41 y42 y43 y41 y42 y43 y41 y42 y43 y41 y42 y43 
x11 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.38 
x12 0 20 0.20 0.20 019 0.19 0.19 019 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.21 0. 19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.19 
x13 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.40 0. 40 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.41 
x21 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.09 0.14 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.04 
x22 0.47 0.47 0.50 0.47 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.49 0.49 0.52 0.52 0.49 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.55 
x23 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 
x24 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 
x31 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.31 0.32 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.27 
x32 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.40 0.40 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 
x33 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 
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Belief update was undertaken after the CPT computation and the resultant posterior probabilities 
for all the nodes were displayed. Figure 18 shows this in a forward inference scheme. The output 
displayed on the right side of the GUI is both graphical and textual.  
 
Figure 18. Belief updating (posterior probabilities) of the nodes in the network after new 
evidence is introduced. 
 For illustration purposes, assume that the evidence for the hypotheses variables Y1,Y2, Y3 
and Y4 is set as follows: Let the probability of node Y1 being in state y11= 0.4 represent the belief 
that  there is a 40% chance that the objective of the insurgency is resistance and liberation of the 
country from occupation. Node Y1 = y12 is ascribed a probability of 0.3, meaning there is a 30% 
chance that a breakdown in law and order to disrupt counterinsurgent control of the local security 
situation is the effect under observation. Less belief Y1 = y13= 0.2 is given to probability that the 
insurgent’s intent is to exercise local population control. By the axioms of probability, the 
complement  Y1 = y14 = 0.1 represents our belief that the effect under observation is simply an 
intent by the insurgents to provoke excessive raids by the counterinsurgent forces and use the 
second order effects of that action as a strategy for resistance. 
73 
 
 
To account for multiple sources of information, the input fields are not mutually 
exclusive and the values for nodes Y2, Y3 and Y4 may be input. Assume that there is reason to 
believe that the end state of the insurgency is to establish some form of political infrastructure to 
legitimize the armed struggle (Y2). If this hypothesis is chosen, then, it is believed that the effect 
under observation is related to the development of sectarian governance structures with a 
probability Y2 = y21 = 0.8. The complement Y2 = y22 = 0.2 is attributed to the hypothesis that the 
insurgency political agenda is driven purely by radical ideologies to which the followers 
subscribe. Variables Y3 (y31 = 0.5, y32 = 0.1, y33 = 0.4) and Y4 (y41 = 0.6, y42 = 0.2, y43 = 0.1) are 
similarly defined. 
Next, we input the evidence values for level 2 evidence variables, the Political 
Operational Effects X1, X2 and X3. This is evidence that is obtainable by direct observation of 
battlefield conditions or by analyzing information from various sources. It is known that a major 
influencing factor for conflict in the Middle East is ethnic and sectarian supremacy (X1). By 
analyzing reports, the indicators are weighted such that fundamentalist ideology X1 = x12 is most 
probable at 50%. Equally probable is the legitimacy of Jihad or armed struggle against non-
believers X1|x13 = 0.4. Sectarian identity (X1 = x11), though a dominant concept in insurgencies, is 
weakly supported with a 0.1 probability. For factor X2, evidence for disruption of the ability to 
carry out nation-building and stability operations is assessed. To this, there is slightly more 
evidence of operational modularity (X2 = x22 = 0.4), than the exploitation of local environment 
and feedback mechanisms (X2 = x21 = 0.3). Little evidence supports the notion of ad hoc threat 
forces, criminal networks or part time forces (X2 = x23 = 0.1) while direct force projection to send 
a message of capability to the population (X2 = x24 = 0.2) is marginally better. Similarly, evidence 
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values for variable X3 (x31 = 0.6, x32 = 0.2, x33 = 0.2) are input. More evidence may be entered for 
level 3 (Military Operational Effects) and level 4 (Political Operational Effects) variables. 
The right hand side of Figure 18 shows the textual and graphical output of the computed 
posterior beliefs of all the network variables after Belief Update in the light of new evidence is 
performed. For the input evidence values discussed above, the computed posterior beliefs 
(correct to three decimal places) are as follows: For variable  Y1, y11 = 0.335, y12 = 0.457, y13 = 
0.178, y14 = 0.030. The net effect of the new evidence was to decrease our belief in hypothesis Y1 
= y11 from 40% to 34% and increase our belief in hypothesis Y1 = y12 from 30% to 46%. For 
variable Y2, y21 = 0.840 and y22 = 0.150. In this case, the new evidence did not significantly 
change our belief concerning the variable. The same conclusion may be drawn for variables Y3 
and Y4, whose posterior beliefs are y31 = 0.476, y32 = 0.082, y33 = 0.441, y41 = 0.558, y42 = 0.252, 
y43 = 0.189.  
The computed posterior beliefs for the Political Operational Effects nodes X1, X2 and X3 
are:  X1[ x11 = 0.126, x12 = 0.376, x13 = 0.497], X2[x21 = 0.203, x22 = 0.629, x23 = 0.056, x24 = 0.112] 
and X3[x31 = 0.652, x32 = 0.234, x33=0.114]. The computed posterior probabilities for the Military 
Operational Effects nodes M1, M2, M3 and M4 are: M1[m11 = 0.480, m12 = 0.386, m13 = 0.134], 
M2[m21 = 0.283, m22 = 0.198, m23 = 0.296, m24 = 0.223], M3[m31 = 0.408, m32 = 0.295, m33 = 
0.297] and M4 [m41 = 0.418, m42 = 0.103, m43 = 0.114, m44 = 0.365]. Posterior distribution results 
for the Tactical Effects nodes T1, T2 and T3 are: T1[ t11 = 0.576, t12 = 0.112, t13 = 0.312], T2[t21 = 
0.409, t22 = 0.311, t23 = 0.280], and T3[t31 = 0.692, t32 = 0.308]. Posterior beliefs for the entire 
Network are displayed in graphical format under the “Bayesian Graphs” data field as displayed  
as shown in Figure 18. The posterior probability of each state of variable (textual result) is 
displayed by a bar chart under the variable node. 
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Several simulation runs were performed to test the model. A simulation run consisted of 
mapping of the level 1 Strategic Effects (Y), the level 2 Political Operational Effects (X), the 
level 3 Military Operational Effects (M), and the level 4 Tactical Effects (T). Dimensionally, the 
simulation space was an Y * X* M * T design. The complexity of the Network was determined 
by the number of elements in Y, X, M, and T respectively.  In this case Y = 12, X = 10, M = 14, 
and T = 8, there were 13,440 possible trial runs by the BAMSS model. However, the mappings 
were also realized through probabilistic decision nodes. The minimum number of experiments 
were then equal to 1 (assume Y = 1, X = 1, M = 1, T = 1). Hence, the probabilistic (expected) 
number of experiments depended on the user’s input and could be constrained by 1 ≤ NE ≤ #E 
where, #E = Y * X * M * T, and at least one Y, X, M, or T had elements greater than 1. For the 
simulation runs discussed in the next section new evidence was introduced to nodes selected 
randomly for each variable level. Belief Updating was performed and the results of the updating 
for all the nodes were recorded. Four simulations were conducted, one for each level of network 
variables for a total of 44 simulation experiments. 
4.3.2 Evidence Propagation in the Bayesian Network 
Posterior distributions were obtained for different variables in the Network using random 
input evidence for different simulated scenarios. The hierarchical BBN was initialized with prior 
probabilities for the parent nodes and prior conditional probabilities for all the child nodes at 
each Network level and loaded into the model. A node was randomly in the Network was 
randomly selected and used as an input node for new evidence introduced into the model. With 
the input evidence varying from 0.1 to 0.9 in the range [0, 1], several simulation runs were 
performed on the model and the posterior belief distribution for each value of input evidence 
recorded. With these simulations experimental data were collected and used to evaluate the 
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robustness of the model as well as validation for accuracy. Some simplifications were made for 
purposes of demonstration such as the completeness of the CPT specification in the model. In 
practice however, it is extremely difficult to fill the CPTs with appropriate numbers. With large 
datasets, it is possible to learn the CPTs from real world data (Neapolitan, 2004).  
In the asymmetric warfare domain, such data is difficult to access because of restrictions 
imposed by national security concerns. Tables 10-17 show the posterior belief distributions from 
the experimental simulation. These distributions represent the updated Beliefs for the nodes in 
the Network as new evidence is introduced. The propagation of the new evidence at all levels of 
the network nodes is shown graphically in Figures 19, 20, and 21. Sample statistics are displayed 
for each simulation run showing the mean belief accrual and the standard deviation per value of 
input evidence for all the variables at the selected level.  
Table 10 
Belief Update in Level 1(Strategic Effects) Nodes 
Simulation 
Run 
Posterior Belief  
Strategic Effects 
Input  
Variable 
X1=x11 
y11 y12 y13 y14 y21 y22 y31 y32 y33 y41 y42 y43 
0.1 0.19 0.46 0.26 0.09 0.60 0.40 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.30 0.40 0.30 
0.2 0.19 0.45  0.27 0.09 0.60 0.40 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.30 0.40 0.30 
0.4 0.20 0.42 0.29 0.10 0.60 0.40 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.30 0.40 0.30 
0.5 0.20 0.40 0.30 0.10 0.60 0.40 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.30 0.40 0.30 
0.7 0.21 0.36 0.32 0.11 0.60 0.40 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.30 0.40 0.30 
0.8 0.21 0.34 0.34 0.11 0.59 0.40 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.30 0.40 0.30 
0.9 0.21 0.32 0.35 0.12 0.61 0.39 0.29 0.30 0.40 0.30 0.40 0.30 
 
In Table 10, variables Y3 and Y4 exhibit steady state values of posterior probabilities for 
all values of the input variable X1. To explain this behavior, we examine the CPTs and in 
particular, the priors of Y3 and Y4 and prior conditionals such as P(X1 = x11|Y3 = y33) or P(X1 = 
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x11|Y4 = y41). X1 = x11 represented the factor Sectarian Identity while Y4 = y41 represented the 
factor Nationalism. The expression P(X1 = x11|Y4 = y41) or P(Nationalism| Sectarian Identity) 
could not be defined in the context of the problem. These inadmissible combinations led to 
oversampling by the algorithm resulting into steady state values of posterior probabilities and 
incompatible hypotheses. Table 11 shows a statistical analysis of the posterior belief distribution. 
The sample size refers to the total state space in Table 10 while the mean evidential accrual and 
the standard deviation are derived from the posterior distribution of Table 10.  
Table 11 
Statistical Analysis of Posterior Belief Distribution of Level 1 Nodes 
Simulation Run Posterior Belief 
Input Variable 
X1=x11 
Sample Size Mean Std. Deviation 
0.1 12 0.333 0.125 
0.2 12 0.333 0.124 
0.4 12 0.334 0.119 
0.5 12 0.333 0.117 
0.7 12 0.333 0.113 
0.8 12 0.332 0.111 
0.9 12 0.332 0.113 
 
Table 12 shows the posterior belief distribution for the level 2 (Political Operational Effects) 
evidence nodes with the statistical analysis in Table 13.The variable X2 = x24 exhibits steady state 
values for all the simulation runs. During network development, the prior conditional P(X2 = x24| 
M2 = m22) was set at 20%. Contextual analysis showed that the expression P(X2 = x24| M2 = m22) 
= 0.20 was not admissible contributing to the steady state values for the variable. 
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Table 12 
Belief Update in Level 2(Political Operational Effects) Nodes 
Simulation 
Run 
Posterior Belief 
Political Operational Effects 
Input 
Variable 
M2=m22  
x11 x12 x13 x21 x22 x23 x24 x31 x32 x33 
0.1 0.38 0.27 0.35 0.24 0.41 0.22 0.13 0.51 0.20 0.29 
0.2 0.40 0.24 0.37 0.24 0.40 0.22 0.13 0.51 0.20 0.29 
0.4 0.42 0.19 0.40 0.25 0.40 0.23 0.13 0.51 0.21 0.28 
0.5 0.43 0.16 0.41 0.25 0.40 0.23 0.13 0.50 0.21 0.28 
0.7 0.45 0.12 0.43 0.25 0.39 0.23 0.13 0.50 0.21 0.28 
0.8 0.45 0.10 0.44 0.25 0.39 0.23 0.13 0.50 0.22 0.28 
0.9 0.46 0.09 0.45 0.25 0.39 0.23 0.13 0.50 0.22 0.28 
 
Table 13 
Statistical Analysis of Posterior Belief Distribution in Level 2 Nodes 
Simulation Run Posterior Belief 
Input Variable 
M2=m22 
Sample Size Mean Std. Deviation 
0.1 10 0.301 0.107 
0.2 10 0.300 0.110 
0.4 10 0.302 0.116 
0.5 10 0.300 0.119 
0.7 10 0.299 0.128 
0.8 10 0.299 0.131 
0.9 10 0.300 0.135 
 
Table 14 shows the posterior belief distribution for the level 3 (Military Operational Effects) 
nodes. Evidence in the input variable T3 = t31 was varied from 0.1 to 0.9 and the posterior 
probabilities for all the M nodes, recorded. The posterior belief for node M2 = m22 and M2= m23 
did not change with variations in the input variable. Table 15 shows the statistical analysis with 
the mean evidential accrual at 0.29 for all the simulation runs.  
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Table 14 
Belief Update in Level 3 (Military Operational Effects) Nodes 
Simulation 
Run 
 Posterior Belief 
 Military  Operational Effects 
Input 
Variable 
T3=t31 
m11 m12 m13 m21 m22 m23 m24 m31 m32 m33 m41 m42 m43 m44 
0.1 0.60 0.25 0.15 0.94 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.47 0.26 0.27 0.44 0.13 0.20 0.23 
0.2 0.55 0.28 0.17 0.93 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.47 0.27 0.27 0.43 0.13 0.20 0.25 
0.4 0.47 0.33 0.20 0.93 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.46 0.27 0.27 0.41 0.12 0.19 0.28 
0.5 0.44 0.35 0.21 0.93 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.46 0.27 0.27 0.41 0.12 0.19 0.29 
0.7 0.39 0.38 0.23 0.93 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.45 0.27 0.27 0.40 0.12 0.18 0.30 
0.8 0.37 0.39 0.24 0.93 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.45 0.27 0.28 0.39 0.12 0.18 0.31 
0.9 0.35 0.40 0.25 0.93 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.45 0.28 0.28 0.39 0.12 0.18 0.32 
 
Table 15 
Statistical Analysis of Posterior Belief Distribution in Level 3 nodes 
Simulation Run Posterior Belief 
Input Variable 
T3=t31 
Sample Size Mean Std. Deviation 
0.1 14 0.286 0.246 
0.2 14 0.287 0.238 
0.4 14 0.286 0.231 
0.5 14 0.286 0.229 
0.7 14 0.285 0.227 
0.8 14 0.286 0.227 
0.9 14 0.287 0.226 
 
Table 16 shows the posterior belief distribution for the level 4 (Tactical Effects) nodes. Evidence 
in the input variable M4 = m41 was varied from 0.1 to 0.9 and the posterior probabilities for all 
the T nodes recorded. Table 17 shows the statistical analysis of the posterior belief distribution. 
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Table 16 
Belief Update in Level 4(Tactical Effects) Nodes 
Simulation 
Run 
Posterior Distribution 
Tactical Effects 
Input 
Variable 
M4=m41 
t11 t12 t13 t21 t22 t23 t31 t32 
0.1 0.57 0.11 0.32 0.41 0.31 0.28 0.70 0.30 
0.2 0.57 0.11 0.32 0.41 0.31 0.28 0.70 0.30 
0.4 0.56 0.11 0.32 0.41 0.31 0.29 0.70 0.30 
0.5 0.56 0.11 0.32 0.41 0.31 0.29 0.70 0.30 
0.7 0.56 0.11 0.33 0.40 0.31 0.29 0.69 0.31 
0.8 0.58 0.11 0.30 0.40 0.32 0.28 0.69 0.31 
0.9 0.56 0.11 0.32 0.39 0.31 0.28 0.69 0.31 
 
Table 17 
Statistical Analysis of Posterior Belief Distribution in Level 4 Nodes 
Simulation Run Posterior Belief 
Input Variable 
M4=m41 
Sample Size Mean Std. Deviation 
0.1 8 0.375 0.172 
0.2 8 0.375 0.172 
0.4 8 0.375 0.170 
0.5 8 0.375 0.170 
0.7 8 0.375 0.166 
0.8 8 0.374 0.171 
0.9 8 0.371 0.167 
 
 The posterior probabilities of randomly selected network variables were plotted against 
the probability of evidence of a select input variable to show the propagation of evidence through 
the network. For each plot, a random variable from each level of the hierarchical network was 
selected and its posterior probability plotted for each simulation run. 
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The results of the evidence propagation (belief revision) for the selected variables in the network 
are shown and discussed below. 
 
Figure 19. Belief revision in nodes Y1 = y11, X1 = x11 and T3 = t32 after new evidence is introduced 
in node M1 = m11. 
In this sensemaking vignette, the hypothesis variable is Y1 = y12 (Law and Order 
Breakdown) and the informational variables are X1 = x11 (Sectarian Identity) and T3= t32 
(Infrastructure Sabotage). New evidence was introduced in node M1 = m11, the Insurgent 
Security Target Engagement. Figure 19 shows the posterior probability distribution of nodes 
after seven simulation runs. We noted the strong positive correlation (r = 0.883) between the 
evidence of attacks on security targets (Insurgent Security Target Engagement) and the targeted 
action (Infrastructure Sabotage). By inspection, as there was more evidence on security target 
engagement, there was an observable marginal increase in breakdown in law and order, 
increasing sabotage of infrastructure, and a decreasing trend in sectarian identity. The last node 
indicated the possibility of no evidence of the groups responsible for sabotage to national 
infrastructures. The minor variability in the posterior distribution for variable Y1 = y12 (Law and 
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Order Breakdown) would seem to indicate that evidence introduced in the variable node M1 = 
m11 was non informative, meaning that it did not significantly impact the hypothesis variable Y1. 
 
Figure 20. Belief revision in nodes Y2 = y22, M1 = m11 and T2 = t21 after new evidence is 
introduced in node X3 = x33. 
 For the second sensemaking vignette, the hypothesis variable was selected as Y2 = y22 
(Insurgent ideology) and the informational variables were M1 = m11 (Insurgent Security Target 
Engagement) and T2 = t21 (Insurgent Small Arms Attacks). New evidence was introduced in node 
X3 = x33 (Intelligence Asymmetry). Figure 20 shows the posterior probability distribution of the 
variables after 7 simulation runs. We observed that when evidence for the input variable (X3 = 
x33) was set to 70%, the posterior probabilities for nodes M1 = m11, Y2 = y22, and T2 = t21 
converged supporting the hypothesis of an attack on security targets such as police and military 
leaders using small arms. Increasing the advantage of intelligence asymmetry was non- 
informative on the selected variables. In addition, it seemed that as the reliability of intelligence 
increased (x33), security target engagement decreased (r = -0.987). Under the same scenario, 
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support for the insurgent ideology remained fairly constant. Correlation analysis for the selected 
variables is shown in appendices B, C, and D. 
 
Figure 21. Belief revision in nodes X2 = x22, Y4 = y41 and M2 = m23 after new evidence is 
introduced in node T3 = t32. 
In the last sensemaking vignette, we considered the hypothesis variable Y4 = y41 the 
insurgent concept of Nationalism. For informational variables, we set X2 = x22 (Insurgent 
Modular Operations) and M2 = m23 (Civilian Shelters). New evidence was introduced into 
variable T3 = t32 (Arson). Figure 21 shows the posterior probability distributions after 7 
simulation runs. The hypothesis variable Y4 = y41 recorded the highest evidential accrual as new 
evidence was introduced to T3 = t32. The wider implication of this was to identify most arson 
attacks and property destruction in that particular area of operations as being carried out by the 
local population angered or motivated by nationalistic feelings. It was also easy to conclude that 
the probability distributions for X2 = x22 (Insurgent Modular Operations) and M2 = m23 (Civilian 
Shelters) were almost non-informative, or had no effect on whether arson occured or not.   
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4.3.3 Inference and Courses of Action Analysis 
To analyze the potential courses of action, we consider the results from sensemaking 
vignettes discussed in section 4.3.2. 
1. Insurgent Security Target Engagement (M1=m11). 
a) By examining the evidence propagation in Figure 19, P(Law and Order Breakdown) remains 
relatively stable at 40% with increasing evidence of the adversary targeting of the 
counterinsurgent security personnel. P(Law and Order Breakdown) refers to the probability 
of disrupting counterinsurgent control of the local security situation by limiting their ability 
for military maneuvers and restricting interaction with the population in stability and support 
operations. The relative stability of the posterior belief distribution implies that the causal 
effect of this variable is limited hence it does not carry much weight as a course of action.  
b) The probability that the Insurgent Security Target Engagement as a mode of operation is 
influenced by Sectarian Identity (X1= x11) decreases from 50% to 30% as evidence of 
Insurgent Security Target Engagement increases from 0.1 to 0.9. This implies that operations 
against security personnel cannot be attributed to a particular group. Infact focusing on the 
sectarian identity of the group is detrimental to the course of action selection because of the 
negative correlation. This effect should therefore be discarded. 
c) P(Infrastructure Sabotage| Insurgent Security Target Engagement) increases from 20% to 
40% as the evidence of Insurgent Security Target Engagement increases from 0.1 to 0.9. 
Increase in infrastructure sabotage is the most likely tactical effect of the increase in 
Insurgent Security Target Engagement probably due to the vacuum created by this particular 
military operational effect. The COA would require the commander to increase protection for 
critical infrastructure and security targets 
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2. Insurgent Intelligence Asymmetry (X3 = x33). 
a) P(Insurgent Security Target Engagement| Intelligence Asymmetry) decreases from 60% 
to 35% as evidence for intelligence asymmetry increases from 0.1 to 0.9. Intelligence 
asymmetry refers to insurgents evolving new tactics that strain or defeat the 
counterinsurgent Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (IS&R) assets. This 
implies that better intelligence by the insurgent group may not directly influence this 
mode of operation. The insurgents may in fact be using the intelligence to select soft less 
protected targets instead of security personnel. The commanders COA is to invest more 
resources in recruiting intelligence assets to counteract the asymmetry. 
b) P(Small Arms Attacks| Intelligence Asymmetry) shows minor variability at 40% similar to 
the P(Insurgent Ideology|intelligence asymmetry). The tactical effect Small Arms Attacks 
is not significantly influenced by the insurgent intelligence assets. Both these effects are 
inadmissible as COA. 
3. Tactical Effect Arson (T3 = t32). 
a) P(Insurgent Modular Operations| Arson) decreases from 50% to 40% (approximately) 
with increase in evidence of Arson as a tactical effect from 0.1 to 0.9. Probability of the 
insurgent concept of Nationalism increases from 30% to 40% while the P(Civilian 
Shelters| Arson) remains constant at 30%. Most arson attacks and property destruction in 
a particular area of are carried out by the local population .The commanders’ COA   
should be to consider the tactical effect  as a reflection of nationalistic feelings and take 
appropriate measures in the PMESII spectrum to address this effect. The first and the last 
probability expressions are inadmissible for COA analysis. 
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Table 18 gives a summary of the Network’s inferential conditions and the supportable courses of 
action for the evidence propagation results. 
Table 18 
Summary of Inferential Conditions and Courses of Action for Sample Sensemaking Tasks 
Inferential Condition Conditional 
Probability 
of Evidence 
(%) 
Course of 
Action 
Results Interpretation 
P(Law and order| Insurgent 
Security Target Engagement) 
40 Not 
supported 
Insufficient evidence to show that 
insurgent attacks on coalition 
security targets are the cause of the 
breakdown in law and order 
P(Sectarian 
Identity|Insurgent Security 
Target Engagement) 
50→30 Not 
supported 
Operations against coalition 
security targets cannot be 
attributed to a particular group 
P(Infrastructure Sabotage| 
Insurgent Security Target 
Engagement) 
20→40 Weakly 
supported 
Increase in infrastructure sabotage 
may be a second order effect of 
targeting security because of the 
security gaps created. 
P(Insurgent Security Target 
Engagement| Intelligence 
Asymmetry) 
60→35 Strongly 
supported 
Insurgents may be using the 
intelligence advantage to select  
soft targets and avoid the hard 
security targets 
P(Small Arms Attacks| 
Intelligence Asymmetry) 
40 Not 
admissible 
The inferential condition is 
incompatible with the hypothesis 
P(Insurgent ideology| 
Intelligence Asymmetry) 
40 Not 
admissible 
The inferential condition is 
incompatible with the hypothesis 
P(Insurgent Modular 
Operations| Arson) 
50→40 Weakly 
supported  
Consider incidents of arson as 
effects of operational modularity 
by the insurgents. 
P(Nationalism|Arson) 30→40 Strongly 
supported  
Consider the tactical effect arson 
as a reflection of nationalistic 
feeling by the local population. 
P(Civilian Shelters|Arson) 30 Not 
admissible 
The inferential condition is 
incompatible with the hypothesis 
 
4.3.4 Discussion 
The probability distributions for Strategic Effects provide an insight into the end state of 
the adversary. By performing the inference at this level, an analyst can reasonably draw 
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conclusions about both the short term and long term objectives or goals of an adversary. For 
example, considering Figure 19, the correlation between an increase in attacks on the security 
targets (Security Target Engagement) and the targeted action (Infrastructure Sabotage) should 
prompt more defensive resource allocations for critical infrastructures. Additionally, the 
observable marginal increase in the breakdown in law and order may imply the necessity to 
deploy more security forces in the affected areas with the resultant effects on manpower 
requirements.  
The probability distributions for Operational Effects (Military and Political) give the 
analyst inference on the areas of focus that will enable the adversary to achieve their desired 
Strategic Effects. From the simulation experiment (Figure 20), the strong evidence of small arms 
attacks (a targeted action) against security targets may require a change in force protection 
conditions, for example necessitating convoy protection and reduced foot patrols in the affected 
areas. 
 Probability distributions for Tactical Effects provide inference into the actual methods, 
techniques, tactics, and procedures that the adversary may employ to attack selected targets. In 
Figure 21, the analyst may note the rise in nationalistic or sectarian sentiment and the 
corresponding increase in cases of arson. Arson as a weapon is more effectively employed by the 
local population. It can be inferred then, that this tactical effect is being carried out by segments 
of the population sympathetic to the insurgent goals by linking them to nationalist ideals.  
Depending on the complexity of the asymmetric battlespace, the potential range of 
Tactical Effects is quite extensive and diverse. For purposes of simplicity only a few effects were 
modelled in the Network. With these probabilities, the analyst could infer the likelihood of a 
specific attack mode, target type, whether or not the target would be attacked based on its 
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symbolic or iconic value, whether it would be a single attack or a set of coordinated attacks and 
the relative location of the attack. It should be emphasized that the importance of these posterior 
belief distributions lies in the threat levels posed by each variable and not so much the specificity 
of the actual numbers.  
4.4 Model validation 
4.4.1 Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analyses were performed on BAMSS to demonstrate its robustness and 
efficacy in responding to probability changes in information.  The purpose of sensitivity analysis 
in this research is to enable the analyst to see the various effects of high influence variables or 
events based on their occurrence probabilities on the overall battlefield information. A good 
discussion on the methodology for sensitivity analysis in Bayesian Networks can be found in 
Woodberry et al. (2004; 2007). For the BAMSS Network, target nodes representing Tactical 
Effects were selected and the probability of each of the parent nodes representing the Strategic 
Effects was varied over the [0,1] probability space by directly introducing evidence while 
keeping all the other nodes fixed. Changes in the target nodes were then observed and plotted 
graphically.  
Table 19 
Probability of New Evidence Introduced in the Network 
Simulation 
Run 
Input evidence  
Strategic Effects 
Run # y11 y12 y13 y14 y21 y22 y31 y32 y33 y41 y42 y43 
1 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.99 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.7 0.5 0.9 0.7 
2 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.2 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.8 
3 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.8 0.4 0.2 
4 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 
5 0.9 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.9 0.9 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 
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Table 20 
Posterior Probability of Target Nodes 
Simulation 
Run 
Posterior belief 
Tactical Effects 
Run# t11 t12 t13 t21 t22 t23 t31 t32 
1 0.57 0.11 0.32 0.41 0.31 0.29 0.7 0.30 
2 0.56 0.09 0.31 0.40 0.30 0.28 0.69 0.30 
3 0.54 0.13 0.28 0.42 0.30 0.28 0.72 0.28 
4 0.55 0.10 0.25 0.39 0.32 0.26 0.66 0.34 
5 0.53 0.08 0.29 0.36 0.33 0.31 0.74 0.26 
 
 
Figure 22. Sensitivity of posterior probabilities for Tactical Effects T1 = t11, T1 = t12 and T1 = t13: 
Parent node Y1 = y12 is varied. 
In the sensitivity analyses of the Tactical Effects node T1 (t11, t12, and t13) it was observed 
that the BAMSS model did not significantly respond to changes in parent variable Y1 = y12 (Law 
and Order Breakdown). It is simplistic to argue that the Tactical Effects (t11, t12 and t13) have 
very little influence on the breakdown in the security situation as the sensitivity charts portray. A 
reasonable explanation would be that the causal linkage is tenuous and needs to be redefined 
during the development of the network topology. Further examination of the sensitivity analysis 
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charts indicates that the posterior distributions of the effects t11, t12 and t13 are mutually exclusive 
on the effect y12. The posterior probability of T1 = t11 is the highest for every level of input  
peaking at 58% implying that civilian suicide bombing is the most prevalent tactical effect for 
the insurgent group. With evidence for law and order breakdown greater than 70%, there is a 
marked increase in incidents of remotely detonated IEDs (T1 = t12). Correspondingly, there is a 
drop in the probability of firing RPGs (T1 = t13). 
 
Figure 23. Sensitivity of posterior probabilities for Tactical Effects T2 = t21, T2 = t22 and T2 = t23: 
Parent node Y4 = y42 is varied. 
In the second simulation, a sensitivity analysis was applied to the node Y4 = y42 (Sectarian 
Violence) by varying the input (evidence) to the node, keeping all the other nodes fixed and 
observing the variations in the posterior distributions of the target nodes. In the results shown in 
Figure 23, node T2 = t22 (Coercive Threats) and T2 = t23 (Convoy Ambushes) displayed low 
sensitivity to the evidence variation while node T2 = t21 (Small Arms Attacks) showed an increase 
in the posterior probabilities accompanied by steeper changes. An examination of the sensitivity 
charts revealed that the posterior distributions of effects Coercive Threats (T2 = t22) and Convoy 
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Ambushes (T2 = t23) co-existed indicating the possibility of some interaction effects. The most 
significant changes occurred in the effect Small Arms Attacks which recorded the highest 
posterior probability (0.43) for the input variable. 
 Lastly, sensitivity analysis was done for target nodes T2 = t23 (Convoy Ambushes), T3 = t31 
(Infrastructure sabotage), and T3 = t32 (Arson), varying the inputs and keeping all the other nodes 
fixed. The results were plotted in Figure 24. The posterior distribution for Infrastructure 
Sabotage recorded the highest sensitivity (0.75) to the input variable Y2 = y22 (Insurgent 
Ideology). 
 
Figure 24. Sensitivity of the posterior probabilities for Tactical Effects node T2 = t23, T3 = t31 and 
T3 = t32: Parent node Y2 = y22 is varied. 
Additional examination of Figure 24 also revealed that the posterior distribution for effects 
Infrastructure Sabotage and Arson were mutually exclusive, indicating some interaction effects 
between the two factors. The response trajectory for t23 and t31 is the same for changes in y22 
although the magnitude was different. This could imply strong causal linkages between the two 
effects. When the input evidence was varied between 0.1 and 0.4, both effects showed a negative 
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gain response. When the input range increased beyond 0.4, both displayed a positive gradient, 
peaking at 0.72 for t31 and 0.29 for t23. 
4.4.2 Inference and Courses of Action Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis allows the commander to infer about the levels of uncertainty for the 
select hypothesis variables. It also allows analysts to perform a what-if analysis to assess the 
effects of the likelihood of the target variables. In the sensemaking vignettes used in this 
simulation, we varied the hypothesis nodes and observed the uncertainty concerning the tactical 
effects nodes. P(Law and Order |High Level Attrition Attacks) did not show significant variation 
to changes in input evidence from 0.1 to 0.9. P(Civilian Suicide Bombing) showed the highest 
posterior belief  accrual peaking at 58% demonstrating that the new evidence on this variable 
could confirm the most likely posteriori hypothesis (Y1 = y12). On average, P(Remotely 
Detonated IEDs|Law and Order Breakdown) was 10% while P(Rocket Propelled Grenades|Law 
and Order Breakdown) was 28%. Summarizing from these statistics, the commander should 
consider variables with posterior distributions that exhibit the greatest variation in response to 
changes in the input variable for additional analysis. 
From Figure 23, P(Small Arms Attacks| Sectarian Violence) recorded the highest 
aposteriori probability at 44%. A COA analysis by the commander requires a closer examination 
of the differences between t22 (Coercive Threats, 30%) and t23 (Convoy Ambushes, 30%) which 
seemed to exhibit interaction effects. From Figure 24, Infrastructure Sabotage recorded the 
highest variations and posterior belief at 75% as evidence in the input variable Y2 = y22 
(Insurgent Ideology) was varied from 0.1 to 0.9. The high degree of sensitivity to the variation in 
input should prompt the commander to perform additional what-if analyses to identify additional 
causal factors. Similar analysis could be extended to P(Convoy Ambush| Sectarian Violence) and 
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P(Arson| Sectarian Violence),  both with average aposteriori probability of 30% since they 
exhibit mutually exclusive behavior. Table 21 gives a summary of the inferential conditions and 
the courses of action for the sensitivity analysis results. 
Table 21 
Summary of Sensitivity Analysis Inferential Conditions and Courses of Action  
Inferential Condition Conditional 
Probability of 
Evidence (%) 
Course of 
Action 
Results Interpretation 
P(Civilian Suicide 
Bombing|Law and order 
Breakdown) 
55 Strongly 
supported 
Law and order breakdown is likely 
to occur 55% of the time because 
of suicide bombing of civilian 
targets 
P(Remotely Detonated 
IEDs|Law and Order 
Breakdown 
10 Weakly 
supported 
Remotely denotated IEDs are not a 
major contributing factor to the law 
and order breakdown (only 10% of 
the time) 
P(Rocket Propelled 
Grenades|Law and 
Order Breakdown 
28 Weakly 
supported 
Rocket Propelled Grenades is not a 
significant contributory factor to 
law and order breakdown 
P(Small Arms Attacks| 
Sectarian Violence) 
44 Strongly 
supported 
Evidence supports the increase in 
the use of small arms as a targeted 
action in sectarian violence 
P(Coercive Threats| 
Sectarian Violence 
30 Additional 
analysis 
No conclusive evidence to support 
this COA. Additional analysis 
needed. 
P(Convoy 
Ambushes|Sectarian 
Violence) 
30 Additional 
analysis 
No conclusive evidence to support 
this COA. Further analysis is 
needed to isolate the causal factors 
P(Infrastructure 
sabotage|Sectarian 
Ideology) 
75 Strongly 
supported 
Strong evidence to show that the 
ideology of the insurgents is linked 
to attacks on certain critical 
infrastructure. 
P(Convoy 
Ambush|Sectarian 
Ideology) 
30 Additional 
analysis 
No conclusive evidence to support 
this COA. Further analysis is 
needed to isolate the causal factors 
P(Arson |Sectarian 
Ideology) 
30 Additional 
analysis 
No conclusive evidence to support 
this COA. Further analysis is 
needed to isolate the causal factors 
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4.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented experiments and validations of the BAMSS model using a case 
study in asymmetric warfare. Some examples on using BAMSS for sensemaking in the context 
of the simulation experiment were presented. We developed and analyzed different vignettes 
representative of the asymmetric warfare domain. In the first vignette, the sensemaking task 
required an analyst to create a hypothesis variable Y1 = y12 where y12 represented Law and Order 
Breakdown. New evidence was then introduced in the node M1 = m11, where m11 was an indicator 
for the Security Target Engagement by varying the input data from 0.1 to 0.9. Results from seven 
simulation runs were then analyzed for select informational variables X1 = x11 (Sectarian Identity) 
and T3 = t32 (Infrastructure Sabotage). 
By examining the evidence propagation in the first vignette, the probability of (Law and 
Order Breakdown) remained relatively stable at 40% with increasing evidence of adversary 
targeting of the counterinsurgent security personnel. The relative stability of the posterior belief 
distribution implied that the causal effect of this variable was limited hence did not carry much 
weight as a COA. The probability that the Insurgent Security Target Engagement as a mode of 
operation as influenced by Sectarian Identity (X1= x11) decreased from 50% to 30% implying 
that operations against security personnel could not be attributed to a particular group. In fact, 
focusing on the sectarian identity of the group could be detrimental to the course of action 
selection because of the negative correlation and this effect ought to be discarded. Probability of 
(Infrastructure Sabotage| Insurgent Security Target Engagement) increased from 20% to 40%. 
Increase in infrastructure sabotage was the most likely tactical effect of the increase in Insurgent 
Security Target Engagement probably due to the vacuum created by this particular military 
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operational effect. This COA would require the commander to increase protection for critical 
infrastructure and security targets.  
For the second vignette, the hypothesis for the sensemaking task was changed to Y2 = y22 
(Insurgent ideology). Evidence was introduced in node X3 = x33 (Intelligence Asymmetry) and the 
posterior probabilities for informational variables M1 = m11 (Security Target Engagement) and T2 
= t21 (Small Arms Attacks) were computed. Probability of (Insurgent Security Target 
Engagement| Intelligence Asymmetry) decreased from 60% to 35% as evidence for intelligence 
asymmetry increased from 0.1 to 0.9. This implied better intelligence by the insurgent group did 
not directly influence this mode of operation. The commander’s COA would be to invest more 
resources in recruiting intelligence assets to counteract the asymmetry. Probability of (Small 
Arms Attacks| Intelligence Asymmetry) showed minor variability at 40% similar to the 
P(Insurgent Ideology|intelligence asymmetry). The tactical effect Small Arms Attacks was not 
significantly influenced by the insurgent intelligence assets. Both these effects were inadmissible 
as COA. 
In the last sensemaking vignette, we considered the hypothesis variable Y4 = y41, the 
insurgent concept of Nationalism. For informational variables we set X2 = x22 (Insurgent Modular 
Operations) and M2 = m23 (Civilian Shelters). New evidence was introduced into variable T3 = t32 
(Arson). The probability of (Insurgent Modular Operations| Arson) decreased from 50% to 40% 
(approximately) with an increase in evidence of Arson as a tactical effect from 0.1 to 0.9. The 
probability of Nationalism increased from 30% to 40% while the P(Civilian Shelters| Arson) 
remained constant at 30%.The commanders’ COA would then be to consider the tactical effect  
as a reflection of nationalistic feelings and take appropriate  measures in the PMESII spectrum to 
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address this effect. P(Insurgent Modular Operations| Arson) and P(Civilian Shelters| Arson) 
were not admissible for COA analysis. 
 A sensitivity analysis was performed on the model output for the second sensemaking 
problem using three simulation experiments. The first experiment entailed the selection of target 
nodes representing Tactical Effects variable T1 (t11, t12, and t13). The probability of (Law and 
Order |High Level Attrition Attacks) did not show significant variation to changes in input 
evidence from 0.1 to 0.9. P(Civilian Suicide Bombing) showed the highest posterior belief  
accrual peaking at 58% demonstrating that the new evidence on this variable could confirm the 
most likely aposteriori hypothesis (Y1 = y12). On average, P (Remotely Detonated IEDs|Law and 
Order Breakdown) was 10% while P(Rocket Propelled Grenades|Law and Order Breakdown) 
was 28%. The commander would consider the variable Civilian Suicide Bombing  for additional 
analysis since it exhibited the greatest variation in response to changes in the input variable.  
In the second simulation, a sensitivity analysis was performed on variable T2 (t21, t22, t23), 
varying the input to node Y4 = y42 (Sectarian Violence). P(Small Arms Attacks| Sectarian 
Violence) recorded the highest aposteriori probability at 44%. A COA analysis by the 
commander would require a closer examination of the differences between t22 (Coercive Threats, 
30%) and t23 (Convoy Ambushes, 30%) which seemed to exhibit interaction effects. Lastly, 
sensitivity analysis was done for target nodes T2 = t23 (Convoy Ambushes), T3 = t31 (Infrastructure 
sabotage), and T3 = t32 (Arson). Infrastructure Sabotage recorded the highest variations and 
posterior belief at 75% as evidence in the input variable Y2 = y22 (Insurgent Ideology) was varied 
from 0.1 to 0.9. Additional analysis could be extended to P(Convoy Ambush| Sectarian Violence) 
and P(Arson| Sectarian Violence) both with average aposteriori probability of 30% since they 
exhibited mutually exclusive behavior. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Optimizing Abductive Inference in BAMSS with Genetic Algorithm 
5.1 Genetic Algorithms  
The Bayesian Clustering Algorithm (Lauritzen &Spiegelhalter, 1988) described in 
Chapter 4 has limitations in terms of resource utilization and the bounded search space. The 
BAMSS model overcomes these limitations by using the GA, thereby increasing its efficiency, 
scalability and robustness. A  GA is a variable search procedure that is based on the principle of 
evolution by natural selection (Goldberg, 1989). The procedure works by evolving sets of 
variables (Chromosomes) that fit certain criteria from an initial random population via cycles of 
differential replication, recombination and mutation of the fittest chromosomes. 
GAs have several advantages over other methods. Conventional search methods are not 
robust, as discussed in Goldberg (1989). GAs improve over the local scope of traditional 
methods by searching in parallel many subspaces in multidimensional spaces with complex 
topologies. Under time constraints, enumerative approaches are often not feasible or too slow. 
Goldberg notes that GAs differ from other methods in the following ways: 1) GAs work with a 
coding of the parameter set, not the parameters themselves; 2) GAs search from a population of 
points, not from a single point; 3) GAs use an objective function without any auxiliary 
knowledge;  and 4) GAs use probabilistic transition rules, not deterministic rules. A population 
representing candidate solutions is evaluated for fitness using a fitness function. Genetic 
operators such as crossover and mutation then create a new population from the old population. 
The probability of transfer of the genetic material of an individual is a function of its fitness.  
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Previous research on the use of GAs for BN inference has been done by Rojas-Guzman 
and Kramer (1993, 1996); Gelsema (1995); Lin et al., (1990); Santos, Shimony and Williams 
(1996); and Welch (1996). de Campos et al., (1999, 2002) did extensive research on partial 
abductive inference in Bayesian Belief Networks using GAs. By focusing only on a subset of 
network variables (partial abduction) known as the explanation set, de Campos et al. were able to 
solve the maximum a posteriori (MAP) probability problem using approximate GA algorithms. 
Mengshoel (1998) used GA in function optimization (finding the most probable explanation) 
focusing particularly on the role of niching and scaling to solve the problems of premature 
convergence and diversity preserving. This was followed by research in using GAs with 
probabilistic crowding replacement for fast and efficient search to perform Network inference 
(1999). A good review of evolutionary algorithms in Bayesian network learning and inference 
tasks is provided by Larranaga, et al., (2013)  
5.1.1 Representation 
In GAs, a solution or individual is conventionally represented by a string of integers or 
chromosomes which encodes the individual genotype. Each position or gene in the string 
corresponds to one variable in the belief network. Each gene can take a number of values 
(alleles) from a finite discrete alphabet which may be different for each gene and corresponds to 
the number of discrete values that the variable can assume in the Belief Network. 
GAs require the existence of a metric in the space of possible solutions. In this case, a 
clearly defined metric is the absolute probability of each possible solution (or point in the search 
space or system state in the BN space).Within the Belief Network framework, performing this 
calculation is straightforward for the special case in which all the nodes have been instantiated. 
The fitness metric corresponds to the individual phenotype and is a product with one factor for 
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each node. Each factor is either a prior probability for parent nodes or a conditional probability 
(for child nodes). These probabilities are efficiently retrieved using multidimensional arrays. A 
phenotype (fitness metric or probability) corresponds to each genotype (set of variable-value 
assignments). 
5.1.2 Parameters 
  BAMSS requires the specification of two GA parameters; the probability of Crossover 
and the probability of Mutation. Crossover (reproduction) is the GA operator that enables 
reproduction between two parents to create new members of the population from the previous 
generation. Two parents can create one or two children in the case where a choice is necessary to 
avoid losing useful new individuals in the resultant population. The genotype of each new 
individual is made up by combining the genotypes of the parents. In traditional GAs, where two 
parents are copied into two children, two positions are randomly chosen in the new strings and 
the genes located between the two positions are interchanged. 
The mutation operator introduces random changes in one allele of the genotype of one 
individual. The mutation frequency is usually very low and its goal is to maintain diversity in the 
population to avoid premature convergence. A BN can be used for predictive reasoning or 
diagnostic abductive inference in which case, any arbitrary subset of variables may be 
instantiated during the inference process. The instantiated values are not changed by the mutation 
to guarantee that all individuals retain legal and meaningful genotypes.  
5.1.3 Fitness Function 
The Bayesian Network Inference Algorithm computes the probability density over a 
variable H given new evidence D formally denoted as P(H|D).The two abductive inference tasks 
in the BN are belief updating and belief revision. Belief updating computes the posterior belief 
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over a hypothesis node H given instantiated evidence nodes D1, D2…Dm as identified by  
P(H|D1=d1,D2=d2,…Dm=dm). Belief revision computes the posterior belief over a set of 
hypothesis nodes H1,H2..Hk given the evidence nodes D1, D2…Dm, more formally written as 
P(H1,H2…Hk|D1=d1,D2=d2,…Dm=dm). For the case where all nodes are instantiated, belief 
revision is known as computing an explanation and the task of computing the Most Probable 
Explanation (MPE) or the k Most Probable Explanations (kMPE) is referred to as abductive 
inference in the model. The following definitions related to the BAMSS model are made: 
Definition 1 
The posterior probability P(h|D) of a network variable as defined by equation(1)  in Chapter 3 is 
computed as follows: 
)(
)()|(
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The fitness function to be used then is based on the posterior probability P(h|D) of the Network 
as defined above. Let all the explanations be ordered according to their posterior probability:  
P(h1|d)≥ P(h2|d)≥P(h3|d)≥…..P(hn|d)                                   (16) 
 Here, the most probable explanation (MPE) is h1. The k most probable explanations (k-MPE) are 
h1, h2,…hk (k≤n). The experimental population consists of a set of explanations or chromosomes 
{ h1, h2,…hn} where n is the population size. The objective is to obtain the posterior probabilities 
of a set of variables (X1,X2,..Xn ) that can be regarded as influencing a particular effect, for 
example, the probability that insurgents adopt certain Tactical effects given that we can infer 
their Sectarian Identity and the Fundamentalist Ideology they adhere to. The overall joint 
probability of the set of variables is given by the product  


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The fitness function is a simple look-up function that computes the overall joint probability of 
the network (known as the network solution) for different combinations of variables and returns 
MPE for the Network based upon a user selected fitness value. Formally, the fitness function for 
BAMSS model can be represented as:  



n
i
XiXii i
xPXfitness
1
)|(maxarg)(
                                  (18) 
where 𝑋𝑖  is the set of all the variables in the network and the right hand side returns the 
maximum argument of the product term. Owing to the ability of the GA to undertake parallel 
search, multiple network solutions compliant with the fitness value (kMPE) may be generated 
and its left to the analyst to evaluate the probability profile of each of the solutions for the best 
COA selection. The combination of variables in the network solution (MPE) constitutes the 
phenotype of interest to the analyst. 
Definition 2 
Since a BN is a directed acyclic graph, a topological sort can be used to linearly order the 
nodes in a BN and a GA string (chromosome) is organized according to the linear order. Let 
𝑋𝑗 = 𝑥𝑗 be the assignment to node j in the BN. If all the nodes are binary, i.e  𝑥𝑗 ∈  {0, 1} then the 
one to one  mapping from the random variable Xj to the chromosome aj in position j is fully 
defined by the vector aj where aj is a string of zeros and ones  for example [10011011101]. In the 
case of the BAMSS model, the random variables have cardinality greater than 2 i.e, 𝑥𝑗 ∈
{0,1,2. . 𝑛} where n represents the nth state of the higher cardinality alphabet hence, more 
appropriately we define the vector string aj as a string of real valued integers. 
[0112211220102112] is an example of a string where the nth state of alphabet is represented by 
the integer 2 in a string of cardinality 3.  
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5.2 Implementing the Genetic Algorithm in BAMSS  
A schematic representation of the information flow and processing in GA is shown in 
Figure 25. 
 
Figure 25. The canonical GA procedure as applied to the BAMSS model. 
The initial step involves a generation of a population of chromosomes (random variable sets). 
Each chromosome in the population is then evaluated according to a user selected fitness value. 
If the chromosome has a score higher than a set threshold value (τ*), this chromosome is selected 
and the procedure stops. The chromosome is then decoded for its real value (phenotype) and 
output by the model as the MPE for the set of random variables. 
If the chromosome has a lower score than τ*, the chromosomes are reproduced 
proportional to their fitness to create a new population. Chromosomes with a higher fitness score 
will reproduce more numerous offspring. In the crossover stage, the genotype of the replicated 
parents is combined by randomly selecting two parent chromosomes and swapping their genetic 
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information. In this way, two new chromosomes are created adding to the range of possible 
solutions to the Network. To avoid premature convergence of the solutions, mutations are 
introduced in the chromosomes randomly to diversify the gene pool. Mutation also ensures that 
the entire state space is searched. The newly created population is then re-evaluated again using 
the fitness function and the fittest individuals selected. This cycle (also called a generation) is 
repeated until a predefined threshold is met.  
The pseudo code for the canonical genetic algorithm or Simple Genetic Algorithm 
(Goldberg, 1989; Mengshoel, 1999) is described below: 
 
Figure 26. A simple genetic algorithm (Mengshoel, 1999). 
Note that maxgen is the iteration threshold and the outermost loop is repeated until this 
threshold is reached. For each generation, the GA functions select, crossover, mutate and the 
objective function objfunc are iterated. select(pop) selects an individual from the input 
population. P(crossover) takes chromosomes chrom1 and chrom 2 as input  and creates new 
chromosomes  as output  by crossing over with a probability  P(crossover). P(Mutation) mutates 
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each allele in the chromosome (chrom) and then returns a mutated chromosome. Objfunc refers 
to the objective function which is used for computing the fitness of the two new individuals. 
Decode maps the genotype to a phenotype (real value) of the chromosome. The fitness function 
objfunc takes a value from the phenotypic space and assigns it a fitness value. 
5.3 BAMSS Analysis with GA 
5.3.1 Data Encoding and Input for Simulation 
Chromosomes in a BBN network are represented using real integers instead of binary 
encodings. The reason for selecting higher order cardinality alphabet is because of:  1) The 
complex nature of the problem which makes binary encodings infeasible and 2) Research by 
Antonise (1989), Bhattacharyya and Koehler (1994), and Davis (1991) which shows that higher 
cardinality alphabets provide better results. We used the BAMSS COA Analysis network 
developed in the GeNIe Network module to evaluate the model GA. The node probabilities were 
obtained by querying the Bayesian Inference module while belief updating was done using the 
Bayesian Clustering Algorithm implementation. Discrete states of each node in the network 
corresponding to the states of a selected random variable and their corresponding prior and 
conditional probabilities were encoded as shown in Tables 22-25. 
Since Level 1 nodes are parent nodes, Table 22 gives the marginal distribution of all the 
variables that constitute that level.  
Table 22 
Level 1 Nodes Chromosome Encoding 
Y1 P(Y1) Y2 P(Y2) Y3 P(Y3) Y4 P(Y4) 
1 0.5 1 0.6 1 0.3 1 0.2 
2 0.3 2 0.4 2 0.3 2 0.6 
3 0.2   3 0.4 3 0.2 
4 0.1       
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Tables 23-25 give the conditional distribution of the rest of the informational variables in the 
Network. Since all Level 2, Level 3 and Level 4 variables are child nodes, the conditional 
dependencies must be encoded as shown. For ease of computation, it is assumed that all the 
variables have non-zero conditional probabilities and non-zero mutual information. 
Table 23 
Level 2 Nodes Sample Chromosome Encoding 
X1 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 P(X1|Y1Y2Y3Y4) X2 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 P(X2|Y1Y2Y3Y4) 
1 1 1 1 1 0.45 1 1 1 1 1 0.50 
2 1 1 1 1 0.30 2 1 1 1 1 0.80 
3 1 1 1 1 0.62 3 1 1 1 1 0.60 
1 2 1 1 1 0.80 4 1 1 1 1 0.35 
2 2 1 1 1 0.78 1 2 1 1 1 0.80 
3 2 1 1 1 0.19 2 2 1 1 1 0.70 
1 3 1 1 1 0.55 3 2 1 1 1 0.37 
2 3 1 1 1 0.45 4 2 1 1 1 0.23 
3 3 1 1 1 0.88 1 3 1 1 1 0.40 
1 4 1 1 1 0.34 2 3 1 1 1 0.20 
2 4 1 1 1 0.70 3 3 1 1 1 0.92 
 
Table 24 
Level 3 Nodes Sample Chromosome Encoding 
M1 X1 X2 X3 P(M1|X1X2X3) M2 X1 X2 X3 P(M2|X1X2X3) 
1 1 1 1 0.60 1 1 1 1 0.22 
2 1 1 1 0.40 2 1 1 1 0.43 
3 1 1 1 0.54 3 1 1 1 0.60 
1 2 1 1 0.90 1 2 1 1 0.50 
2 2 1 1 0.62 2 2 1 1 0.88 
3 2 1 1 0.10 3 2 1 1 0.15 
1 3 1 1 0.33 1 3 1 1 0.23 
2 3 1 1 0.85 2 3 1 1 0.54 
3 3 1 1 0.70 3 3 1 1 0.34 
1 1 2 1 0.30 1 1 2 1 0.65 
2 1 2 1 0.85 2 1 2 1 0.45 
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Table 25 
Level 4 Nodes Sample Chromosome Encoding 
T1 M1 M2 M3 M4 (P(T1|M1M2M3M4) T2 M1 M2 M3 M4 P(T2|M1M2M3M4) 
1 1 1 1 1 0.45 1 1 1 1 1 0.20 
2 1 1 1 1 0.30 2 1 1 1 1 0.67 
3 1 1 1 1 0.62 3 1 1 1 1 0.32 
1 2 1 1 1 0.80 1 2 1 1 1 0.89 
2 2 1 1 1 0.78 2 2 1 1 1 0.45 
3 2 1 1 1 0.19 3 2 1 1 1 0.60 
1 3 1 1 1 0.55 1 3 1 1 1 0.55 
2 3 1 1 1 0.45 2 3 1 1 1 0.70 
3 3 1 1 1 0.88 3 3 1 1 1 0.10 
1 1 2 1 1 0.34 1 1 2 1 1 0.50 
2 1 2 1 1 0.70 2 1 2 1 1 0.45 
 
The complete state of the Network can thus be represented by a chromosome of 50 genes, 
each gene representing a network variable. The chromosome is a configuration of all the network 
variables, represented as a string of integers and it encapsulates the conditional probability of a 
variable in a given state. Considering the rows in Tables 22-25, a sample population of five 
chromosomes representing the complete state of the network is represented as follows:  
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
𝒀𝟏    𝒀𝟐    𝒀𝟑    𝒀𝟒    𝑿𝟏    𝑿𝟐     𝑿𝟑    𝑴𝟏    𝑴 𝟐    𝑴𝟑     𝑴𝟒     𝑻𝟏    𝑻𝟐     𝑻𝟑
1111 11111 11111 11111 1111 1111 1111 1111 11111 11111 11111
  2111 21111 21111 21111 2111 2111 2111 2111 21111 21111 21111 
 3111 31111 31111 31111 3111 3111 3111 3111 31111 31111 12111
 4111 12111 41111 12111 1211 4111 1211 4111 12111 12111 22111
1211 22111 12111 22111 2211 1211 2211 1211  22111 22111 13111 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Note that the gene position in the chromosome array represents the actual order of the variable 
nodes in the topology of the network. The phenotype for these chromosomes is decoded to the 
following linearly ordered array: 
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[
 
 
 
 
 
𝒀𝟏    𝒀𝟐    𝒀𝟑    𝒀𝟒    𝑿𝟏    𝑿𝟐     𝑿𝟑    𝑴𝟏    𝑴 𝟐    𝑴𝟑     𝑴𝟒     𝑻𝟏    𝑻𝟐     𝑻𝟑
0.5   0.6   0.3   0.2   0.45   0.5   0.8   0.6   0.22   0.47   0.75   0.5   0.2   0.8
0.3   0.6   0.3   0.2   0.3   0.8   0.6   0.4   0.43   0.82   0.62   0.8   0.67   0.15
0.2   0.6   0.3   0.2  0.62   0.8   0.5   0.54   0.6  0.23   0.9   0.33   0.32   0.88
0.1   0.6   0.3   0.2   0.8    0.35   0.6    0.9  0.5   0.7    0.4   0.45  0.89    0.55
0.5   0.4   0.3   0.2   0.78  0.8   0.6   0.62  0.88  0.2    0.7    0.65   0.45    0.8]
 
 
 
 
 
 
Considering only the first two levels of the model with seven nodes (Level 1 and Level 2 nodes) 
the search space comprises of {(𝑌1)
4 ∗ (𝑌2)
2 ∗ (𝑌3)
3 ∗ (𝑌4)
3 ∗ (𝑋1)
3 ∗ (𝑋2)
4 ∗ (𝑋3)
3} =2592 
points .With each gene having two or more discrete values (alleles) the search space for all 
possible combinations of variables in the Network is exponentially large making abductive 
inference in such a network to be considered an NP-hard problem (Shimony, 1994).  
The GA used in the BAMSS model development was implemented in Java using the 
JAGA API. JAGA runs on Java version 1.4 and higher and is freely available under the GNU 
General Public License Version 2.0. After downloading the appropriate libraries, an executable 
.jar file was developed in the NetBeans IDE and modified for the fitness function and other 
problem-specific GA operators. For the standalone GA module, the original version was 
developed in the Python 2.7 programming language in order to better capture the graphical 
results of the GA. The graphical library used is Pyside, a python version of QT4. The jpype 
library was used to interface with the smile.jar library in the main BAMSS model. The plot 
graphing was done using pyqtgraph, which required NumPy and SciPy as dependencies. All 
development was done in the IDE.  
5.3.2 Experimental Evaluation 
The BAMSS Network described in Chapter 4 is used to evaluate the model using the 
BAMSS- GA. The Network consists of 14 variables each of which has 2, 3 or 4 different states. 
The pseudo code for the BAMSS GA algorithm is described in Figure 27 and a sample Java-
based implementation algorithm is given in Figure 28. 
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Figure 27. BAMSS genetic algorithm.  
 
Figure 28. Sample Java code for BAMSS-GA implementation.  
//  GA algorithm work
            
             Configuration gaConfig=new DefaultConfiguration();
               DefaultConfiguration.reset();
               // Adding mutation and crossover
               GeneticOperator gcr=new CrossoverOperator(gaConfig,pcr, true);
               GeneticOperator gmr=new GaussianMutationOperator(gaConfig,pmt);
               gaConfig.addGeneticOperator(gcr);
               gaConfig.addGeneticOperator(gmr);
               
             IChromosome chromosome=new Chromosome(gaConfig,new DoubleGene(gaConfig,0, 
1),14);
             gaConfig.setSampleChromosome(chromosome);
             gaConfig.setPopulationSize(populationSize);
             gaConfig.setFitnessFunction(new ByesianNetworkFitness(fitnessValue));
             
             Population pop=new Population(gaConfig, populationSize);
             for(int c=0;c<populationSize;c++)
             {
             Gene[]gene=chromosome.getGenes();
              Gene[]newGene=new Gene[gene.length];
              for(int j=0;j<gene.length;j++)
              {
                  newGene[j]=gene[j].newGene();
                  newGene[j].setAllele(cbMatrix[c][j]);                  
              }
              IChromosome chrom = new Chromosome(gaConfig);
              chrom.setGenes(newGene);
              pop.addChromosome(chrom);
             }
          logger.info("Gene initialisation completed");
           // Now we need to construct the Genotype.
             Genotype genotype=new Genotype(gaConfig, pop);
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The termination condition is a user-defined fitness value which specifies the probability 
of the Network solutions that we are interested in or the maximum number of generations that is 
set for algorithmic computations. Any solution that does not meet the stopping criterion is 
discarded by the model and does not appear in the output results. For BAMSS simulation 
experiments, a fitness value of 70% was used for all the experimental configurations. A common 
problem with GA is that it does not provide a window into the piecewise examination of the 
output. This makes the interpretation of the results challenging. To overcome this challenge, a 
decode function was added to convert the genotype to the phenotype for output interpretation. . 
This is shown in the algorithm in Figure 29. 
 
Figure 29. Sample Java code for decoding the BAMSS-GA genotype. 
public class GAResult
{
    private int generation;
    private double fitnessValue;
    private String geneCombination;
    public int getGeneration() {
        return generation;
    }
    public void setGeneration(int generation) {
        this.generation = generation;
    }
    public double getFitnessValue() {
        return fitnessValue;
    }
    public void setFitnessValue(double 
fitnessValue) {
        this.fitnessValue = fitnessValue;
    }
    public String getGeneCombination() {
        return geneCombination;
    }
    public void setGeneCombination(String 
geneCombination) {
        this.geneCombination = geneCombination;
   }
  
}
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5.3.3 Simulation Results 
Three simulation runs were performed, varying the algorithm parameters for each run. 
For each simulation, the GA parameters were set as shown in Table 26. 
Table 26 
GA Parameters for Three Simulation Experiments 
 
The initial population was entirely randomized for a faster convergence to a good solution. 
Following de Campos et al. (1999) we added a parameter for probability of transition (selection) 
to ensure the diversity of the population and avoid convergence to local optima. By setting the 
probability to 50%, we ensured that the best 50% of the chromosomes were carried over from the 
initial population to the population at the next generation. The probability of crossover ensured 
that 49% of the new population is selected by crossover. The choice of the parent to be selected 
for crossover was proportional to the fitness of that parent. The final 1% of the new population 
was selected by mutation. The chromosomes to be mutated were selected randomly from the 
initial population, mutated with a given probability of mutation and copied into the new 
population.  
 The algorithm terminated when the stopping criterion (20 generations) had been reached. 
The desired number of network solutions (k) was set to 20 so that the model would output 20 
MPEs for the network. Figure 30 shows the interface for the GA standalone module of BAMSS 
with the parameter input menu displayed. 
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Figure 30. Graphical user interface for the BAMSS-GA module. 
The complete GA processing returned a table with the k most probable network states as 
shown in Figure 31. The first column here, represents the probability of the selected MPE 
defined as the probability that the network will be in the chosen state. The second column is the 
genotype, a string representation of the MPE where each gene represents a specific node in the 
network (random variable) and the outcome of that node. The third column is the graphical 
representation of the phenotype, showing all the nodes in the appropriate state. Each node has the 
state of the random variable set according to the genotype of the MPE.  
Belief Updating and Abductive Inference is performed when the user selects the 
phenotype of the MPE. The resultant Network and posterior probabilities are displayed as shown 
in Figure 32. The kMPEs are stored in a sensemaking database and when appropriately selected 
are loaded into BAMSS by the “Select Model File” command in the BAMSS GUI. When new 
evidence is available, inference is performed using the Bayesian Clustering Algorithm as 
described in Chapter 4. 
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Figure 31. The kMPE output of the BAMSS-GA module. 
Figure 32 shows the network view of the phenotype of the selected MPE. Clicking on the view 
button shows one global view of the MPE. 
 
Figure 32. Network view of the phenotype of a selected MPE. 
The BAMSS-GA GUI allows the user to plot and graphically evaluate the evolution of 
the fitness value of the selected solution(s) in each generation. Figure 33 shows the evolution of 
probabilities over all the generations for the best, the worst and the average solutions. The green 
line represents the best solutions while the red line represents the worst solutions. The average of 
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the two populations represents the convergence trend towards an optimal solution and is 
represented by the blue line. This is a graphical representation of how the algorithm search 
process refines the results pool over each generation and how fast it converges towards the 
optimal result.  
The best solution follows a logarithmic growth curve, increasing rapidly for the first 10 
generations before flat lining to a constant level. The maximum probability is reached at the 10
th
 
generation. The average solution asymptotically approaches the best solution, converging after 
15 generations. The worst solution of the network is a non-monotonic with oscillations of 
significant amplitude especially after 10 generations. The oscillations of the fitness (probability) 
of the solutions in each generation indicate that the algorithm is sampling from a diverse 
population and this is a desirable feature for the model to achieve better results. The probability 
of the MPE is plotted on the y-axis while the iteration or generation number is plotted on the x-
axis. 
 
Figure 33. Evolution of fitness for the best, average and worst solutions of the BAMSS COA 
Analysis network for experiment 1.Green = best solution, Blue = average, Red = worst solution. 
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The effects of varying the GA parameters for the second and third simulations are shown 
in Figure 34. The most significant effect is the faster convergence to an optimal Network 
solution. The population diversity is increased due to an increase in the probability of mutation 
and hence, the convergence of the algorithm to an optimal solution is faster. The behavior of the 
worst individuals is also significantly improved with fewer oscillations due to the diverse 
sampling population. The probability of the MPE is plotted on the y-axis while the iteration or 
generation number is plotted on the x-axis. 
 
Figure 34. Effects of varying the GA parameters on the network solution probability for 
experiment 2(top) and experiment 3(bottom).Green = best solution, Blue = average solution, Red 
= worst solution.  
Table 27 is a summary of the probability of the best, average, and worst network 
solutions obtained for each of the three trials. A result for only the first 10 generations are shown 
since convergence to the best solution occurs after about 10 generations. The genotype for the 
kMPEs is [02110110000000] which is decoded to the phenotype [Y1 = y12, Y2 = y21, Y3 = y33, Y4 = 
y42; X1 = x11, X2 = x22, X3 = x32; M1 = m11, M2 = m21, M3 = m31, M4 = m41; T1 = t11, T2 = t21, T3 = t31]. 
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Table 27 
Probability of MPE for the Simulation Experiments 
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
P (MPE) P(MPE) P(MPE) 
Gen
# 
Best Average Worst Gen
# 
Best Average Worst Gen
# 
Best Average Worst 
0 3.44E-06 1.03E-09 1.65E-07 0 2.25E-06 1.87E-09 1.83E-07 0 3.89E-06 3.76E-09 1.65E-07 
1 4.01E-06 4.90E-09 2.48E-07 1 4.50E-06 3.20E-09 2.98E-07 1 3.89E-06 2.73E-09 2.59E-07 
2 5.73E-06 3.40E-08 5.19E-07 2 4.50E-06 4.31E-08 5.91E-07 2 3.89E-06 3.23E-08 5.20E-07 
3 5.73E-06 1.15E-07 9.39E-07 3 4.50E-06 9.19E-08 1.04E-06 3 4.00E-06 1.02E-07 9.42E-07 
4 5.73E-06 2.00E-07 1.61E-06 4 1.02E-05 2.20E-07 1.69E-06 4 5.76E-06 1.49E-07 1.51E-06 
5 6.30E-06 6.24E-07 2.64E-06 5 1.02E-05 2.65E-07 2.61E-06 5 9.81E-06 2.09E-07 2.29E-06 
6 7.59E-06 1.48E-06 3.65E-06 6 1.02E-05 7.17E-07 3.75E-06 6 9.81E-06 3.92E-07 3.32E-06 
7 1.12E-05 2.06E-06 4.62E-06 7 1.12E-05 8.38E-07 5.19E-06 7 9.81E-06 6.79E-07 4.45E-06 
8 1.12E-05 2.62E-06 5.74E-06 8 1.12E-05 8.94E-07 6.50E-06 8 9.81E-06 1.51E-06 5.78E-06 
9 1.12E-05 3.45E-06 7.03E-06 9 1.19E-05 2.23E-06 7.71E-06 9 1.19E-05 1.51E-06 6.90E-06 
10 1.19E-05 5.27E-06 8.31E-06 10 1.19E-05 1.52E-06 8.89E-06 10 1.19E-05 1.23E-06 8.06E-06 
 
Table 28 shows the comparison of performance gains for BAMSS-GA compared to BAMSS for 
the three experiments. Seven simulations were performed for each experiment and the MPE for 
each run selected. The corresponding genotype of each MPE is shown in the second column. For 
all the simulation runs, each variable of the network was set to a specific state which was held 
constant across all the trials. The probability of evidence for BAMSS (Bayesian Clustering 
Algorithm) and BAMSS-GA was then computed.  
Table 28 
Performance Comparison for BAMSS and BAMSS-GA 
 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
P (MPE) MPE  P(MPE) MPE P (MPE) MPE P(MPE)) 
BAMSS Genotype BAMSS-
GA 
Genotype BAMSS-
GA 
Genotype BAMSS-
GA 
1.508E-08 02110110000000 1.193E-05 02110110000000 1.193E-05 02120110000000 8.951E-06 
8.639E-09 10000100000000 4.789E-05 10000100000000 4.789E-05 10000100300000 3.369E-05 
7.999E-09 10000100000000 4.543E-05 10000100000000 4.543E-05 10000101000000 3.724E-05 
7.251E-09 10002100200000 4.227E-05 10000100000000 4.693E-05 10002110000000 3.672E-05 
7.504E-09 10000100000000 5.602E-05 10000100200000 5.038E-05 10000110000000 4.866E-05 
5.823E-09 10002100300000 4.849E-05 10000100300000 5.385E-05 10000110300000 4.678E-05 
8.446E-09 10000100300000 4.873E-05 10000100300000 4.874E-05 10000110000000 3.963E-05 
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The results of these simulations are displayed graphically in Figures 35-38.To make the 
charts readable, a logarithmic scale was used for the probability of the network solution denoted 
as P(MPE) or simply as P(e). 
 
Figure 35. Comparison of performance gains for BAMSS-GA for Experiments 1, 2 and 3. 
 
Figure 36. Performance gains for BAMSS-GA compared to BAMSS for Experiment 1. 
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Figure 37. Performance gains for BAMSS-GA compared to BAMSS for experiment 2. 
 
Figure 38. Performance gains for BAMSS-GA compared to BAMSS for experiment 3. 
5.4 Discussion 
The results shown in the preceding section show that the BAMSS-GA is able to find the 
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probabilities are also displayed in the first column of Figure 31. For each experiment, the 
probabilities of 10 Network solutions are presented along with the optimal solution. To each 
solution, there exists a specific genotype corresponding to the combination of variables that can 
produce the solution as displayed in the second column of Figure 31. The genotype for the 
kMPEs is [02110110000000] which is decoded to the phenotype [Y1 = y12, Y2 = y21, Y3 = y33, Y4 = 
y42; X1 = x11, X2 = x22, X3 = x32; M1 = m11, M2 = m21, M3 = m31, M4 = m41; T1 = t11, T2 = t21, T3 = t31]. 
From the phenotype, the extracted hypotheses for the MPE are Y1 = y12 (Law and Order 
Breakdown); Y2 = y21 (Sectarian Governance Structures), Y3 = y33 (Disruption of Civic and 
Governance Processes) and Y4 = y42 (Sectarian Violence). 
 A comparison of performance gains obtained by using BAMSS-GA is shown in Table 
28. Using the Bayesian Clustering Algorithm (Chapter 4), each simulation can only return one 
probability of the Network solution. An advantage of using GA, as shown in Tables 27 and 28 is 
that each simulation returns more than one Network solution as well as the optimal Network 
solutions based on the user defined parameters. If the analyst is interested in 20 solutions with a 
fitness value of, say 70%, the only input needed is the parameter specification. The output results 
will contain 20 Network solutions with a 70% probability of occurring given the evidence as 
well as the probability and genotype of the optimal Network solution.  
For COA analysis, the states of the variables for the three experimental configurations in 
the simulation were set as follows: The hypothesis variable Y1 was set to state y13 (Insurgent 
Control of the Population).Similarly Y2 = y21 (Sectarian governance structures), Y3 = y32 
(Insurgent control of the security space), and Y4 = y41 (Nationalism).The informational variables 
were set as follows: X1 = x11, X2 = x23, X3 = x32, M1 = m12,M2 = m23,M3 = m33,M4 = m42, T1 = t12, T2 
= t23 and T3 = t32.  For experiment 1, using BAMSS-GA, the probability of obtaining an MPE is 
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4.227E-05 with the genotype [10002100200000] corresponding to phenotypes: Y1 = y12, Y2 = y21, 
Y3 = y31, Y4 = y41; X1 = x13, X2 = x22, X3 = x31; M1 = m11, M2 = m24, M3 = m31, M4 = m41; T1 = t11, T2 = 
t21, T3 = t31. 
 For illustration purposes, assume that the following hypotheses are under consideration 
by the commander:  Y1 = y13 (Insurgent Control of the Population), Y2 = y21 (Sectarian 
Governance Structures), Y3 = y32 (Insurgent Control of the Security Space) and Y4 = y41 
(Insurgent Nationalism).  From the simulation results, considering only the Y1 hypothesis 
variable, the MPE is Y1 = y12 (breakdown in law and order) and not the initial hypothesis state y13 
(Insurgent Control of the Population). The change in the hypothesis state is supported by 
explanatory variables X3|x32→x31 (Unbounded Battlespace), M1|m12→m11 (Insurgent Security 
Target Engagement). For experiment 2, the probability of the MPE is 4.693E-05 with a 
corresponding genotype, [10000100000000]. The informational variable changes from X1 = x13 to 
X1 = x11 meaning the most probable state of the Network is to be reached if we consider the 
insurgent political operational effect to be Sectarian Identity (X1 = x11) rather than the Legitimacy 
of Jihad (X1 = x13). Additionally the tactical effect changes from T3 = t32 (Infrastructure 
Sabotage) to T3= t31 (Arson).  The commander will therefore have to give more weight to this 
evidence variable for detail planning by, for example, increasing force levels in areas where 
critical infrastructure such as dams or power stations are located or deploying surplus units.  
For experiment 3, the probability of the MPE is 3.672E-05 with a genotype, 
[10002110000000].The evidence variable X3 = x31 (Unbounded Battlespace) changes to X3 = x32 
(Techniques, Tactics and Procedures). In this case a change in the counterinsurgent force tactics 
may be required to counteract the insurgents who operate with highly dispersed and 
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decentralized command and control structures. The commander may have to consider these 
changes in the Political Operational Effects to inform the select hypotheses.  
 Using the Bayesian Clustering Algorithm, the probability for getting an MPE with the 
Network evidence set as previously described is 7.251E-09. Note that the probability of 
obtaining the Network solution, P(MPE) decreases by an order of magnitude (103) due to the 
inherent limitations of the clustering algorithm. In general, from the kMPEs output from 
BAMSS-GA, the analyst can select an MPE for a COA analysis. When new evidence is 
introduced in the evidence variables of the network, the Bayesian Clustering Algorithm is then 
applied and the posterior belief distribution of the hypothesis variables or the target variables of 
interest is computed as discussed in Chapter 4. 
5.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter described the optimization of abductive inference in BAMSS using a 
Genetic Algorithm. The problem of Abductive Inference was presented as one of finding the 
most probable explanation or the MPEs of a Bayesian Network. Three simulation runs were 
conducted, varying the GA parameters for each run. For the first experiment, the probability of 
crossover was set to 0.49 while the probability of mutation was set at 0.01. The probability of the 
best network solution (MPE) was 1.19E-0.5 for the genotype [02110110000000] with a 
corresponding phenotype [Y1 = y12, Y2 = y21, Y3 = y33, Y4 = y42; X1 = x11, X2 = x22, X3 = x32; M1 = 
m11, M2 = m21, M3 = m31, M4 = m41; T1 = t11, T2 = t21, T3 = t31] 
For the second experiment, the parameters were varied with the probability of crossover 
= 0.4 and the probability of mutation = 0.1.  By comparing the best results for each experiment in 
Table 27 using the P(MPE) or P(e) as the comparison metric, this experimental configuration 
yielded 30% better network solutions due to the population diversity introduced by the increase 
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in the probability of mutation. The third simulation experiment with P(Crossover) = 0.35 and 
P(Mutation) = 0.15 did not show much improvement in the quality of the solutions implying that 
the best parameter setting had been exceeded.  
For COA analyses, the states of the variables  for all the experimental configurations in 
the  simulation were set as follows: The hypothesis variable Y1 was set to state y13 (Insurgent 
Control of the Population).Similarly Y2 = y21 (Sectarian governance structures), Y3 = y32 
(Insurgent control of the security space), and Y4 = y41 (Nationalism).The informational variables 
were set as follows: X1 = x11, X2 = x23, X3 = x32, M1 = m12, M2 = m23, M3 = m33, M4 = m42, T1 = t12, 
T2 = t23 and T3 = t32.  Tables 29-31 give the summary and comparisons of the outcomes of the 
experiments. The most probable hypothesis and the explanatory variables are highlighted.  
Table 29 
Experiment 1: Probability of Crossover = 0.49, Probability of Mutation = 0.01, Number of 
Generations=20, k MPEs=20 
Genotype Input Hypothesis 
Input nodes 
Input 
Informational 
Variables 
Output 
Hypothesis 
nodes 
Best 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Network 
Efficiency 
Comments 
10100211221121 Y1 = y13 
Y2 = y21 
Y3 = y32 
Y4 = y41 
X1 = x11 
X2 = x23  
X3 = x32 
M1 = m12 
M2 = m23 
 M3 = m33 
M4 = m42 
T1= t12,  
T2 = t23,  
T3 = t32 
Y1 = y12 
Y2 = y21 
 Y3 = y31 
 Y4 = y41 
X1 = x11, 
X2 = x23,  
X3 = x31, 
M1= m11, 
M2 = m24 
M3 = m31 
M4 = m41  
T1 = t11, 
T2 = t21, 
T3 = t31 
85% →17 
out of 20 
plausible 
network 
solutions 
better than 
BAMSS 
Most 
probable 
hypothesis 
is 
Breakdown 
in Law and 
Order, y12 
not 
Insurgent 
Control of 
the 
Population, 
y13. 
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Table 30 
Experiment 2: Probability of Crossover = 0.40, Probability of Mutation = 0.10, Number of 
Generations=20, k MPEs=20 
Genotype Input Hypothesis 
Input nodes 
Input 
Informational 
Variables 
Output 
Hypothesis 
nodes 
Best 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Network 
Efficiency 
Comments 
10100211221121 Y1 = y13 
Y2 = y21 
Y3 = y32 
Y4 = y41 
X1 = x11 
X2 = x23  
X3 = x32, 
M1 = m12  
M2 = m23 
M3 = m33 
M4 = m42  
T1= t12  
T2 = t23  
T3 = t32 
Y1 = y11 
Y2 = y22 
Y3 = y31 
Y4 = y41 
X1 = x13 
X2 = x22  
X3 = x31 
M1= m11 
M2 = m21 
M3 = m31 
M4 = m41  
T1 = t11  
T2 = t21  
T3 = t31 
95%→ 19 
out of 20 
plausible 
network 
solutions 
better than 
BAMSS 
X1 = x13 to 
X1 = x11: the 
insurgents 
are using 
Sectarian 
Identity (X1 
= x11) rather 
than the 
Legitimacy 
of Jihad (X1 
= x13) as the 
political 
operations 
effect. 
 
Table 31 
Experiment 3: Probability of Crossover = 0.35, Probability of Mutation = 0.15, Number of 
Generations=20, k MPEs=7 
Genotype Input Hypothesis 
Input nodes 
Input 
Informational 
Variables 
Output 
Hypothesis 
nodes 
Best 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Network 
Efficiency 
Comments 
10100211221121 Y1 = y13 
Y2 = y21 
Y3 = y32 
Y4 = y41 
X1 = x11 
X2 = x23 
 X3 = x32 
M1 = m12 
M2 = m23  
M3 = m33 
M4 = m42  
T1= t12 
T2 = t23 
T3 = t32 
Y1 = y11 
Y2 = y22  
Y3 = y31  
Y4 = y41 
X1 = x12 
X2 = x22  
X3 = x32 
M1= m11 
M2 = m21  
M3 = m31 
M4 = m41  
T1 = t11  
T2 = t21  
T3 = t31 
70%→14 
out of 20 
plausible 
network 
solutions 
better than 
BAMSS 
X3 = x31 
Unbounded 
Battlespace
changes to 
X3 = x32 
Techniques, 
Tactics and 
Procedures
. Probable 
COA is to 
consider 
changes in 
coalition 
TTPs  
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Comparison of performance gains for BAMSS-GA and BAMSS was performed using the 
same experimental setup. Using P(MPE) as the comparison metric, the results showed that 
Bayesian Network inference using BAMSS-GA produced better network solutions than BAMSS 
by an order of magnitude (103). The network view of the computed MPE gave a representation 
of the network nodes with evidence set to the state of the solution. The phenotype of this 
representation was a network with a global state of the computed posterior probabilities. When 
the network was loaded into BAMSS, the computed posterior probabilities became priors and 
prior conditionals. When new evidence was introduced into the network, the Bayesian Inference 
algorithm was applied and the updated posterior beliefs of the hypothesis variables or target 
variables of interest were computed. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Observations, Conclusions and Future Research 
6.1 Summary 
Chapter one offers a general introduction to the research topic, the problem statement, the 
research goals and objectives, the challenges encountered in the research and the general 
contribution to the scientific body of knowledge. Chapter two reviews both the qualitative and 
analytical models of sensemaking. From the qualitative analyses, most researchers have focused 
on the aspect of cognition where the primary sensemaking task is to construct a meaningful 
mental representation of the problem space. Schema-driven representation, mental models, and 
other cognitive constructs dominate the process models of sensemaking that have been 
discussed. These models give an understanding of the meta-cognitive and cognitive acts that 
inform the sensemaking process and determine how they may be applied to understand and 
overcome the cognitive limitations of the human mind. The limitations of this approach lie 
primarily in the lack of a unifying paradigm of sensemaking. An additional challenge exists in 
knowing how to use information gained from these models to develop a unifying framework or 
provide standardized guidance for the development of better sensemaking support systems. 
  Research on sensemaking analytics is presented as a tool to support the sensemaking 
process. In this approach, sensemaking models are defined as computational cognitive models 
whose primary task is to enable processing of information to achieve an understanding of the 
problem space and facilitate an effective analysis process. Most of the models discussed have 
been developed for the fields of intelligence analysis, information foraging and knowledge 
management. The diversity of approaches advocated provides challenges in developing a unified 
sensemaking process. A critical look at the tools developed does point to one aspect: the gradual 
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shift from decision support tools to sensemaking support tools. Sensemaking support tools focus 
on augmenting the cognitive capability of the sense-maker during the whole process of 
sensemaking. 
This research uses the tool-based approach for two reasons:  First, advances in the field of 
Computational Intelligence have led to the development of powerful and efficient algorithms and 
methods that can be used to computationally simulate some processes in sensemaking. For 
example, it is possible to represent sensemaking models in software and cognitive architectures. 
The algorithms can simplify the process of sensemaking tasks in context. Second, through the 
use of computational techniques such as Bayesian Networks and Abductive Inference, both the 
qualitative and quantitative approaches can be combined to provide a better representation of a 
sensemaking process. 
Chapter three discusses Bayesian Formalism for representing sensemaking information. 
The Bayesian Belief Network reflects a person’s belief about the state of a variable in the real 
world through the use of joint probability distributions over the variables. Bayesian Networks are 
presented as normative cognitive models that support sensemaking under uncertainty. The 
networks are shown to support reasoning about evidence and actions not easily handled by other 
competing computational models. In a Bayesian Belief Network, inference is undertaken by 
abduction. This means that we infer from effects to the best explanation of those effects. This 
reflects the behavior of a sensemaking problem. A forward (top-down) inference was shown to 
support prospective sensemaking, while a backward (bottom-up) inference supported 
information fusion in retrospective sensemaking. 
Chapter four discusses the development experiments and validations of the BAMSS 
model using a case study in asymmetric warfare. Vignettes representative of a sensemaking task 
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in the asymmetric warfare domain were developed and used for analyses. In the first vignette, the 
sensemaking task required an analyst to create a hypothesis variable Y1 = y12 where y12 
represented Law and Order Breakdown. New evidence was then introduced in the node M1 = 
m11, where m11 was an indicator for the Security Target Engagement by varying the input data 
from 0.1 to 0.9. Results from seven simulation runs were then analyzed for the informational 
variables X1 = x11 (Sectarian Identity) and T3 = t32 (Infrastructure Sabotage). 
Examining the evidence propagation in the first vignette, the probability of (Law and 
Order Breakdown) remained relatively stable at 40% with increasing evidence of adversary 
targeting of the counterinsurgent security personnel. The relative stability of the posterior belief 
distribution implied that the causal effect of this variable was limited hence does not carry much 
weight as a COA. The probability that the Insurgent Security Target Engagement as a mode of 
operation was influenced by Sectarian Identity (X1= x11) decreased from 50% to 30% .This 
would imply that operations against security personnel could not be attributed to a particular 
group. In fact, focusing on the sectarian identity of the group could be detrimental to the course 
of action selection because of the negative correlation and this effect then, ought to be discarded. 
The probability of (Infrastructure Sabotage| Insurgent Security Target Engagement) increased 
from 20 to 40%. An increase in infrastructure sabotage was the most likely tactical effect of the 
increase in insurgent security target engagement probably due to the vacuum created by this 
particular military operational effect. This COA would require the commander to increase 
protection for critical infrastructure and security targets.  
For the second vignette, the hypothesis for the sensemaking task was changed to Y2 = y22 
(Insurgent ideology). Evidence was introduced in node X3 = x33 (Intelligence Asymmetry) and the 
posterior probabilities for informational variables M1 = m11 (Security Target Engagement) and T2 
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= t21 (Small Arms Attacks) were computed. The probability of (Insurgent Security Target 
Engagement| Intelligence Asymmetry) decreased from 60 to 35% as evidence for intelligence 
asymmetry increased from 0.1 to 0.9. This implied that better intelligence by the insurgent group 
was not a direct influence on this mode of operation. The commander’s COA could likely invest 
more resources in recruiting intelligence assets to counteract the asymmetry. Probability of 
(Small Arms Attacks| Intelligence Asymmetry) showed minor variability at 40% similar to the 
P(Insurgent Ideology|intelligence asymmetry) . The tactical effect Small Arms Attacks was not 
significantly influenced by the insurgent intelligence assets. Both these effects were however, 
inadmissible as courses of action. 
In the last sensemaking vignette, we considered the hypothesis variable Y4 = y41, the 
insurgent concept of Nationalism. For the informational variables we set X2 = x22 (Insurgent 
Modular Operations) and M2 = m23 (Civilian Shelters). New evidence was introduced into 
variable T3 = t32 (Arson). The probability of (Insurgent Modular Operations| Arson) decreased 
from 50 to 40% (approximately) with an increase in evidence of Arson as a tactical effect from 
0.1 to 0.9. The probability of Nationalism increased from 30 to 40% while the P(Civilian 
Shelters| Arson) remained constant at 30%. The commanders’ COA could be to consider the 
tactical effect as a reflection of nationalistic feelings and take appropriate measures in the 
PMESII spectrum to address this effect. P(Insurgent Modular Operations| Arson) and P(Civilian 
Shelters| Arson)  were not admissible for COA analyses. 
 A sensitivity analysis was performed on the model output for the second sensemaking 
support demonstration using three simulation experiments. In the first experiment, target nodes 
representing Tactical Effects variable T1 (t11, t12, and t13) were selected. The probability of (Law 
and Order |High Level Attrition Attacks) did not show significant variation to changes in input 
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evidence from 0.1 to 0.9. P(Civilian Suicide Bombing) showed the highest posterior belief  
accrual peaking at 58% demonstrating that the new evidence on this variable could confirm the 
most likely aposteriori hypothesis (Y1 = y12). On average, P(Remotely Detonated IEDs|Law and 
Order Breakdown) was 10% while P(Rocket Propelled Grenades|Law and Order Breakdown) 
was 28%. In general, the commander could consider the variable Civilian Suicide Bombing for 
additional analysis since it exhibited the greatest variation in response to changes in the input 
variable. 
In the second simulation, a sensitivity analysis was performed on variable T2 (t21, t22, t23), 
varying the input to node Y4 = y42 (Sectarian Violence). P(Small Arms Attacks| Sectarian 
Violence) recorded the highest aposteriori probability at 44%. A COA analysis by the 
commander required a closer examination of the differences between t22 (Coercive Threats, 
30%) and t23 (Convoy Ambushes, 30%) which seemed to exhibit interaction effects. Lastly, 
sensitivity analysis was done for target nodes T2=t23 (Convoy Ambushes), T3=t31 (Infrastructure 
sabotage), and T3= t32 (Arson). Infrastructure Sabotage recorded the highest variations and 
posterior belief at 75% as evidence in the input variable Y2 = y22 (Insurgent Ideology) was varied 
from 0.1 to 0.9. The high degree of sensitivity to the variation in input could prompt the 
commander to perform additional what-if analyses to identify more causal variables. Similarly, 
for P(Convoy Ambush| Sectarian Violence) and P(Arson| Sectarian Violence), both had an 
average aposteriori probability of 30% since they exhibited mutually exclusive behaviors. 
Chapter five described an optimization of Abductive Inference in BAMSS using a 
Genetic Algorithm(GA)  and simulation experiments to find the most probable explanations 
(MPEs). Three simulation runs were conducted, varying the GA parameters for each run. For the 
first experiment, the probability of crossover was set to 0.49 while the probability of mutation 
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was set at 0.01. The probability of the best network solution (MPE) was 1.19E-0.5 for the 
genotype [02110110000000] with a corresponding phenotype [Y1 = y12, Y2 = y21, Y3 = y33, Y4 = y42; 
X1 = x11, X2 = x22, X3 = x32; M1 = m11, M2 = m21, M3 = m31, M4 = m41; T1 = t11, T2 = t21, T3 = t31] 
For the second experiment the parameters were varied with the probability of crossover = 
0.4 and the probability of mutation = 0.1. By comparing the best results for each experiment in 
Table 27 using the P(MPE) as the comparison metric, this experimental configuration yielded 
30% better network solutions due to the population diversity introduced by the increase in the 
probability of mutation. The third simulation experiment with the probability of crossover = 0.35 
and the probability of mutation = 0.15 did not show much improvement in the quality of the 
solutions implying that the best parameter setting had been exceeded. 
For COA analysis, the states of the variables for the three experimental configurations in 
the simulation were set as follows: The hypothesis variable Y1 was set to state y13 (Insurgent 
Control of the Population). Similarly, Y2 = y21 (Sectarian governance structures), Y3 = y32 
(Insurgent control of the security space), and Y4 = y41 (Nationalism). The informational variables 
were set as follows: X1 = x11, X2 = x23, X3 = x32, M1 = m12,M2 = m23,M3 = m33,M4 = m42, T1 = t12, T2 
= t23 and T3 = t32.  For experiment 1, using the BAMSS-GA, the probability of obtaining an MPE 
was 4.227E-05 with the genotype [10002100200000] corresponding to phenotypes: Y1 = y12, Y2 = 
y21, Y3 = y31, Y4 = y41; X1 = x13, X2 = x22, X3 = x31; M1 = m11, M2 = m24, M3 = m31, M4 = m41; T1 = t11, 
T2 = t21, T3 = t31. 
For illustration purposes, assume that the following hypotheses are under consideration 
by the commander:  Y1 = y13 (Insurgent Control of the Population), Y2 = y21 (Sectarian 
Governance Structures), Y3 = y32 (Insurgent Control of the Security Space) and Y4 = y41 
(Insurgent Nationalism).  From the simulation results, considering only the Y1 hypothesis 
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variable, the MPE supports Y1 = y12 (breakdown in law and order) and not the initial hypothesis 
state y13 (insurgent control of the population). The change in the hypothesis state is supported by 
explanatory variables X3|x32→x31 (Unbounded Battlespace), M1|m12→m11 (Insurgent Security 
Target Engagement).  
For experiment 2, the probability of the MPE is 4.693E-05 with a corresponding 
genotype, [10000100000000]. The informational variable changes from X1 = x13 to X1 = x11 
meaning the most probable state of the network is to be reached if we consider the insurgent 
political operational effect as using Sectarian Identity (X1 = x11) rather than the Legitimacy of 
Jihad (X1 = x13). Additionally the tactical effect changes from T3 = t32 (Infrastructure Sabotage) 
to T3= t31 (Arson).  The commander will therefore have to give more weight to this evidence 
variable for detail planning in the form of perhaps increasing force levels in areas where critical 
infrastructure such as dams or power stations are located or deploying surplus units. For the third 
experiment, the probability of the MPE is 3.672E-05 with a genotype, [10002110000000]. The 
evidence variable X3 = x31 (Unbounded Battlespace) changes to X3 = x32 (Techniques, Tactics 
and Procedures). In this case a change in the counterinsurgent force tactics may be required to 
counteract the insurgents who operate with highly dispersed and decentralized command and 
control structures. The commander then, has to consider these changes in the Political 
Operational Effects to inform the select hypotheses. 
 Comparisons of performance gains for BAMSS-GA as compared to BAMSS were 
performed using the same experimental setup. Using P(MPE) as the comparison metric, the 
results showed that Bayesian Network Inference using BAMSS-GA produced better network 
solutions than BAMSS by an order of magnitude (103). A direct comparison with BAMSS was 
done using network efficiency as the metric. In this case, network efficiency refers to the 
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“throughput” or the ability of the model to generate plausible network solutions under the 
influence of various variables. For the first experiment, a network efficiency of 85% was 
achieved with BAMSS-GA. When the probability of crossover and mutation were varied for the 
second experiment, a network efficiency of 95% was realized. Additional variation in the GA 
parameters resulted in a network efficiency of 70%.  
As per the experimental results, this means that the best configuration for BAMSS-GA is 
achieved when the probability of crossover is set to 40% and the probability of mutation is set at 
10%. The network view of the computed MPE gives a representation of the network nodes with 
evidence set to the state of the solution. The phenotype of this representation is a network with a 
global state of the computed posterior probabilities. When new evidence is introduced into the 
network, the Bayesian Inference Algorithm is applied and the updated posterior beliefs of the 
hypothesis variables or target variables of interest are computed. 
6.2 Observations and Conclusions 
Belief Updating and Abductive Inference have been demonstrated using a BAMSS 
prototype, a sensemaking support tool. Two algorithms were implemented for BAMSS, the 
Bayesian Clustering Algorithm for Bayesian Abductive Inference and the Genetic Algorithm to 
optimize  Abductive Inference in the model. Experimental simulation was used to test BAMSS 
and BAMSS-GA using sensemaking vignettes from an asymmetrical battlespace domain. A 
summary comparison of the major performance parameters for BAMSS and BAMSS-GA is 
presented below. 
a) Problem Representation: The clustering algorithm used in BAMSS takes direct probability 
values as input without any need for extra data massaging. Some effort is needed to develop 
the network topology and populate the conditional probability tables with prior probabilities 
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for the parent variables and prior conditionals for the children variables. BAMSS-GA 
requires the input data to be encoded in a format that is compatible with GA operators. This 
requires additional computational resources to massage the data into GA format before it can 
be used as input to the BAMSS model. 
b) Computational complexity: BAMSS uses a clustering algorithm, an exact search algorithm 
to perform inference in a Bayesian Network. For simple networks, the algorithm does not 
consume much computing resources. However, its search becomes limited as the network 
grows and more computation time is required.  As the network grows, the clustering 
algorithm defaults to the use of hierarchical search through a top-down processing to reveal 
structures of interest at different levels in its divisive hierarchical clustering process. 
Divisive clustering, however, does not produce an optimal solution. Additionally, as the 
network complexity increases, inference using the clustering algorithm becomes intractable, 
exponentially increasing resource utilization. The space complexity is O(n2 ) because of the 
space required for adjacency matrix (where they are n items to cluster). The time complexity 
is O(kn2  ) because of there is one iteration for each level in the dendogram hence the matrix 
(or subset of it) must be accessed multiple times. BAMSS-GA uses a Genetic Algorithm to 
perform inference. GA has a parallel search capability which leads to a fast and efficient 
convergence to optimal network solution. Additionally, GAs search from a population of 
points and use a coding of the parameter sets as compared to the parameters themselves. GA 
can handle networks of varying complexity without significant resource utilization.  
c) Quality of network solutions: BAMSS-GA can be configured to output k network solutions 
or kMPEs for each simulation run. Additionally, BAMSS-GA output can be configured to 
display the best (optimal), average and worst solutions. Without additional significant 
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computation, the output of BAMSS cannot be determined to be optimal on any input. 
Comparison of performance gains for BAMSS-GA as compared to BAMSS using the 
probability of MPE as the comparison metric showed that inference using BAMSS-GA 
produced better network solutions by an order of magnitude (103). 
In order to obtain better solutions for BAMSS, two issues have to be considered: Foremost, an 
algorithm for CPT elicitation and computation should be incorporated. A CPT elicitation 
requires a considerable input time from the user and if not done right, can lead to outputs with 
spurious results. Algorithms with the capacity to filter inadmissible and/or conflicting CPT 
expressions have been developed. Inadmissible expressions often result into incompatible 
hypotheses or the wrong chains of evidence propagations through the network being output to 
the user. Secondly, the use of hybrid exact search algorithms to replace the clustering algorithm 
is found to speed up computation and output better and accurate results. Hybrid algorithms will 
produce better results than those produced by the clustering algorithm and in the case of some 
networks will produce results that are an order of magnitude more precise.  
 Although the asymmetric battlespace domain has been used for network development   
simulation experimentation, BAMSS is a sensemaking support tool and can used for any 
problem domain where causal reasoning and Abductive Inference is desired. With appropriately 
defined networks, BAMSS can be used for diagnostic assistance in the medical field, fault 
detection and isolation in engineering, as well as problem solving and data mining in education. 
The Open Source software used in its prototype development creates opportunities for further 
tailored development. 
BAMSS is a standalone application, currently not hosted on the web server. To run the 
tool, the software listed in Table 2 has to be installed and run on the client machine. However, 
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the executable BAMSS files are easily portable and are readily available to the user. The only 
component of the BAMSS accessible on the web is GeNIe which is used for network 
development as described in Chapter 4.   
This research represents a successful step in developing a proof of concept sensemaking 
support system that combines the qualitative and quantitative approaches of sensemaking with 
asymmetric battlespace as the problem domain. The use of Genetic Algorithms for sensemaking 
support has not been widely explored. We have demonstrated through experimental simulations 
that the use of GA for Abductive Inference can produce better results. This technique is useful 
for computational search for changes in a network due to belief revisions. 
6.3 Lessons Learned and Recommendations for Future Research in BAMSS 
The BAMSS developed in this research is a proof of concept in computational 
sensemaking, especially in extracting conditional evidences that support a set of hypotheses. 
Prior probabilities and prior conditionals for the BAMSS COA Analysis network were obtained 
from existing and historical databases of asymmetric wars in the Middle East. No empirical 
validation was performed. Additionally, empirical research needs to be done to test the model 
with real world data and military expert assessment. The experimental participants need to be 
given representative scenarios, be presented with evidence, and then, select a COA without the 
use of BAMSS. In the next iteration, the same participants should be required to use the tool, 
compare the COA selection in terms of accuracy (with or without the tool) and time needed to 
make the correct inference, and select a COA.  
With regards to the BAMSS future development, a lot of software development work still 
remains to be done in order to seamlessly integrate the GA and the Bayesian Algorithm. The 
most important and immediate tasks to be accomplished are: 
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i) Since BAMSS requires a user to define the Belief Network, an additional task is to 
develop the Network module as a standalone application in order to remove the 
requirement for expert knowledge needed develop the N.etwork structure.  
ii) A dedicated data parsing and formatting subroutine needs to be developed within the 
model to convert the output (posterior) probabilities into a format that is suitable for 
genetic algorithm application. The challenge is in developing automatic encoding 
functions to convert the Bayesian output (phenotype) to GA input (genotype). This 
will significantly increase the BAMSS functionality. 
iii) A  GUI front end is needed to support BAMSS. This can include the development of 
user manuals, an interactive help menu, and a function to enable the user to create 
new data fields.   
iv) A further significant enhancement would be to add functionality to BAMSS so that it 
can perform sensitivity analysis automatically to reduce the manual COA selection 
from kMPEs 
A web version of BAMSS that operates in a client-server model will enhance distributed access 
for multiple sensemakers who are distributively co-located or geographically dispersed. 
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Appendix A: Description of Insurgent Asymmetric Battlespace Variables  
Node Name Definition States (Indicators) 
Y1 Resistance and liberation from 
foreign occupation.  
y11: Resistance and liberation- liberate the 
country or region from the militarily stronger 
occupation force by engaging in asymmetric 
warfare 
y12: Law and order breakdown-Disruption of 
counterinsurgent control of the local security 
situation by limiting their ability for military 
maneuvers and restricting interaction with 
the population in stability and support 
operations. 
y13: Control of the population- Discouraging 
the local population from cooperating with 
the counterinsurgents through instability, 
chaos, conflict and fear. 
y14: Excessive force projection- provoking   
excessive raids by the counterinsurgent 
forces and use the second order effects of 
that action as a strategy for resistance 
Y2 Establishment of political 
infrastructure to legitimize the 
insurgency 
y21: Sectarian governance structures 
y22: Fundamentalist insurgent ideology based 
on radical tenets 
Y3 Control of the political space by 
the insurgent force 
y31: Political opposition to the ruling regime 
y32: Control of the security space 
y33: Disruption of civic and governance 
processes 
Y4 Promotion of fundamentalist 
ideologies 
y41: Nationalism 
y42: Sectarian  and inter-faith conflicts by 
insurgent groups 
y43: The conceptual Islamic state (Caliphate). 
X1 Ethnic and sectarian supremacy 
by the insurgent force 
x11: Sectarian identity and influence on 
insurgent mode of operation 
x12: Use of  fundamentalist ideologies such as 
Salafism as a motivating factor for some 
forms of battlespace operations 
x13: Legitimacy of the Jihad-jihad used in the 
context of armed struggle against non-
believers. 
X2 Disruption of the ability to carry 
out nation building and stability 
operations by the 
counterinsurgent forces 
x21: Local environment and feedback 
mechanisms 
x22: Operational modularity-modular 
operations make it difficult for the rigid 
counterinsurgent Techniques, Tactics and 
Procedures 
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x23:Threat forces, criminal elements and part 
time forces 
x24: Direct attacks on counterinsurgent forces  
to influence the perception of the population 
regarding capability 
X3 Exploiting  the vulnerabilities in 
the counterinsurgent force 
structure 
x31: Unbounded battlespace- the forward 
edge of the battlespace is unbounded 
introducing a complexity that supports the 
insurgents asymmetrical tactics 
x32:Techniques, tactics and procedures- 
coherent  but highly dispersed and 
decentralized command and control 
structures  
x33: Intelligence asymmetry- evolving new 
tactics that strain or defeat the 
counterinsurgent Intelligence, Surveillance 
and Reconnaissance (IS&R) assets. 
M1 Targeted assassinations and 
attacks on counterinsurgent forces 
and institutions  
m11: Security target engagement-attacks on 
military and security leaders considered hard 
targets. 
m12: Political target engagement-attacks on 
government officials, political party leaders 
and religious leaders. 
m13: Symbolic target engagement-Attacking 
symbolic or iconic targets that represent the 
best opportunities to achieve a desired 
reaction in the psychological target 
M2 Promotion of sectarian and 
religious violence 
m21: Civil war- Instability due to the second 
order effects of the sectarian and religious 
conflict 
m22: Sanctuary cities- areas where the local 
population is sympathetic to and supportive 
of the insurgent objectives 
m23: Civilian shelters- Insurgents shelter in 
mosques, shrines, and other high value 
targets as well as targets with high cultural 
impact. 
m24: Information operations-use of mass 
media and internet to disseminate 
information quickly and polarize public 
opinion. 
M3 Undermining the formation of 
legitimate government structures 
m31: Armed militias- formation of militias by 
the insurgent groups tasked with the 
responsibility to provide protection to the 
population and ensure law and order in the 
regions controlled by insurgents 
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m32: Propaganda warfare- The process of 
democratization and nation building is 
portrayed as a project of the occupying force 
and its implementation as the root cause of 
violence  
m33: Criminal networks- emergence of 
ungovernable areas outside the central 
government’s control, smuggling networks, 
or tribal or sectarian based militias 
M4 Insurgent force projection of  
military capability 
m41: Counter maneuver- employing 
unconventional means and methods to 
prolonging the conflict through a low level 
war of attrition 
m42: Foreign fighters- Linking national 
insurgencies a wider global conflict, pitting 
nation states against transnational insurgent-
terrorist networks. 
m43: Force structure- insurgent groups 
decentralize and compartmentalize to avoid 
presenting an easy massive strike target to 
the counterinsurgents. 
m44: Informal networks- networks of 
informers and sources act as reliable sources 
of actionable intelligence on 
counterinsurgent maneuvers, targets and 
locations. 
T1 High level attrition attacks by 
Insurgents 
t11: Civilian suicide bombing- A high priority 
targeted action within the military structure 
of a number of organized insurgent groups. 
t12: Remotely detonated IED- The massive 
casualty rate of this tactic makes it highly 
popular among insurgent groups. 
t13: Rocket propelled grenades: non- line of 
sight munitions give insurgents the ability to 
attack undetected, a wide target selection and 
limited engagement with counterinsurgent 
force 
T2 Low level attrition attacks by 
insurgents 
t21: Small arms attacks- A combination of 
low intensity kinetic effects, kidnappings and 
executions, usually of high value targets 
t22: Coercive threats- Threats against the 
population seen as cooperating with the 
counterinsurgent force. 
t23: Convoy ambushes- guerilla type ambush 
and disperse attacks on soft units such as 
lightly armed logistics and personnel 
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transport units 
T3 Critical infrastructure attacks by 
insurgents 
t31: Infrastructure sabotage- Sabotage of 
critical infrastructure to paralyze the 
operations of the government and disrupt 
counterinsurgent SASO operations. 
t32: Arson- Burning of houses in residential 
neighborhoods in a form of “cleansing” 
operation. A tactic widely used especially in 
the Iraqi Insurgency 
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Appendix B: Correlation Analysis of the Posterior Distributions for the Variables of Figure 19 
 
The SAS System 
 
The CORR Procedure 
4 Variables: m11 y11 x11 t32 
 
Simple Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Sum Minimum Maximum Label 
m11 7 0.51429 0.30237 3.60000 0.10000 0.90000 m11 
y11 7 0.20143 0.00900 1.41000 0.19000 0.21000 y11 
x11 7 0.42714 0.02928 2.99000 0.38000 0.46000 x11 
t32 7 0.30429 0.00535 2.13000 0.30000 0.31000 t32 
 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N = 7  
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 
  m11 y11 x11 t32 
m11 
m11 
 
1.00000 
  
 
0.97144 
0.0003 
 
0.98438 
<.0001 
 
0.88388 
0.0083 
 
y11 
y11 
 
0.97144 
0.0003 
 
1.00000 
  
 
0.96715 
0.0004 
 
0.89113 
0.0071 
 
x11 
x11 
 
0.98438 
<.0001 
 
0.96715 
0.0004 
 
1.00000 
  
 
0.83680 
0.0189 
 
t32 
t32 
 
0.88388 
0.0083 
 
0.89113 
0.0071 
 
0.83680 
0.0189 
 
1.00000 
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Appendix C: Correlation Analysis of the Posterior Distributions for the Variables of Figure 20 
 
 
The CORR Procedure 
4 Variables: x33 y22 m11 t21 
 
Simple Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Sum Minimum Maximum Label 
x33 7 0.51429 0.30237 3.60000 0.10000 0.90000 x33 
y22 7 0.39857 0.00378 2.79000 0.39000 0.40000 y22 
m11 7 0.45286 0.09394 3.17000 0.35000 0.60000 m11 
t21 7 0.40429 0.00787 2.83000 0.39000 0.41000 t21 
 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N = 7  
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 
  x33 y22 m11 t21 
x33 
x33 
 
1.00000 
  
 
-0.56250 
0.1887 
 
-0.98748 
<.0001 
 
-0.87070 
0.0108 
 
y22 
y22 
 
-0.56250 
0.1887 
 
1.00000 
  
 
0.48284 
0.2724 
 
0.80064 
0.0305 
 
m11 
m11 
 
-0.98748 
<.0001 
 
0.48284 
0.2724 
 
1.00000 
  
 
0.79249 
0.0336 
 
t21 
t21 
 
-0.87070 
0.0108 
 
0.80064 
0.0305 
 
0.79249 
0.0336 
 
1.00000 
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Appendix D: Correlation Analysis of the Posterior Distributions for the Variables of Figure 21 
 
The SAS System 
 
The CORR Procedure 
4 Variables: t32 x22 y41 m23 
 
Simple Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Sum Minimum Maximum Label 
t32 7 0.51429 0.30237 3.60000 0.10000 0.90000 t32 
x22 7 0.39714 0.00756 2.78000 0.39000 0.41000 x22 
y41 7 0.30000 0 2.10000 0.30000 0.30000 y41 
m23 7 0.27000 0.00577 1.89000 0.26000 0.28000 m23 
 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N = 7  
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 
  t32 x22 y41 m23 
t32 
t32 
 
1.00000 
  
 
-0.92708 
0.0027 
 
. 
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0.76376 
0.0457 
 
x22 
x22 
 
-0.92708 
0.0027 
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-0.76376 
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y41 
y41 
 
. 
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. 
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. 
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. 
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m23 
m23 
 
0.76376 
0.0457 
 
-0.76376 
0.0457 
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1.00000 
  
 
 
 
